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ABOUT THIS PUBLICATION
Every day public banks are developing new and innovative ways of ﬁnancing a green transfor-
mation. To illustrate how public banks can provide green ﬁnancing in a public way, this issue 
brief explores two speciﬁc and distinct examples: Costa Rica’ s BPDC (Banco Popular y de 
Desarrollo Comunal, or Bank of Popular and Community Development) and Germany’ s KfW 
(Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau, or Reconstruction Credit Institute). Much of the information 
provided on the BPDC and KfW draws from primary resources, including the banks’ annual 
reports. The case of BPDC beneﬁts from a series of conﬁdential interviews undertaken in Costa 
Rica in April 2017.
The looming energy 
transformation and the potential 
of public banks
Today the energy transformation debate goes 
hand-in-hand with global demands for new 
infrastructure, estimated to be in the range of 
US$90 trillion.3 Ideally for mainstream authorities 
like the World Bank, this new infrastructure should 
be low-carbon and climate resilient. Their ﬁrst 
problem, however, is how to actually ﬁnance this 
new infrastructure, be it green or otherwise. The 
hoped-for private sources of capital have simply 
not materialized. This is not for lack of resources 
but because ﬁnanciers prefer shorter term, lower 
risk, and more conventional investments (EPSC 
2017; Financial Times 2016).
Rather than absorbing the investment risks 
themselves, private investors want public banks to 
invest with them in new infrastructural projects. 
That is, the private sector wants public banks and 
public ﬁnance to ‘wrap’ green infrastructure 
projects in public guarantees so as to socialize the 
risks while allowing the privatisation of the returns 
(see Levy 2017). The IFIs appear all too eager to 
comply. Public banks, once the bugbears of most 
international development institutions, now seem 
to oﬀer the ﬁnancial panacea (OECD 2016). 
Instead of investing themselves, according to this 
narrative, public banks should help leverage 
private capital investment.
The idea has become popular. As stated in the 
2015 UN Addis Ababa Financing for Development 
Report: “We note the role that well-functioning 
national and regional development banks can play 
in ﬁnancing sustainable development” (2015, 
13-14; emphasis added). Yet mainstream under-
standings of a ‘well-functioning’ public bank share 
little with the needs of energy democracy – 
focused, as they are, on securing higher and more 
stable returns on investment for private investors. 
This trajectory will mean the further subordina-
tion of the environment to corporate ﬁnancial 
ends. Alternative, progressive and collective 
eﬀorts are needed to stem the private capture of 
public banks. The payoﬀ of such a campaign could 
be substantial for energy democracy.
There is context to this public bank resurgence. 
Despite 40 years of neoliberal privatisation eﬀorts, 
public banks remain major actors at the global, 
regional, national and provincial levels. There are 
today 586 ‘public’ banks spanning the globe, and 
their combined resources are massive. Public 
banks account for a quarter of all banking assets, 
worth some $35 trillion – an amount equal to 46 
per cent of global GDP (Orbis 2017; World Bank 
2013). Public banks often embody important 
cultural and historical legacies. Governments and 
communities have long relied on public banks to 
channel ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial support to 
development initiatives (Schmit et al. 2011). This is 
not to say that public banks are without problems 
and challenges, but often the negative charges 
levelled against public banks are more ideological-
ly driven than evidence-based (Marois 2013). 
There is real potential for public banks to lead and 
support popular struggles for green transforma-
tion and energy democracy.
Financing the green 
transformation: Costa Rica’s BPDC 
and Germany’s KfW
Every day public banks are developing new and 
innovative ways of ﬁnancing a green transforma-
tion. To illustrate how public banks can provide 
green ﬁnancing in a public way, this issue brief 
explores two speciﬁc and distinct examples: Costa 
Rica’s BPDC (Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comu-
nal, or Bank of Popular and Community Develop-
ment) and Germany’s KfW (Kreditanstalt für Wieder-
aufbau, or Reconstruction Credit Institute). Much 
of the information provided on the BPDC and KfW 
draws from primary resources, including the 
banks’ annual reports. The case of BPDC beneﬁts 
from a series of conﬁdential interviews undertak-
en in Costa Rica in April 2017.
Before proceeding it is important to specify the 
intent and scope of this issue brief. First and 
foremost, the intent is not to uncritically advocate 
either the BPDC or the KfW as ideal models of 
public banks. Rather, the issue brief intends to 
draw out positive and promising elements of each 
bank’s green operations and public ethos. It 
follows that the scope of the exercise does not 
extend to a full analysis of these banks. Neither 
bank is perfect; both can be improved. By compar-
ing diﬀerent cases, however, the issue brief 
intends to signal where improvements might be 
made. For example, the KfW could be more 
democratic a la BPDC and the BPDC could have a 
stronger green lending portfolio a la KfW. In short, 
there is something interesting, if imperfect, going 
on in each public bank that is signiﬁcant for 
energy democracy struggles.
or all but the most hard core of climate change deniers, the environmental challenge before us is real 
and substantial. We must transition from our current carbon-intensive and environmentally destruc-
tive regime to a low-carbon, environmentally resilient one. On this point, mainstream and radical perspec-
tives converge. Divergence appears when discussing the nature and extent of change needed. Mainstream 
commentators focus on technical ﬁxes and market-friendly mechanisms. Critics, radical scholars, activists, 
and civil society organisations argue for a more substantive socioeconomic transformation process.
Colleagues from the Transnational Institute capture the popular desire for more substantive environmental 
change in the concept of ‘energy democracy’ , which has emerged out of activist and community struggles.1 
Struggles for energy democracy demand more decentralized and socially controlled energy systems, which 
may be realized as smaller scale local initiatives provided by cooperatives and community associations or as 
larger scale initiatives provided by reclaimed public municipal and state-owned providers. The lynchpin 
remains the substantive democratisation of energy generation and distribution based on renewables.
For many, the struggle for energy democracy is a necessary one. But alone it is also insuﬃcient. Any green 
transformation must also be ﬁnanced. And if the ﬁnancing required does not share the same societal or 
public interest orientation then the struggles for green transformation are likely to be stillborn. Money may 
trump even the best of intentions. Public and ‘public-like’ cooperative banks may therefore hold the key to 
the future of a just global green transformation and energy democracy.2
The current global context is favourable to raise the potential for public banks to support a green energy 
transition because the 2015 UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and Paris Agreement on climate 
change (COP21) both stress the need for investment in sustainable infrastructure. “Sustainable” in this con-
text is intended to align new infrastructure with the requirement of keeping climate change “well below” 
2° C (while also delivering on “development” , which will be a major challenge). An estimated US$5-7 trillion 
per year is needed to realize the SDGs (UNEP 2015). To date, the international ﬁnancial institutions (IFIs), 
such as the World Bank, have done relatively little ﬁnancing in this direction
F
As a promotional bank, KfW supports change and 
encourages forward-looking ideas – in Germany, 
Europe and throughout the world.
Banco Popular serves the social and 
sustainable welfare of Costa Rican 
inhabitants.
Mission
Developmental/Promotional Universal (commercial and develop-
mental)
Type of Bank
Federal Republic of Germany 80%; German federal 
states 20%.
Workers of Costa RicaOwnership
US$545 billion US$5.4 billionTotal Assets
US$1.4 billion US$68 millionNet Income
4,767 4,269 (in 2015)No. of Employees
80 oﬃces (no branch network) 103No. of Branches
KfW BPDC
Table 1. KfW and BPDC at a glance, 2016 (USD)
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hand-in-hand with global demands for new 
infrastructure, estimated to be in the range of 
US$90 trillion.3 Ideally for mainstream authorities 
like the World Bank, this new infrastructure should 
be low-carbon and climate resilient. Their ﬁrst 
problem, however, is how to actually ﬁnance this 
new infrastructure, be it green or otherwise. The 
hoped-for private sources of capital have simply 
not materialized. This is not for lack of resources 
but because ﬁnanciers prefer shorter term, lower 
risk, and more conventional investments (EPSC 
2017; Financial Times 2016).
Rather than absorbing the investment risks 
themselves, private investors want public banks to 
invest with them in new infrastructural projects. 
That is, the private sector wants public banks and 
public ﬁnance to ‘wrap’ green infrastructure 
projects in public guarantees so as to socialize the 
risks while allowing the privatisation of the returns 
(see Levy 2017). The IFIs appear all too eager to 
comply. Public banks, once the bugbears of most 
international development institutions, now seem 
to oﬀer the ﬁnancial panacea (OECD 2016). 
Instead of investing themselves, according to this 
narrative, public banks should help leverage 
private capital investment.
The idea has become popular. As stated in the 
2015 UN Addis Ababa Financing for Development 
Report: “We note the role that well-functioning 
national and regional development banks can play 
in ﬁnancing sustainable development” (2015, 
13-14; emphasis added). Yet mainstream under-
standings of a ‘well-functioning’ public bank share 
little with the needs of energy democracy – 
focused, as they are, on securing higher and more 
stable returns on investment for private investors. 
This trajectory will mean the further subordina-
tion of the environment to corporate ﬁnancial 
ends. Alternative, progressive and collective 
eﬀorts are needed to stem the private capture of 
public banks. The payoﬀ of such a campaign could 
be substantial for energy democracy.
There is context to this public bank resurgence. 
Despite 40 years of neoliberal privatisation eﬀorts, 
public banks remain major actors at the global, 
regional, national and provincial levels. There are 
today 586 ‘public’ banks spanning the globe, and 
their combined resources are massive. Public 
banks account for a quarter of all banking assets, 
worth some $35 trillion – an amount equal to 46 
per cent of global GDP (Orbis 2017; World Bank 
2013). Public banks often embody important 
cultural and historical legacies. Governments and 
communities have long relied on public banks to 
channel ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial support to 
development initiatives (Schmit et al. 2011). This is 
not to say that public banks are without problems 
and challenges, but often the negative charges 
levelled against public banks are more ideological-
ly driven than evidence-based (Marois 2013). 
There is real potential for public banks to lead and 
support popular struggles for green transforma-
tion and energy democracy.
Financing the green 
transformation: Costa Rica’s BPDC 
and Germany’s KfW
Every day public banks are developing new and 
innovative ways of ﬁnancing a green transforma-
tion. To illustrate how public banks can provide 
green ﬁnancing in a public way, this issue brief 
explores two speciﬁc and distinct examples: Costa 
Rica’s BPDC (Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comu-
nal, or Bank of Popular and Community Develop-
ment) and Germany’s KfW (Kreditanstalt für Wieder-
aufbau, or Reconstruction Credit Institute). Much 
of the information provided on the BPDC and KfW 
draws from primary resources, including the 
banks’ annual reports. The case of BPDC beneﬁts 
from a series of conﬁdential interviews undertak-
en in Costa Rica in April 2017.
Before proceeding it is important to specify the 
intent and scope of this issue brief. First and 
foremost, the intent is not to uncritically advocate 
either the BPDC or the KfW as ideal models of 
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follows that the scope of the exercise does not 
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Costa Rica’s BPDC
The BPDC is a public-like bank that is legally 
owned by the workers of Costa Rica.4 Control of 
the bank, however, is exercised both by worker 
and government representatives. The Govern-
ment of Costa Rica created the BPDC in 1969 to 
promote development and to oﬀer economic 
protection for the country’s workers. Established 
under special law, the BPDC is deﬁned as a 
non-state but public institution that is 100 per 
cent owned by the workers of Costa Rica (BPDC 
2012, 7). A worker’s right to share ownership is 
dependent on having a mandatory savings 
account for at least one year.
The BPDC’s overarching mission is to serve the 
social and sustainable welfare of Costa Ricans 
(BPDC 2015, 15). In 2010, a nationwide 
consultative process gave rise to ﬁve new 
‘Guidelines’ for the Workers’ Assembly:
1. The promotion of the social economy;
2. A quality oﬀering of services by the   
 Conglomerate;
3. The competitive management of the   
 institution;
4. Regional and local development; and
5. The conglomerate as an entity for   
 development.5
Three strategic axes further guide banking 
decisions: gender equity, accessibility and 
environmental responsibility.
The BPDC’s governance model (i.e. control of 
strategic decision-making) is impressive, repre-
senting perhaps the most democratic bank in the 
world. The highest governing body of the BPDC is 
the Assembly of Workers (Asamblea de los Traba-
jadores y Trabajadoras). While not initially mandat-
ed in law, legal changes in 1986 established the 
Workers’ Assembly as the peak of the bank’s 
governance. As of late 2016, the Workers’ Assem-
bly represents nearly 1.2 million savers (BPDC 
2017, 13). That is about 20 per cent of the popula-
tion! Operationally, the Workers’ Assembly itself is 
constituted by 290 individual representatives from 
10 social and economic sectors in Costa Rica 
(artisanal; communal; cooperative; self-managed; 
independent; teachers; professional; confederated 
syndicates; non-confederated and solidarity 
syndicates).
Unlike examples of successful European cooper-
ative banks that are often locally or regionally 
focused, the BPDC is national (see Kalmi 2012). 
This geographical spread can create challenges of 
representation, solidarity and political will to 
sustain the cooperative model. That said, BPDC 
has explicit and formal links to the 10 social 
sectors, which are themselves founded on a 
strong historical tradition of solidarity and cooper-
ative development in Costa Rica. Through its 
lending, the bank strengthens these sectors.
Democratizing finance: 
The BPDC way
To inform a new direction for the BPDC in 
promoting the social economy, the bank’s Nation-
al Board of Directors organized a series of nation-
wide forums. The BPDC social sector leaders in 
the Workers’ Assembly and senior management 
participated in the forums, which connected with 
nearly 1,500 participants across Costa Rica’s 11 
diﬀerent regions. The results have shaped the 
future of the bank (BPDC 2015, 25).
While worker-owners provide strategic direction 
to the BPDC through the Assembly, eﬀective 
control over daily operations is exercised by the 
National Board of Directors, which is the bank’s 
highest administrative unit. The bank’s Board of 
Directors is composed of seven members: four 
represent the Assembly and three, the Govern-
ment. Presently, there are four women and three 
men on the Board, fulﬁlling the requirement that 
it be at least half women. This has earned the 
BPDC an important marker of democratisation, 
namely that it became the ﬁrst public organisation 
in Central America to establish at least 50 per cent 
of women in their decision-making bodies (BPDC 
2017, 13).
The operational strategy of the BPDC reﬂects its 
status as a universal bank (which combines retail 
commercial and developmental functions) and its 
mission to serve the working class of Costa Rica. 
Target clients include workers, peasants, and 
micro-, small- and medium-sized enterprises 
(MSMEs) as well as communal, cooperative and 
municipal development associations. This is 
signiﬁcant: the BPDC prioritizes working with 
cooperatives and public institutions, as well as 
with those people typically excluded from ﬁnan-
cial services. This is qualitatively diﬀerent from the 
bulk of corporative private banks.
The BPDC approach to ﬁnancial sustainability is 
much broader than maximizing returns. Rather, as 
directed by the Workers’ Assembly, the BPDC now 
operates according to what it refers to as a triple 
bottom-line: the economic; the environmental; 
and the social (BPDC 2012, 21). That is, the envi-
ronmental and social good is placed alongside a 
need to generate positive ﬁnancial returns within 
the bank – another qualitative diﬀerence from 
typical private banks.
Unlike strictly public banks, however, the Costa 
Rican government does not explicitly guarantee 
the BPDC. Nevertheless, BPDC experts suggest 
that the bank beneﬁts from implicit state backing. 
That is, most people believe that the BPDC has 
state backing and that, should push come to 
shove and the BPDC face economic troubles, it 
would receive state support. This, together with 
the fact that the bank is founded according to a 
speciﬁc public law (unlike private banks) and thus 
operates according to that law, supports the bank’ 
s credit rating and societal trust in the bank. In 
short, the BPDC has the conﬁdence of markets 
and of the people.
A middle road between profits 
and social lending?
As a universal bank, the BPDC oﬀers a wide 
variety of lending and ﬁnancial services. Since 
2000, it too has grown into a larger ﬁnancial 
conglomerate (and the third largest bank in Costa 
Rica) that incorporates not only its commercial 
and development banking services, but also 
pension, stock market, investment and insurance 
services.
Its banking division is separated into three areas: 
personal banking (Banca de Persona); business and 
corporate banking (Banca Empresarial y Corporati-
va); and social development banking (Banca de 
Desarrollo Social). Notably, 25 per cent of the 
entire BPDC Conglomerate’s returns are chan-
nelled into a series of ‘special funds’, which are 
explicitly intended to meet the social needs of 
those typically excluded from the banking system 
in Costa Rica (BPDC 2017, 58).
The BPDC returns are nonetheless in line with 
other universal banks in developing countries, 
averaging around 1.5 per cent return on assets in 
the last few years. In simple terms, that is at least 
50 per cent more earnings than your average 
private bank (e.g. HSBC or Citibank) in the US or 
Europe.
Conﬁdential interviews with BPDC personnel 
reveal insights into its daily operations. In the past, 
generating returns via commercial activities was 
less important, but since the late 1990s it became 
more signiﬁcant, even overarching. Proﬁts began 
to override its worker-oriented mandate. However, 
more recently, the Workers’ Assembly has 
demanded a return to the bank’s core mandate 
and to servicing the social economy.
These changes experienced in the BPDC opera-
tions have created an interesting situation. The 
ﬁnancial returns now generated by the more 
commercial-oriented operations are seen by some 
personnel as enabling the bank’s other concession-
ary lending (meaning not-for-proﬁt, discounted, or 
made cheaper in one way or another) pro-
grammes (such as the ‘Social Development Bank’). 
Others, however, argue that the whole banking 
operation should be geared towards more social 
and concessionary lending. Presently, the BPDC 
has taken a middle road between proﬁts and 
social lending, with an aim to enhancing the social 
economic and environmental role of the BPDC.
How BPDC is linked to the 
working class and the public 
sector
It should be noted that a deﬁning characteristic 
of the bank derives from a unique source of 
capital, which is linked to the workers of Costa 
Rica. Article 5 of the BPDC Law states that all 
public and private employers must contribute 0.5 
per cent of paid monthly wages to the bank’s 
capital base. Additionally, workers must contrib-
ute 1 per cent of their monthly wages. These 
contributions (or ‘obligatory savings’) are deduct-
ed by the employer and deposited in the BPDC. 
After a year, 1.25 per cent of these savings are 
transferred to each worker’s own pension fund. 
The BPDC, for its part, gets to hold onto the other 
0.25 per cent as a means of permanent capitalisa-
tion. This feature provides economic stability to 
the bank, and infuses a sense of publicness into 
the capital resources held by the bank.
The BPDC is also shaped by its unique links to 
Costa Rica’s public sphere. The BPDC accepts over 
40 per cent of the public sector payroll deposits 
(BPDC 2012, 42). In addition, and unlike private 
banks, the BPDC – because it is governed under 
public law – is not required to hold capital reserves 
in the central bank. This frees up capital for 
lending. Additionally, the BPDC relies on long-term 
deposits and loans from other publicly owned 
development banks to support its own lending 
operations. In this way, the BPDC has a diversity of 
sources of capital that, moreover, inextricably link 
the BPDC to the working class and to the public 
sector. In interviews with BPDC senior managers, 
the bank’s historic ties to workers and the public 
sphere were clearly recognized and celebrated as 
important and unique characteristics of the bank’s 
history and operating ethos.
In response to its deepening environmental 
direction, the BPDC has developed specialty green 
lending facilities, such as the Eco-savings and 
Eco-credits, geared speciﬁcally towards MSME 
projects in which the environment is a key 
element of the project. In 2017 for example, the 
BPDC, in collaboration with a local provider, 
launched a programme to purchase and install 
solar energy panels in residential settings.
As another part of its developmental mandate, 
the BPDC supports local communal associations 
in the provisioning of sustainable, safe local water 
supply systems (ASADAS). According to one local 
BPDC manager: “The BPDC is doing training and 
supporting ASADAS to help them run better, more 
sustainably”.6 This type of assistance too must be 
considered green and sustainable lending.
The BPDC has begun to produce annual Sustain-
ability Reports, which follow the Global Reporting 
Initiative7 guidelines. The bank now tracks its own 
consumption of energy and can more concretely 
strategize around reducing its own carbon impact. 
The Pensions division, for example, has been 
certiﬁed as ‘carbon neutral’ for the last four years 
and been awarded a Five-Star climate change 
award three years running (BPDC 2017, 72). In the 
words of the BPDC: “In environmental matters we 
are promoting green products, accountability and 
the incorporation of this theme throughout the 
chain of value” (2017, 68).
Spotlight on financing energy 
democracy: The BPDC and 
COOPELESCA
“In this case, the community is socializing the 
responsibility of taking care of the environ-
ment” (author interview with BPDC Employee 
in Business Management, San Carlos, Costa 
Rica, 7 April 2017)
In the central valley of Costa Rica, an important 
strategic ‘green’ alliance exists between the BPDC 
and a regional energy cooperative, COOPELESCA.8 
COOPELESCA was formed in 1965 and began 
distributing energy in 1969. Today, the coopera-
tive supplies about 10 per cent of Costa Rica’s 
energy and it is doing so sustainably. In 2013, the 
Costa Rican government certiﬁed the cooperative 
as “Carbon Neutral”, giving COOPELESCA the 
distinction of being the ﬁrst energy distributor in 
Latin America to achieve this certiﬁcation. By 2015, 
COOPELESCA was able to fully oﬀset its carbon 
footprint by using its own resources and through 
its own environmental initiatives.
COOPELESCA environmental policy
COOPELESCA expresses its commitment to 
systematically avoid, mitigate and compen-
sate for negative environmental impacts and 
to optimize the positive environmental 
impacts derived from its economic and social 
projects.
Two examples show how the BPDC has facilitated 
the ‘greening’ of COOPELESCA, and by extension, 
its community. First, the BPDC ﬁnanced the 
conversion of all lighting within COOPELESCA to 
low-energy LED. Together with the energy coopera-
tive, local BPDC staﬀ analyzed the potential cost 
savings from the switch, and then granted a 
low-cost loan based on these savings. The switch 
to LED contributed to gaining carbon neutral 
certiﬁcation, and even continues to provide 
COOPELESCA additional cost reductions beyond 
the cost of ﬁnancing.
Second, the BPDC ﬁnanced a COOPELESCA 
initiative to purchase land for conservation purpos-
es. Beginning in 2009, the community of San 
Carlos recognized that the border areas of the 
Juan Castro Blanco National Park were at risk of 
over-exploitation by local farmers. This, in turn, 
jeopardized the valley’s clean water supply. In 
response to a broad-based community preserva-
tion initiative, the Associates’ Assembly of 
COOPELESCA decided to purchase land in order to 
help preserve the park's natural water resources, 
biodiversity, air, soil and scenic beauty. Coopera-
tive members raised US$1 million in funds, and 
with this approached the BPDC for an additional 
$2 million-loan at not-for-proﬁt concessional rates. 
This collaboration enabled COOPELESCA to pur-
chase and protect 1,124.7 hectares in the national 
park. COOPELESCA workers maintain and protect 
the forest, and the cooperative is developing 
research collaborations with public universities to 
support student environmental and biodiversity 
programming in the reclaimed areas. The farmers 
who sold their land to COOPELESCA have moved 
on, but there remain more areas within the park in 
need of reclaiming for the ecological and common 
good of the community.
In summary, the BPDC exempliﬁes a large, nation-
al, universal, public-like cooperative bank that also 
has a long history and signiﬁcant lending capacity 
in Costa Rica. Its governance model of ownership 
and control is substantially democratic insofar as it 
represents broad sections of Costa Rican society 
and government. Uniquely, the bank is unmistak-
ably oriented towards serving the needs of workers 
and the poor in Costa Rica. Over the last ﬁve to 10 
years, the BPDC has taken signiﬁcant steps towards 
internalizing environmental (and gender equity) 
goals into its operations. Initial interviews suggest 
that BPDC personnel deeply share this vision.
Still, there is room for improvement. In terms of 
ownership and eﬀective control, at times it seems 
the government can exercise deciding inﬂuence. 
Should workers assume complete governing 
control? What if workers decided to privatize the 
BPDC, would this be in the public interest? The 
issue remains open to debate in Costa Rica. In 
terms of the bank’s green proﬁle, it is certainly 
orienting operations in this direction. Yet the 
BPDC does not systematically measure the impact 
or levels of green lending programmes. Conse-
quently, what the balance of environmental versus 
regular lending is remains unknown. As with most 
public banks today, it is important to work 
towards substantively greening the bank from 
start to ﬁnish, so that lending in one area does not 
oﬀset the green lending in another. This is espe-
cially important when trying to ﬁnd the balance 
between concessional and non-concessional 
lending, or between generating returns and 
maximizing social and environmental impacts. 
There is much to commend the BPDC for, not least 
of which as a strong example of ﬁnancial democra-
tisation and mobilisation of public capital, but it is 
not perfect and there is work yet to be done.
Germany’s KfW: A global 
developmental juggernaut
Germany’s KfW is quite a diﬀerent bank from the 
BPDC. It is a fully public or state-owned and 
controlled development bank (‘promotional’ bank 
in European terms), whose existence is also 
inscribed in public law. Ownership rests with the 
Federal Republic of Germany, which holds 80 per 
cent of KfW shares, and the German federal states, 
which hold 20 per cent. While today the KfW aims 
for the “sustainable improvement of the economic, 
social, and ecological conditions of people’s lives”, 
the bank was born out of post-WWII reconstruc-
tion eﬀorts (founded in 1948).9 The German 
government decided to create a bank to manage 
the incoming Marshall Plan reconstruction funds, 
rather than directly spending the money.
The decision had foresight. Since then, the KfW 
has grown to be one of the largest national 
development banks in the world. Many scholars 
cite KfW as a good example of a public develop-
ment bank that is also ‘green’ (Griﬃth-Jones 2016). 
Yet no public bank should be idealized, and the 
KfW has its problems. Dramatically, the KfW and 
its subsidiary, the IKB (Industriekreditbank), got 
deeply embroiled in the 2008-09 global ﬁnancial 
crisis. The IKB wanted a new source of returns, 
and the subprime mortgage mania seemed to be 
the answer. Yet when the crash hit the conse-
quences cost it dearly (and the KfW by extension). 
When market logics begin to drive public sector 
decisions, this is often the consequence. Social 
forces must actively ensure that public banks are 
run transparently and democratically in the public, 
not private, interest.
The KfW nevertheless has a solid, if imperfect, 
governance structure. At base, it enables the 
representation of German government and 
society within the bank (KfW 2015, 174-6). This is 
not the case for every public bank. The KfW’s 
shareholders (i.e. the government) are represent-
ed by the Board of Supervisory Directors, which 
functions as a general shareholders’ forum (KfW 
2015, 179). The Federal Minister of Finance and 
Federal Minister for Economic Aﬀairs and Energy 
hold the Chair and Deputy Chair positions in 
alternation. The Board is composed of 37 addition-
al members from across German society. These 
members include federal ministers speciﬁed in 
the Law Concerning KfW; members appointed by 
the legislative branch of government, the Bunde-
stag and Bundesrat; representatives of banks and 
savings banks; and representatives of industry, 
the municipalities, agriculture, commerce, handi-
crafts, housing and the trade unions. Transparen-
cy is maintained by the KfW Executive and Supervi-
sory Boards being subject to the Public Corporate 
Governance Code, and the KfW is required to have 
its annual ﬁnancial statements audited by an 
independent auditor.
Over the decades, KfW has built up substantial 
lending capacity that has become increasingly 
green in orientation. In 2016, new lending amount-
ed to €81 billion while 44 per cent of this lending 
(over €35 billion) was dedicated to environmental 
and climate protection projects (KfW 2017, 2). 
Importantly, the KfW does not strive to maximize 
returns but instead to oﬀer low-interest loans. Its 
returns, therefore, are well below that of the 
private sector’s average. This is not a problem, 
though, because KfW excels at fulﬁlling its man-
date of supplying low-interest loans and grants. 
That is its underlying rationale.
The operational strategies of KfW are diverse and 
complex given its large size and scope of business. 
The KfW has four banking divisions separated 
along domestically and internationally oriented 
operations (KfW 2016, 2). For domestic-oriented 
lending, which constitutes about two thirds of 
lending, the SME Bank (Mittelstandsbank) supports 
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), 
business start-ups and other commercial clients. 
The Municipal and Private Client Bank (Kommunal- 
und Privatkundenbank/Kreditinstitute) provides 
private ﬁnancing for housing, education, and 
climate or environmental protection and public 
funding for municipal infrastructure and regional 
development banks (see Box 2 below). For interna-
tionally oriented lending, which is about a third of 
lending, the KfW IPEX-Bank supports international 
export and project ﬁnance. The KfW Development 
Bank (DEG) supports developing and transition 
countries. In October 2012, KfW opened a ﬁfth 
charitable division, the KfW Stiftung, as an indepen-
dent non-proﬁt foundation operating under the 
banners of responsible entrepreneurship; social 
commitment; environment and climate; art and 
culture (KfW 2015a, 13-14).
Unlike commercial banks like the HSBC or 
Citibank, development banks like the KfW do not 
accept personal deposits or lend directly to 
individuals. The KfW lends directly to other banks, 
municipalities and developing country govern-
ments. And, instead of accepting individual 
deposits, the KfW draws in capital from ﬁnancial 
markets and then lends on to various banking 
intermediaries, institutions and organisations that 
have more direct access and contact with individu-
al customers. One beneﬁt of oﬃcial state owner-
ship for the KfW is that it comes with an explicit 
sovereign guarantee, which supports the KfW’s 
very strong credit rating (S&P AAA). This enables 
the KfW to access market-based funds at cheaper 
rates of interest, and pass these savings along.
The KfW can fund projects alone or in collabora-
tion with other funders and donors. The types of 
ﬁnancial instruments used vary across the divi-
sions, but include:
Grants: ﬁnancing provided exclusively from 
German Federal Government budget funds, 
which does not have to be repaid.
Standard loans: subsidized loans from federal 
budget funds that have to be repaid by the 
borrower.
Development loans: a combination of federal 
budget funds and funds that KfW raises on the 
capital market. Combining funds enables the 
loan terms and conditions to be adjusted to the 
economic strength of the borrower country and 
features of the project.
Promotional loans: loans to partners in devel-
oping countries as mandated by the Federal 
Government. The loans are used for projects 
that have a development impact, but for which 
ﬁnancing via the commercial banking sector 
alone is not oﬀered (e.g. due to the longer 
ﬁnancing period necessary).
Oﬃcial donations: KfW may also accept funds 
from other donors.
Green bonds: for investors who place high value 
on sustainable investment.
The funding of projects may be not-for-proﬁt 
(concessional) or at market rates (non-concession-
al). Research suggests that the KfW tends to prefer 
‘promotional loans with subsidized credits’, that is, 
programme-tied loans that explicitly target govern-
ment-determined priority projects geared towards 
overcoming society’s grand challenges, such as 
climate change (Mazzucato and Penna 2015). In 
this way, KfW funds can help to promote the 
public interest.
Green lending ﬁgures prominently in the KfW, 
which has adopted a strong focus on renewable 
energy development (KfW 2015, 18). Notably, 
KfW’s green activities have been guided by a series 
of legal and governmental initiatives undertaken 
in Germany society since 2000, notably the Renew-
able Energy Act (2000); the Integrated Energy and 
Climate Programme (2007); the Climate Initiative 
(2008); and the Energy Initiative (2010). These 
public policy initiatives provide important context 
for why the KfW has committed 44 per cent of all 
lending to green, environmental and low-carbon 
projects.
Costa Rica’s BPDC
The BPDC is a public-like bank that is legally 
owned by the workers of Costa Rica.4 Control of 
the bank, however, is exercised both by worker 
and government representatives. The Govern-
ment of Costa Rica created the BPDC in 1969 to 
promote development and to oﬀer economic 
protection for the country’s workers. Established 
under special law, the BPDC is deﬁned as a 
non-state but public institution that is 100 per 
cent owned by the workers of Costa Rica (BPDC 
2012, 7). A worker’s right to share ownership is 
dependent on having a mandatory savings 
account for at least one year.
The BPDC’s overarching mission is to serve the 
social and sustainable welfare of Costa Ricans 
(BPDC 2015, 15). In 2010, a nationwide 
consultative process gave rise to ﬁve new 
‘Guidelines’ for the Workers’ Assembly:
1. The promotion of the social economy;
2. A quality oﬀering of services by the   
 Conglomerate;
3. The competitive management of the   
 institution;
4. Regional and local development; and
5. The conglomerate as an entity for   
 development.5
Three strategic axes further guide banking 
decisions: gender equity, accessibility and 
environmental responsibility.
The BPDC’s governance model (i.e. control of 
strategic decision-making) is impressive, repre-
senting perhaps the most democratic bank in the 
world. The highest governing body of the BPDC is 
the Assembly of Workers (Asamblea de los Traba-
jadores y Trabajadoras). While not initially mandat-
ed in law, legal changes in 1986 established the 
Workers’ Assembly as the peak of the bank’s 
governance. As of late 2016, the Workers’ Assem-
bly represents nearly 1.2 million savers (BPDC 
2017, 13). That is about 20 per cent of the popula-
tion! Operationally, the Workers’ Assembly itself is 
constituted by 290 individual representatives from 
10 social and economic sectors in Costa Rica 
(artisanal; communal; cooperative; self-managed; 
independent; teachers; professional; confederated 
syndicates; non-confederated and solidarity 
syndicates).
Unlike examples of successful European cooper-
ative banks that are often locally or regionally 
focused, the BPDC is national (see Kalmi 2012). 
This geographical spread can create challenges of 
representation, solidarity and political will to 
sustain the cooperative model. That said, BPDC 
has explicit and formal links to the 10 social 
sectors, which are themselves founded on a 
strong historical tradition of solidarity and cooper-
ative development in Costa Rica. Through its 
lending, the bank strengthens these sectors.
Democratizing finance: 
The BPDC way
To inform a new direction for the BPDC in 
promoting the social economy, the bank’s Nation-
al Board of Directors organized a series of nation-
wide forums. The BPDC social sector leaders in 
the Workers’ Assembly and senior management 
participated in the forums, which connected with 
nearly 1,500 participants across Costa Rica’s 11 
diﬀerent regions. The results have shaped the 
future of the bank (BPDC 2015, 25).
While worker-owners provide strategic direction 
to the BPDC through the Assembly, eﬀective 
control over daily operations is exercised by the 
National Board of Directors, which is the bank’s 
highest administrative unit. The bank’s Board of 
Directors is composed of seven members: four 
represent the Assembly and three, the Govern-
ment. Presently, there are four women and three 
men on the Board, fulﬁlling the requirement that 
it be at least half women. This has earned the 
BPDC an important marker of democratisation, 
namely that it became the ﬁrst public organisation 
in Central America to establish at least 50 per cent 
of women in their decision-making bodies (BPDC 
2017, 13).
The operational strategy of the BPDC reﬂects its 
status as a universal bank (which combines retail 
commercial and developmental functions) and its 
mission to serve the working class of Costa Rica. 
Target clients include workers, peasants, and 
micro-, small- and medium-sized enterprises 
(MSMEs) as well as communal, cooperative and 
municipal development associations. This is 
signiﬁcant: the BPDC prioritizes working with 
cooperatives and public institutions, as well as 
with those people typically excluded from ﬁnan-
cial services. This is qualitatively diﬀerent from the 
bulk of corporative private banks.
The BPDC approach to ﬁnancial sustainability is 
much broader than maximizing returns. Rather, as 
directed by the Workers’ Assembly, the BPDC now 
operates according to what it refers to as a triple 
bottom-line: the economic; the environmental; 
and the social (BPDC 2012, 21). That is, the envi-
ronmental and social good is placed alongside a 
need to generate positive ﬁnancial returns within 
the bank – another qualitative diﬀerence from 
typical private banks.
Unlike strictly public banks, however, the Costa 
Rican government does not explicitly guarantee 
the BPDC. Nevertheless, BPDC experts suggest 
that the bank beneﬁts from implicit state backing. 
That is, most people believe that the BPDC has 
state backing and that, should push come to 
shove and the BPDC face economic troubles, it 
would receive state support. This, together with 
the fact that the bank is founded according to a 
speciﬁc public law (unlike private banks) and thus 
operates according to that law, supports the bank’ 
s credit rating and societal trust in the bank. In 
short, the BPDC has the conﬁdence of markets 
and of the people.
A middle road between profits 
and social lending?
As a universal bank, the BPDC oﬀers a wide 
variety of lending and ﬁnancial services. Since 
2000, it too has grown into a larger ﬁnancial 
conglomerate (and the third largest bank in Costa 
Rica) that incorporates not only its commercial 
and development banking services, but also 
pension, stock market, investment and insurance 
services.
Its banking division is separated into three areas: 
personal banking (Banca de Persona); business and 
corporate banking (Banca Empresarial y Corporati-
va); and social development banking (Banca de 
Desarrollo Social). Notably, 25 per cent of the 
entire BPDC Conglomerate’s returns are chan-
nelled into a series of ‘special funds’, which are 
explicitly intended to meet the social needs of 
those typically excluded from the banking system 
in Costa Rica (BPDC 2017, 58).
The BPDC returns are nonetheless in line with 
other universal banks in developing countries, 
averaging around 1.5 per cent return on assets in 
the last few years. In simple terms, that is at least 
50 per cent more earnings than your average 
private bank (e.g. HSBC or Citibank) in the US or 
Europe.
Conﬁdential interviews with BPDC personnel 
reveal insights into its daily operations. In the past, 
generating returns via commercial activities was 
less important, but since the late 1990s it became 
more signiﬁcant, even overarching. Proﬁts began 
to override its worker-oriented mandate. However, 
more recently, the Workers’ Assembly has 
demanded a return to the bank’s core mandate 
and to servicing the social economy.
These changes experienced in the BPDC opera-
tions have created an interesting situation. The 
ﬁnancial returns now generated by the more 
commercial-oriented operations are seen by some 
personnel as enabling the bank’s other concession-
ary lending (meaning not-for-proﬁt, discounted, or 
made cheaper in one way or another) pro-
grammes (such as the ‘Social Development Bank’). 
Others, however, argue that the whole banking 
operation should be geared towards more social 
and concessionary lending. Presently, the BPDC 
has taken a middle road between proﬁts and 
social lending, with an aim to enhancing the social 
economic and environmental role of the BPDC.
How BPDC is linked to the 
working class and the public 
sector
It should be noted that a deﬁning characteristic 
of the bank derives from a unique source of 
capital, which is linked to the workers of Costa 
Rica. Article 5 of the BPDC Law states that all 
public and private employers must contribute 0.5 
per cent of paid monthly wages to the bank’s 
capital base. Additionally, workers must contrib-
ute 1 per cent of their monthly wages. These 
contributions (or ‘obligatory savings’) are deduct-
ed by the employer and deposited in the BPDC. 
After a year, 1.25 per cent of these savings are 
transferred to each worker’s own pension fund. 
The BPDC, for its part, gets to hold onto the other 
0.25 per cent as a means of permanent capitalisa-
tion. This feature provides economic stability to 
the bank, and infuses a sense of publicness into 
the capital resources held by the bank.
The BPDC is also shaped by its unique links to 
Costa Rica’s public sphere. The BPDC accepts over 
40 per cent of the public sector payroll deposits 
(BPDC 2012, 42). In addition, and unlike private 
banks, the BPDC – because it is governed under 
public law – is not required to hold capital reserves 
in the central bank. This frees up capital for 
lending. Additionally, the BPDC relies on long-term 
deposits and loans from other publicly owned 
development banks to support its own lending 
operations. In this way, the BPDC has a diversity of 
sources of capital that, moreover, inextricably link 
the BPDC to the working class and to the public 
sector. In interviews with BPDC senior managers, 
the bank’s historic ties to workers and the public 
sphere were clearly recognized and celebrated as 
important and unique characteristics of the bank’s 
history and operating ethos.
In response to its deepening environmental 
direction, the BPDC has developed specialty green 
lending facilities, such as the Eco-savings and 
Eco-credits, geared speciﬁcally towards MSME 
projects in which the environment is a key 
element of the project. In 2017 for example, the 
BPDC, in collaboration with a local provider, 
launched a programme to purchase and install 
solar energy panels in residential settings.
As another part of its developmental mandate, 
the BPDC supports local communal associations 
in the provisioning of sustainable, safe local water 
supply systems (ASADAS). According to one local 
BPDC manager: “The BPDC is doing training and 
supporting ASADAS to help them run better, more 
sustainably”.6 This type of assistance too must be 
considered green and sustainable lending.
The BPDC has begun to produce annual Sustain-
ability Reports, which follow the Global Reporting 
Initiative7 guidelines. The bank now tracks its own 
consumption of energy and can more concretely 
strategize around reducing its own carbon impact. 
The Pensions division, for example, has been 
certiﬁed as ‘carbon neutral’ for the last four years 
and been awarded a Five-Star climate change 
award three years running (BPDC 2017, 72). In the 
words of the BPDC: “In environmental matters we 
are promoting green products, accountability and 
the incorporation of this theme throughout the 
chain of value” (2017, 68).
Spotlight on financing energy 
democracy: The BPDC and 
COOPELESCA
“In this case, the community is socializing the 
responsibility of taking care of the environ-
ment” (author interview with BPDC Employee 
in Business Management, San Carlos, Costa 
Rica, 7 April 2017)
In the central valley of Costa Rica, an important 
strategic ‘green’ alliance exists between the BPDC 
and a regional energy cooperative, COOPELESCA.8 
COOPELESCA was formed in 1965 and began 
distributing energy in 1969. Today, the coopera-
tive supplies about 10 per cent of Costa Rica’s 
energy and it is doing so sustainably. In 2013, the 
Costa Rican government certiﬁed the cooperative 
as “Carbon Neutral”, giving COOPELESCA the 
distinction of being the ﬁrst energy distributor in 
Latin America to achieve this certiﬁcation. By 2015, 
COOPELESCA was able to fully oﬀset its carbon 
footprint by using its own resources and through 
its own environmental initiatives.
COOPELESCA environmental policy
COOPELESCA expresses its commitment to 
systematically avoid, mitigate and compen-
sate for negative environmental impacts and 
to optimize the positive environmental 
impacts derived from its economic and social 
projects.
Two examples show how the BPDC has facilitated 
the ‘greening’ of COOPELESCA, and by extension, 
its community. First, the BPDC ﬁnanced the 
conversion of all lighting within COOPELESCA to 
low-energy LED. Together with the energy coopera-
tive, local BPDC staﬀ analyzed the potential cost 
savings from the switch, and then granted a 
low-cost loan based on these savings. The switch 
to LED contributed to gaining carbon neutral 
certiﬁcation, and even continues to provide 
COOPELESCA additional cost reductions beyond 
the cost of ﬁnancing.
Second, the BPDC ﬁnanced a COOPELESCA 
initiative to purchase land for conservation purpos-
es. Beginning in 2009, the community of San 
Carlos recognized that the border areas of the 
Juan Castro Blanco National Park were at risk of 
over-exploitation by local farmers. This, in turn, 
jeopardized the valley’s clean water supply. In 
response to a broad-based community preserva-
tion initiative, the Associates’ Assembly of 
COOPELESCA decided to purchase land in order to 
help preserve the park's natural water resources, 
biodiversity, air, soil and scenic beauty. Coopera-
tive members raised US$1 million in funds, and 
with this approached the BPDC for an additional 
$2 million-loan at not-for-proﬁt concessional rates. 
This collaboration enabled COOPELESCA to pur-
chase and protect 1,124.7 hectares in the national 
park. COOPELESCA workers maintain and protect 
the forest, and the cooperative is developing 
research collaborations with public universities to 
support student environmental and biodiversity 
programming in the reclaimed areas. The farmers 
who sold their land to COOPELESCA have moved 
on, but there remain more areas within the park in 
need of reclaiming for the ecological and common 
good of the community.
In summary, the BPDC exempliﬁes a large, nation-
al, universal, public-like cooperative bank that also 
has a long history and signiﬁcant lending capacity 
in Costa Rica. Its governance model of ownership 
and control is substantially democratic insofar as it 
represents broad sections of Costa Rican society 
and government. Uniquely, the bank is unmistak-
ably oriented towards serving the needs of workers 
and the poor in Costa Rica. Over the last ﬁve to 10 
years, the BPDC has taken signiﬁcant steps towards 
internalizing environmental (and gender equity) 
goals into its operations. Initial interviews suggest 
that BPDC personnel deeply share this vision.
Still, there is room for improvement. In terms of 
ownership and eﬀective control, at times it seems 
the government can exercise deciding inﬂuence. 
Should workers assume complete governing 
control? What if workers decided to privatize the 
BPDC, would this be in the public interest? The 
issue remains open to debate in Costa Rica. In 
terms of the bank’s green proﬁle, it is certainly 
orienting operations in this direction. Yet the 
BPDC does not systematically measure the impact 
or levels of green lending programmes. Conse-
quently, what the balance of environmental versus 
regular lending is remains unknown. As with most 
public banks today, it is important to work 
towards substantively greening the bank from 
start to ﬁnish, so that lending in one area does not 
oﬀset the green lending in another. This is espe-
cially important when trying to ﬁnd the balance 
between concessional and non-concessional 
lending, or between generating returns and 
maximizing social and environmental impacts. 
There is much to commend the BPDC for, not least 
of which as a strong example of ﬁnancial democra-
tisation and mobilisation of public capital, but it is 
not perfect and there is work yet to be done.
Germany’s KfW: A global 
developmental juggernaut
Germany’s KfW is quite a diﬀerent bank from the 
BPDC. It is a fully public or state-owned and 
controlled development bank (‘promotional’ bank 
in European terms), whose existence is also 
inscribed in public law. Ownership rests with the 
Federal Republic of Germany, which holds 80 per 
cent of KfW shares, and the German federal states, 
which hold 20 per cent. While today the KfW aims 
for the “sustainable improvement of the economic, 
social, and ecological conditions of people’s lives”, 
the bank was born out of post-WWII reconstruc-
tion eﬀorts (founded in 1948).9 The German 
government decided to create a bank to manage 
the incoming Marshall Plan reconstruction funds, 
rather than directly spending the money.
The decision had foresight. Since then, the KfW 
has grown to be one of the largest national 
development banks in the world. Many scholars 
cite KfW as a good example of a public develop-
ment bank that is also ‘green’ (Griﬃth-Jones 2016). 
Yet no public bank should be idealized, and the 
KfW has its problems. Dramatically, the KfW and 
its subsidiary, the IKB (Industriekreditbank), got 
deeply embroiled in the 2008-09 global ﬁnancial 
crisis. The IKB wanted a new source of returns, 
and the subprime mortgage mania seemed to be 
the answer. Yet when the crash hit the conse-
quences cost it dearly (and the KfW by extension). 
When market logics begin to drive public sector 
decisions, this is often the consequence. Social 
forces must actively ensure that public banks are 
run transparently and democratically in the public, 
not private, interest.
The KfW nevertheless has a solid, if imperfect, 
governance structure. At base, it enables the 
representation of German government and 
society within the bank (KfW 2015, 174-6). This is 
not the case for every public bank. The KfW’s 
shareholders (i.e. the government) are represent-
ed by the Board of Supervisory Directors, which 
functions as a general shareholders’ forum (KfW 
2015, 179). The Federal Minister of Finance and 
Federal Minister for Economic Aﬀairs and Energy 
hold the Chair and Deputy Chair positions in 
alternation. The Board is composed of 37 addition-
al members from across German society. These 
members include federal ministers speciﬁed in 
the Law Concerning KfW; members appointed by 
the legislative branch of government, the Bunde-
stag and Bundesrat; representatives of banks and 
savings banks; and representatives of industry, 
the municipalities, agriculture, commerce, handi-
crafts, housing and the trade unions. Transparen-
cy is maintained by the KfW Executive and Supervi-
sory Boards being subject to the Public Corporate 
Governance Code, and the KfW is required to have 
its annual ﬁnancial statements audited by an 
independent auditor.
Over the decades, KfW has built up substantial 
lending capacity that has become increasingly 
green in orientation. In 2016, new lending amount-
ed to €81 billion while 44 per cent of this lending 
(over €35 billion) was dedicated to environmental 
and climate protection projects (KfW 2017, 2). 
Importantly, the KfW does not strive to maximize 
returns but instead to oﬀer low-interest loans. Its 
returns, therefore, are well below that of the 
private sector’s average. This is not a problem, 
though, because KfW excels at fulﬁlling its man-
date of supplying low-interest loans and grants. 
That is its underlying rationale.
The operational strategies of KfW are diverse and 
complex given its large size and scope of business. 
The KfW has four banking divisions separated 
along domestically and internationally oriented 
operations (KfW 2016, 2). For domestic-oriented 
lending, which constitutes about two thirds of 
lending, the SME Bank (Mittelstandsbank) supports 
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), 
business start-ups and other commercial clients. 
The Municipal and Private Client Bank (Kommunal- 
und Privatkundenbank/Kreditinstitute) provides 
private ﬁnancing for housing, education, and 
climate or environmental protection and public 
funding for municipal infrastructure and regional 
development banks (see Box 2 below). For interna-
tionally oriented lending, which is about a third of 
lending, the KfW IPEX-Bank supports international 
export and project ﬁnance. The KfW Development 
Bank (DEG) supports developing and transition 
countries. In October 2012, KfW opened a ﬁfth 
charitable division, the KfW Stiftung, as an indepen-
dent non-proﬁt foundation operating under the 
banners of responsible entrepreneurship; social 
commitment; environment and climate; art and 
culture (KfW 2015a, 13-14).
Unlike commercial banks like the HSBC or 
Citibank, development banks like the KfW do not 
accept personal deposits or lend directly to 
individuals. The KfW lends directly to other banks, 
municipalities and developing country govern-
ments. And, instead of accepting individual 
deposits, the KfW draws in capital from ﬁnancial 
markets and then lends on to various banking 
intermediaries, institutions and organisations that 
have more direct access and contact with individu-
al customers. One beneﬁt of oﬃcial state owner-
ship for the KfW is that it comes with an explicit 
sovereign guarantee, which supports the KfW’s 
very strong credit rating (S&P AAA). This enables 
the KfW to access market-based funds at cheaper 
rates of interest, and pass these savings along.
The KfW can fund projects alone or in collabora-
tion with other funders and donors. The types of 
ﬁnancial instruments used vary across the divi-
sions, but include:
Grants: ﬁnancing provided exclusively from 
German Federal Government budget funds, 
which does not have to be repaid.
Standard loans: subsidized loans from federal 
budget funds that have to be repaid by the 
borrower.
Development loans: a combination of federal 
budget funds and funds that KfW raises on the 
capital market. Combining funds enables the 
loan terms and conditions to be adjusted to the 
economic strength of the borrower country and 
features of the project.
Promotional loans: loans to partners in devel-
oping countries as mandated by the Federal 
Government. The loans are used for projects 
that have a development impact, but for which 
ﬁnancing via the commercial banking sector 
alone is not oﬀered (e.g. due to the longer 
ﬁnancing period necessary).
Oﬃcial donations: KfW may also accept funds 
from other donors.
Green bonds: for investors who place high value 
on sustainable investment.
The funding of projects may be not-for-proﬁt 
(concessional) or at market rates (non-concession-
al). Research suggests that the KfW tends to prefer 
‘promotional loans with subsidized credits’, that is, 
programme-tied loans that explicitly target govern-
ment-determined priority projects geared towards 
overcoming society’s grand challenges, such as 
climate change (Mazzucato and Penna 2015). In 
this way, KfW funds can help to promote the 
public interest.
Green lending ﬁgures prominently in the KfW, 
which has adopted a strong focus on renewable 
energy development (KfW 2015, 18). Notably, 
KfW’s green activities have been guided by a series 
of legal and governmental initiatives undertaken 
in Germany society since 2000, notably the Renew-
able Energy Act (2000); the Integrated Energy and 
Climate Programme (2007); the Climate Initiative 
(2008); and the Energy Initiative (2010). These 
public policy initiatives provide important context 
for why the KfW has committed 44 per cent of all 
lending to green, environmental and low-carbon 
projects.
Costa Rica’s BPDC
The BPDC is a public-like bank that is legally 
owned by the workers of Costa Rica.4 Control of 
the bank, however, is exercised both by worker 
and government representatives. The Govern-
ment of Costa Rica created the BPDC in 1969 to 
promote development and to oﬀer economic 
protection for the country’s workers. Established 
under special law, the BPDC is deﬁned as a 
non-state but public institution that is 100 per 
cent owned by the workers of Costa Rica (BPDC 
2012, 7). A worker’s right to share ownership is 
dependent on having a mandatory savings 
account for at least one year.
The BPDC’s overarching mission is to serve the 
social and sustainable welfare of Costa Ricans 
(BPDC 2015, 15). In 2010, a nationwide 
consultative process gave rise to ﬁve new 
‘Guidelines’ for the Workers’ Assembly:
1. The promotion of the social economy;
2. A quality oﬀering of services by the   
 Conglomerate;
3. The competitive management of the   
 institution;
4. Regional and local development; and
5. The conglomerate as an entity for   
 development.5
Three strategic axes further guide banking 
decisions: gender equity, accessibility and 
environmental responsibility.
The BPDC’s governance model (i.e. control of 
strategic decision-making) is impressive, repre-
senting perhaps the most democratic bank in the 
world. The highest governing body of the BPDC is 
the Assembly of Workers (Asamblea de los Traba-
jadores y Trabajadoras). While not initially mandat-
ed in law, legal changes in 1986 established the 
Workers’ Assembly as the peak of the bank’s 
governance. As of late 2016, the Workers’ Assem-
bly represents nearly 1.2 million savers (BPDC 
2017, 13). That is about 20 per cent of the popula-
tion! Operationally, the Workers’ Assembly itself is 
constituted by 290 individual representatives from 
10 social and economic sectors in Costa Rica 
(artisanal; communal; cooperative; self-managed; 
independent; teachers; professional; confederated 
syndicates; non-confederated and solidarity 
syndicates).
Unlike examples of successful European cooper-
ative banks that are often locally or regionally 
focused, the BPDC is national (see Kalmi 2012). 
This geographical spread can create challenges of 
representation, solidarity and political will to 
sustain the cooperative model. That said, BPDC 
has explicit and formal links to the 10 social 
sectors, which are themselves founded on a 
strong historical tradition of solidarity and cooper-
ative development in Costa Rica. Through its 
lending, the bank strengthens these sectors.
Democratizing finance: 
The BPDC way
To inform a new direction for the BPDC in 
promoting the social economy, the bank’s Nation-
al Board of Directors organized a series of nation-
wide forums. The BPDC social sector leaders in 
the Workers’ Assembly and senior management 
participated in the forums, which connected with 
nearly 1,500 participants across Costa Rica’s 11 
diﬀerent regions. The results have shaped the 
future of the bank (BPDC 2015, 25).
While worker-owners provide strategic direction 
to the BPDC through the Assembly, eﬀective 
control over daily operations is exercised by the 
National Board of Directors, which is the bank’s 
highest administrative unit. The bank’s Board of 
Directors is composed of seven members: four 
represent the Assembly and three, the Govern-
ment. Presently, there are four women and three 
men on the Board, fulﬁlling the requirement that 
it be at least half women. This has earned the 
BPDC an important marker of democratisation, 
namely that it became the ﬁrst public organisation 
in Central America to establish at least 50 per cent 
of women in their decision-making bodies (BPDC 
2017, 13).
The operational strategy of the BPDC reﬂects its 
status as a universal bank (which combines retail 
commercial and developmental functions) and its 
mission to serve the working class of Costa Rica. 
Target clients include workers, peasants, and 
micro-, small- and medium-sized enterprises 
(MSMEs) as well as communal, cooperative and 
municipal development associations. This is 
signiﬁcant: the BPDC prioritizes working with 
cooperatives and public institutions, as well as 
with those people typically excluded from ﬁnan-
cial services. This is qualitatively diﬀerent from the 
bulk of corporative private banks.
The BPDC approach to ﬁnancial sustainability is 
much broader than maximizing returns. Rather, as 
directed by the Workers’ Assembly, the BPDC now 
operates according to what it refers to as a triple 
bottom-line: the economic; the environmental; 
and the social (BPDC 2012, 21). That is, the envi-
ronmental and social good is placed alongside a 
need to generate positive ﬁnancial returns within 
the bank – another qualitative diﬀerence from 
typical private banks.
Unlike strictly public banks, however, the Costa 
Rican government does not explicitly guarantee 
the BPDC. Nevertheless, BPDC experts suggest 
that the bank beneﬁts from implicit state backing. 
That is, most people believe that the BPDC has 
state backing and that, should push come to 
shove and the BPDC face economic troubles, it 
would receive state support. This, together with 
the fact that the bank is founded according to a 
speciﬁc public law (unlike private banks) and thus 
operates according to that law, supports the bank’ 
s credit rating and societal trust in the bank. In 
short, the BPDC has the conﬁdence of markets 
and of the people.
A middle road between profits 
and social lending?
As a universal bank, the BPDC oﬀers a wide 
variety of lending and ﬁnancial services. Since 
2000, it too has grown into a larger ﬁnancial 
conglomerate (and the third largest bank in Costa 
Rica) that incorporates not only its commercial 
and development banking services, but also 
pension, stock market, investment and insurance 
services.
Its banking division is separated into three areas: 
personal banking (Banca de Persona); business and 
corporate banking (Banca Empresarial y Corporati-
va); and social development banking (Banca de 
Desarrollo Social). Notably, 25 per cent of the 
entire BPDC Conglomerate’s returns are chan-
nelled into a series of ‘special funds’, which are 
explicitly intended to meet the social needs of 
those typically excluded from the banking system 
in Costa Rica (BPDC 2017, 58).
The BPDC returns are nonetheless in line with 
other universal banks in developing countries, 
averaging around 1.5 per cent return on assets in 
the last few years. In simple terms, that is at least 
50 per cent more earnings than your average 
private bank (e.g. HSBC or Citibank) in the US or 
Europe.
Conﬁdential interviews with BPDC personnel 
reveal insights into its daily operations. In the past, 
generating returns via commercial activities was 
less important, but since the late 1990s it became 
more signiﬁcant, even overarching. Proﬁts began 
to override its worker-oriented mandate. However, 
more recently, the Workers’ Assembly has 
demanded a return to the bank’s core mandate 
and to servicing the social economy.
These changes experienced in the BPDC opera-
tions have created an interesting situation. The 
ﬁnancial returns now generated by the more 
commercial-oriented operations are seen by some 
personnel as enabling the bank’s other concession-
ary lending (meaning not-for-proﬁt, discounted, or 
made cheaper in one way or another) pro-
grammes (such as the ‘Social Development Bank’). 
Others, however, argue that the whole banking 
operation should be geared towards more social 
and concessionary lending. Presently, the BPDC 
has taken a middle road between proﬁts and 
social lending, with an aim to enhancing the social 
economic and environmental role of the BPDC.
How BPDC is linked to the 
working class and the public 
sector
It should be noted that a deﬁning characteristic 
of the bank derives from a unique source of 
capital, which is linked to the workers of Costa 
Rica. Article 5 of the BPDC Law states that all 
public and private employers must contribute 0.5 
per cent of paid monthly wages to the bank’s 
capital base. Additionally, workers must contrib-
ute 1 per cent of their monthly wages. These 
contributions (or ‘obligatory savings’) are deduct-
ed by the employer and deposited in the BPDC. 
After a year, 1.25 per cent of these savings are 
transferred to each worker’s own pension fund. 
The BPDC, for its part, gets to hold onto the other 
0.25 per cent as a means of permanent capitalisa-
tion. This feature provides economic stability to 
the bank, and infuses a sense of publicness into 
the capital resources held by the bank.
The BPDC is also shaped by its unique links to 
Costa Rica’s public sphere. The BPDC accepts over 
40 per cent of the public sector payroll deposits 
(BPDC 2012, 42). In addition, and unlike private 
banks, the BPDC – because it is governed under 
public law – is not required to hold capital reserves 
in the central bank. This frees up capital for 
lending. Additionally, the BPDC relies on long-term 
deposits and loans from other publicly owned 
development banks to support its own lending 
operations. In this way, the BPDC has a diversity of 
sources of capital that, moreover, inextricably link 
the BPDC to the working class and to the public 
sector. In interviews with BPDC senior managers, 
the bank’s historic ties to workers and the public 
sphere were clearly recognized and celebrated as 
important and unique characteristics of the bank’s 
history and operating ethos.
In response to its deepening environmental 
direction, the BPDC has developed specialty green 
lending facilities, such as the Eco-savings and 
Eco-credits, geared speciﬁcally towards MSME 
projects in which the environment is a key 
element of the project. In 2017 for example, the 
BPDC, in collaboration with a local provider, 
launched a programme to purchase and install 
solar energy panels in residential settings.
As another part of its developmental mandate, 
the BPDC supports local communal associations 
in the provisioning of sustainable, safe local water 
supply systems (ASADAS). According to one local 
BPDC manager: “The BPDC is doing training and 
supporting ASADAS to help them run better, more 
sustainably”.6 This type of assistance too must be 
considered green and sustainable lending.
The BPDC has begun to produce annual Sustain-
ability Reports, which follow the Global Reporting 
Initiative7 guidelines. The bank now tracks its own 
consumption of energy and can more concretely 
strategize around reducing its own carbon impact. 
The Pensions division, for example, has been 
certiﬁed as ‘carbon neutral’ for the last four years 
and been awarded a Five-Star climate change 
award three years running (BPDC 2017, 72). In the 
words of the BPDC: “In environmental matters we 
are promoting green products, accountability and 
the incorporation of this theme throughout the 
chain of value” (2017, 68).
Spotlight on financing energy 
democracy: The BPDC and 
COOPELESCA
“In this case, the community is socializing the 
responsibility of taking care of the environ-
ment” (author interview with BPDC Employee 
in Business Management, San Carlos, Costa 
Rica, 7 April 2017)
In the central valley of Costa Rica, an important 
strategic ‘green’ alliance exists between the BPDC 
and a regional energy cooperative, COOPELESCA.8 
COOPELESCA was formed in 1965 and began 
distributing energy in 1969. Today, the coopera-
tive supplies about 10 per cent of Costa Rica’s 
energy and it is doing so sustainably. In 2013, the 
Costa Rican government certiﬁed the cooperative 
as “Carbon Neutral”, giving COOPELESCA the 
distinction of being the ﬁrst energy distributor in 
Latin America to achieve this certiﬁcation. By 2015, 
COOPELESCA was able to fully oﬀset its carbon 
footprint by using its own resources and through 
its own environmental initiatives.
COOPELESCA environmental policy
COOPELESCA expresses its commitment to 
systematically avoid, mitigate and compen-
sate for negative environmental impacts and 
to optimize the positive environmental 
impacts derived from its economic and social 
projects.
Two examples show how the BPDC has facilitated 
the ‘greening’ of COOPELESCA, and by extension, 
its community. First, the BPDC ﬁnanced the 
conversion of all lighting within COOPELESCA to 
low-energy LED. Together with the energy coopera-
tive, local BPDC staﬀ analyzed the potential cost 
savings from the switch, and then granted a 
low-cost loan based on these savings. The switch 
to LED contributed to gaining carbon neutral 
certiﬁcation, and even continues to provide 
COOPELESCA additional cost reductions beyond 
the cost of ﬁnancing.
Second, the BPDC ﬁnanced a COOPELESCA 
initiative to purchase land for conservation purpos-
es. Beginning in 2009, the community of San 
Carlos recognized that the border areas of the 
Juan Castro Blanco National Park were at risk of 
over-exploitation by local farmers. This, in turn, 
jeopardized the valley’s clean water supply. In 
response to a broad-based community preserva-
tion initiative, the Associates’ Assembly of 
COOPELESCA decided to purchase land in order to 
help preserve the park's natural water resources, 
biodiversity, air, soil and scenic beauty. Coopera-
tive members raised US$1 million in funds, and 
with this approached the BPDC for an additional 
$2 million-loan at not-for-proﬁt concessional rates. 
This collaboration enabled COOPELESCA to pur-
chase and protect 1,124.7 hectares in the national 
park. COOPELESCA workers maintain and protect 
the forest, and the cooperative is developing 
research collaborations with public universities to 
support student environmental and biodiversity 
programming in the reclaimed areas. The farmers 
who sold their land to COOPELESCA have moved 
on, but there remain more areas within the park in 
need of reclaiming for the ecological and common 
good of the community.
In summary, the BPDC exempliﬁes a large, nation-
al, universal, public-like cooperative bank that also 
has a long history and signiﬁcant lending capacity 
in Costa Rica. Its governance model of ownership 
and control is substantially democratic insofar as it 
represents broad sections of Costa Rican society 
and government. Uniquely, the bank is unmistak-
ably oriented towards serving the needs of workers 
and the poor in Costa Rica. Over the last ﬁve to 10 
years, the BPDC has taken signiﬁcant steps towards 
internalizing environmental (and gender equity) 
goals into its operations. Initial interviews suggest 
that BPDC personnel deeply share this vision.
Still, there is room for improvement. In terms of 
ownership and eﬀective control, at times it seems 
the government can exercise deciding inﬂuence. 
Should workers assume complete governing 
control? What if workers decided to privatize the 
BPDC, would this be in the public interest? The 
issue remains open to debate in Costa Rica. In 
terms of the bank’s green proﬁle, it is certainly 
orienting operations in this direction. Yet the 
BPDC does not systematically measure the impact 
or levels of green lending programmes. Conse-
quently, what the balance of environmental versus 
regular lending is remains unknown. As with most 
public banks today, it is important to work 
towards substantively greening the bank from 
start to ﬁnish, so that lending in one area does not 
oﬀset the green lending in another. This is espe-
cially important when trying to ﬁnd the balance 
between concessional and non-concessional 
lending, or between generating returns and 
maximizing social and environmental impacts. 
There is much to commend the BPDC for, not least 
of which as a strong example of ﬁnancial democra-
tisation and mobilisation of public capital, but it is 
not perfect and there is work yet to be done.
Germany’s KfW: A global 
developmental juggernaut
Germany’s KfW is quite a diﬀerent bank from the 
BPDC. It is a fully public or state-owned and 
controlled development bank (‘promotional’ bank 
in European terms), whose existence is also 
inscribed in public law. Ownership rests with the 
Federal Republic of Germany, which holds 80 per 
cent of KfW shares, and the German federal states, 
which hold 20 per cent. While today the KfW aims 
for the “sustainable improvement of the economic, 
social, and ecological conditions of people’s lives”, 
the bank was born out of post-WWII reconstruc-
tion eﬀorts (founded in 1948).9 The German 
government decided to create a bank to manage 
the incoming Marshall Plan reconstruction funds, 
rather than directly spending the money.
The decision had foresight. Since then, the KfW 
has grown to be one of the largest national 
development banks in the world. Many scholars 
cite KfW as a good example of a public develop-
ment bank that is also ‘green’ (Griﬃth-Jones 2016). 
Yet no public bank should be idealized, and the 
KfW has its problems. Dramatically, the KfW and 
its subsidiary, the IKB (Industriekreditbank), got 
deeply embroiled in the 2008-09 global ﬁnancial 
crisis. The IKB wanted a new source of returns, 
and the subprime mortgage mania seemed to be 
the answer. Yet when the crash hit the conse-
quences cost it dearly (and the KfW by extension). 
When market logics begin to drive public sector 
decisions, this is often the consequence. Social 
forces must actively ensure that public banks are 
run transparently and democratically in the public, 
not private, interest.
The KfW nevertheless has a solid, if imperfect, 
governance structure. At base, it enables the 
representation of German government and 
society within the bank (KfW 2015, 174-6). This is 
not the case for every public bank. The KfW’s 
shareholders (i.e. the government) are represent-
ed by the Board of Supervisory Directors, which 
functions as a general shareholders’ forum (KfW 
2015, 179). The Federal Minister of Finance and 
Federal Minister for Economic Aﬀairs and Energy 
hold the Chair and Deputy Chair positions in 
alternation. The Board is composed of 37 addition-
al members from across German society. These 
members include federal ministers speciﬁed in 
the Law Concerning KfW; members appointed by 
the legislative branch of government, the Bunde-
stag and Bundesrat; representatives of banks and 
savings banks; and representatives of industry, 
the municipalities, agriculture, commerce, handi-
crafts, housing and the trade unions. Transparen-
cy is maintained by the KfW Executive and Supervi-
sory Boards being subject to the Public Corporate 
Governance Code, and the KfW is required to have 
its annual ﬁnancial statements audited by an 
independent auditor.
Over the decades, KfW has built up substantial 
lending capacity that has become increasingly 
green in orientation. In 2016, new lending amount-
ed to €81 billion while 44 per cent of this lending 
(over €35 billion) was dedicated to environmental 
and climate protection projects (KfW 2017, 2). 
Importantly, the KfW does not strive to maximize 
returns but instead to oﬀer low-interest loans. Its 
returns, therefore, are well below that of the 
private sector’s average. This is not a problem, 
though, because KfW excels at fulﬁlling its man-
date of supplying low-interest loans and grants. 
That is its underlying rationale.
The operational strategies of KfW are diverse and 
complex given its large size and scope of business. 
The KfW has four banking divisions separated 
along domestically and internationally oriented 
operations (KfW 2016, 2). For domestic-oriented 
lending, which constitutes about two thirds of 
lending, the SME Bank (Mittelstandsbank) supports 
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), 
business start-ups and other commercial clients. 
The Municipal and Private Client Bank (Kommunal- 
und Privatkundenbank/Kreditinstitute) provides 
private ﬁnancing for housing, education, and 
climate or environmental protection and public 
funding for municipal infrastructure and regional 
development banks (see Box 2 below). For interna-
tionally oriented lending, which is about a third of 
lending, the KfW IPEX-Bank supports international 
export and project ﬁnance. The KfW Development 
Bank (DEG) supports developing and transition 
countries. In October 2012, KfW opened a ﬁfth 
charitable division, the KfW Stiftung, as an indepen-
dent non-proﬁt foundation operating under the 
banners of responsible entrepreneurship; social 
commitment; environment and climate; art and 
culture (KfW 2015a, 13-14).
Unlike commercial banks like the HSBC or 
Citibank, development banks like the KfW do not 
accept personal deposits or lend directly to 
individuals. The KfW lends directly to other banks, 
municipalities and developing country govern-
ments. And, instead of accepting individual 
deposits, the KfW draws in capital from ﬁnancial 
markets and then lends on to various banking 
intermediaries, institutions and organisations that 
have more direct access and contact with individu-
al customers. One beneﬁt of oﬃcial state owner-
ship for the KfW is that it comes with an explicit 
sovereign guarantee, which supports the KfW’s 
very strong credit rating (S&P AAA). This enables 
the KfW to access market-based funds at cheaper 
rates of interest, and pass these savings along.
The KfW can fund projects alone or in collabora-
tion with other funders and donors. The types of 
ﬁnancial instruments used vary across the divi-
sions, but include:
Grants: ﬁnancing provided exclusively from 
German Federal Government budget funds, 
which does not have to be repaid.
Standard loans: subsidized loans from federal 
budget funds that have to be repaid by the 
borrower.
Development loans: a combination of federal 
budget funds and funds that KfW raises on the 
capital market. Combining funds enables the 
loan terms and conditions to be adjusted to the 
economic strength of the borrower country and 
features of the project.
Promotional loans: loans to partners in devel-
oping countries as mandated by the Federal 
Government. The loans are used for projects 
that have a development impact, but for which 
ﬁnancing via the commercial banking sector 
alone is not oﬀered (e.g. due to the longer 
ﬁnancing period necessary).
Oﬃcial donations: KfW may also accept funds 
from other donors.
Green bonds: for investors who place high value 
on sustainable investment.
The funding of projects may be not-for-proﬁt 
(concessional) or at market rates (non-concession-
al). Research suggests that the KfW tends to prefer 
‘promotional loans with subsidized credits’, that is, 
programme-tied loans that explicitly target govern-
ment-determined priority projects geared towards 
overcoming society’s grand challenges, such as 
climate change (Mazzucato and Penna 2015). In 
this way, KfW funds can help to promote the 
public interest.
Green lending ﬁgures prominently in the KfW, 
which has adopted a strong focus on renewable 
energy development (KfW 2015, 18). Notably, 
KfW’s green activities have been guided by a series 
of legal and governmental initiatives undertaken 
in Germany society since 2000, notably the Renew-
able Energy Act (2000); the Integrated Energy and 
Climate Programme (2007); the Climate Initiative 
(2008); and the Energy Initiative (2010). These 
public policy initiatives provide important context 
for why the KfW has committed 44 per cent of all 
lending to green, environmental and low-carbon 
projects.
Costa Rica’s BPDC
The BPDC is a public-like bank that is legally 
owned by the workers of Costa Rica.4 Control of 
the bank, however, is exercised both by worker 
and government representatives. The Govern-
ment of Costa Rica created the BPDC in 1969 to 
promote development and to oﬀer economic 
protection for the country’s workers. Established 
under special law, the BPDC is deﬁned as a 
non-state but public institution that is 100 per 
cent owned by the workers of Costa Rica (BPDC 
2012, 7). A worker’s right to share ownership is 
dependent on having a mandatory savings 
account for at least one year.
The BPDC’s overarching mission is to serve the 
social and sustainable welfare of Costa Ricans 
(BPDC 2015, 15). In 2010, a nationwide 
consultative process gave rise to ﬁve new 
‘Guidelines’ for the Workers’ Assembly:
1. The promotion of the social economy;
2. A quality oﬀering of services by the   
 Conglomerate;
3. The competitive management of the   
 institution;
4. Regional and local development; and
5. The conglomerate as an entity for   
 development.5
Three strategic axes further guide banking 
decisions: gender equity, accessibility and 
environmental responsibility.
The BPDC’s governance model (i.e. control of 
strategic decision-making) is impressive, repre-
senting perhaps the most democratic bank in the 
world. The highest governing body of the BPDC is 
the Assembly of Workers (Asamblea de los Traba-
jadores y Trabajadoras). While not initially mandat-
ed in law, legal changes in 1986 established the 
Workers’ Assembly as the peak of the bank’s 
governance. As of late 2016, the Workers’ Assem-
bly represents nearly 1.2 million savers (BPDC 
2017, 13). That is about 20 per cent of the popula-
tion! Operationally, the Workers’ Assembly itself is 
constituted by 290 individual representatives from 
10 social and economic sectors in Costa Rica 
(artisanal; communal; cooperative; self-managed; 
independent; teachers; professional; confederated 
syndicates; non-confederated and solidarity 
syndicates).
Unlike examples of successful European cooper-
ative banks that are often locally or regionally 
focused, the BPDC is national (see Kalmi 2012). 
This geographical spread can create challenges of 
representation, solidarity and political will to 
sustain the cooperative model. That said, BPDC 
has explicit and formal links to the 10 social 
sectors, which are themselves founded on a 
strong historical tradition of solidarity and cooper-
ative development in Costa Rica. Through its 
lending, the bank strengthens these sectors.
Democratizing finance: 
The BPDC way
To inform a new direction for the BPDC in 
promoting the social economy, the bank’s Nation-
al Board of Directors organized a series of nation-
wide forums. The BPDC social sector leaders in 
the Workers’ Assembly and senior management 
participated in the forums, which connected with 
nearly 1,500 participants across Costa Rica’s 11 
diﬀerent regions. The results have shaped the 
future of the bank (BPDC 2015, 25).
While worker-owners provide strategic direction 
to the BPDC through the Assembly, eﬀective 
control over daily operations is exercised by the 
National Board of Directors, which is the bank’s 
highest administrative unit. The bank’s Board of 
Directors is composed of seven members: four 
represent the Assembly and three, the Govern-
ment. Presently, there are four women and three 
men on the Board, fulﬁlling the requirement that 
it be at least half women. This has earned the 
BPDC an important marker of democratisation, 
namely that it became the ﬁrst public organisation 
in Central America to establish at least 50 per cent 
of women in their decision-making bodies (BPDC 
2017, 13).
The operational strategy of the BPDC reﬂects its 
status as a universal bank (which combines retail 
commercial and developmental functions) and its 
mission to serve the working class of Costa Rica. 
Target clients include workers, peasants, and 
micro-, small- and medium-sized enterprises 
(MSMEs) as well as communal, cooperative and 
municipal development associations. This is 
signiﬁcant: the BPDC prioritizes working with 
cooperatives and public institutions, as well as 
with those people typically excluded from ﬁnan-
cial services. This is qualitatively diﬀerent from the 
bulk of corporative private banks.
The BPDC approach to ﬁnancial sustainability is 
much broader than maximizing returns. Rather, as 
directed by the Workers’ Assembly, the BPDC now 
operates according to what it refers to as a triple 
bottom-line: the economic; the environmental; 
and the social (BPDC 2012, 21). That is, the envi-
ronmental and social good is placed alongside a 
need to generate positive ﬁnancial returns within 
the bank – another qualitative diﬀerence from 
typical private banks.
Unlike strictly public banks, however, the Costa 
Rican government does not explicitly guarantee 
the BPDC. Nevertheless, BPDC experts suggest 
that the bank beneﬁts from implicit state backing. 
That is, most people believe that the BPDC has 
state backing and that, should push come to 
shove and the BPDC face economic troubles, it 
would receive state support. This, together with 
the fact that the bank is founded according to a 
speciﬁc public law (unlike private banks) and thus 
operates according to that law, supports the bank’ 
s credit rating and societal trust in the bank. In 
short, the BPDC has the conﬁdence of markets 
and of the people.
A middle road between profits 
and social lending?
As a universal bank, the BPDC oﬀers a wide 
variety of lending and ﬁnancial services. Since 
2000, it too has grown into a larger ﬁnancial 
conglomerate (and the third largest bank in Costa 
Rica) that incorporates not only its commercial 
and development banking services, but also 
pension, stock market, investment and insurance 
services.
Its banking division is separated into three areas: 
personal banking (Banca de Persona); business and 
corporate banking (Banca Empresarial y Corporati-
va); and social development banking (Banca de 
Desarrollo Social). Notably, 25 per cent of the 
entire BPDC Conglomerate’s returns are chan-
nelled into a series of ‘special funds’, which are 
explicitly intended to meet the social needs of 
those typically excluded from the banking system 
in Costa Rica (BPDC 2017, 58).
The BPDC returns are nonetheless in line with 
other universal banks in developing countries, 
averaging around 1.5 per cent return on assets in 
the last few years. In simple terms, that is at least 
50 per cent more earnings than your average 
private bank (e.g. HSBC or Citibank) in the US or 
Europe.
Conﬁdential interviews with BPDC personnel 
reveal insights into its daily operations. In the past, 
generating returns via commercial activities was 
less important, but since the late 1990s it became 
more signiﬁcant, even overarching. Proﬁts began 
to override its worker-oriented mandate. However, 
more recently, the Workers’ Assembly has 
demanded a return to the bank’s core mandate 
and to servicing the social economy.
These changes experienced in the BPDC opera-
tions have created an interesting situation. The 
ﬁnancial returns now generated by the more 
commercial-oriented operations are seen by some 
personnel as enabling the bank’s other concession-
ary lending (meaning not-for-proﬁt, discounted, or 
made cheaper in one way or another) pro-
grammes (such as the ‘Social Development Bank’). 
Others, however, argue that the whole banking 
operation should be geared towards more social 
and concessionary lending. Presently, the BPDC 
has taken a middle road between proﬁts and 
social lending, with an aim to enhancing the social 
economic and environmental role of the BPDC.
How BPDC is linked to the 
working class and the public 
sector
It should be noted that a deﬁning characteristic 
of the bank derives from a unique source of 
capital, which is linked to the workers of Costa 
Rica. Article 5 of the BPDC Law states that all 
public and private employers must contribute 0.5 
per cent of paid monthly wages to the bank’s 
capital base. Additionally, workers must contrib-
ute 1 per cent of their monthly wages. These 
contributions (or ‘obligatory savings’) are deduct-
ed by the employer and deposited in the BPDC. 
After a year, 1.25 per cent of these savings are 
transferred to each worker’s own pension fund. 
The BPDC, for its part, gets to hold onto the other 
0.25 per cent as a means of permanent capitalisa-
tion. This feature provides economic stability to 
the bank, and infuses a sense of publicness into 
the capital resources held by the bank.
The BPDC is also shaped by its unique links to 
Costa Rica’s public sphere. The BPDC accepts over 
40 per cent of the public sector payroll deposits 
(BPDC 2012, 42). In addition, and unlike private 
banks, the BPDC – because it is governed under 
public law – is not required to hold capital reserves 
in the central bank. This frees up capital for 
lending. Additionally, the BPDC relies on long-term 
deposits and loans from other publicly owned 
development banks to support its own lending 
operations. In this way, the BPDC has a diversity of 
sources of capital that, moreover, inextricably link 
the BPDC to the working class and to the public 
sector. In interviews with BPDC senior managers, 
the bank’s historic ties to workers and the public 
sphere were clearly recognized and celebrated as 
important and unique characteristics of the bank’s 
history and operating ethos.
In response to its deepening environmental 
direction, the BPDC has developed specialty green 
lending facilities, such as the Eco-savings and 
Eco-credits, geared speciﬁcally towards MSME 
projects in which the environment is a key 
element of the project. In 2017 for example, the 
BPDC, in collaboration with a local provider, 
launched a programme to purchase and install 
solar energy panels in residential settings.
As another part of its developmental mandate, 
the BPDC supports local communal associations 
in the provisioning of sustainable, safe local water 
supply systems (ASADAS). According to one local 
BPDC manager: “The BPDC is doing training and 
supporting ASADAS to help them run better, more 
sustainably”.6 This type of assistance too must be 
considered green and sustainable lending.
The BPDC has begun to produce annual Sustain-
ability Reports, which follow the Global Reporting 
Initiative7 guidelines. The bank now tracks its own 
consumption of energy and can more concretely 
strategize around reducing its own carbon impact. 
The Pensions division, for example, has been 
certiﬁed as ‘carbon neutral’ for the last four years 
and been awarded a Five-Star climate change 
award three years running (BPDC 2017, 72). In the 
words of the BPDC: “In environmental matters we 
are promoting green products, accountability and 
the incorporation of this theme throughout the 
chain of value” (2017, 68).
Spotlight on financing energy 
democracy: The BPDC and 
COOPELESCA
“In this case, the community is socializing the 
responsibility of taking care of the environ-
ment” (author interview with BPDC Employee 
in Business Management, San Carlos, Costa 
Rica, 7 April 2017)
In the central valley of Costa Rica, an important 
strategic ‘green’ alliance exists between the BPDC 
and a regional energy cooperative, COOPELESCA.8 
COOPELESCA was formed in 1965 and began 
distributing energy in 1969. Today, the coopera-
tive supplies about 10 per cent of Costa Rica’s 
energy and it is doing so sustainably. In 2013, the 
Costa Rican government certiﬁed the cooperative 
as “Carbon Neutral”, giving COOPELESCA the 
distinction of being the ﬁrst energy distributor in 
Latin America to achieve this certiﬁcation. By 2015, 
COOPELESCA was able to fully oﬀset its carbon 
footprint by using its own resources and through 
its own environmental initiatives.
COOPELESCA environmental policy
COOPELESCA expresses its commitment to 
systematically avoid, mitigate and compen-
sate for negative environmental impacts and 
to optimize the positive environmental 
impacts derived from its economic and social 
projects.
Two examples show how the BPDC has facilitated 
the ‘greening’ of COOPELESCA, and by extension, 
its community. First, the BPDC ﬁnanced the 
conversion of all lighting within COOPELESCA to 
low-energy LED. Together with the energy coopera-
tive, local BPDC staﬀ analyzed the potential cost 
savings from the switch, and then granted a 
low-cost loan based on these savings. The switch 
to LED contributed to gaining carbon neutral 
certiﬁcation, and even continues to provide 
COOPELESCA additional cost reductions beyond 
the cost of ﬁnancing.
Second, the BPDC ﬁnanced a COOPELESCA 
initiative to purchase land for conservation purpos-
es. Beginning in 2009, the community of San 
Carlos recognized that the border areas of the 
Juan Castro Blanco National Park were at risk of 
over-exploitation by local farmers. This, in turn, 
jeopardized the valley’s clean water supply. In 
response to a broad-based community preserva-
tion initiative, the Associates’ Assembly of 
COOPELESCA decided to purchase land in order to 
help preserve the park's natural water resources, 
biodiversity, air, soil and scenic beauty. Coopera-
tive members raised US$1 million in funds, and 
with this approached the BPDC for an additional 
$2 million-loan at not-for-proﬁt concessional rates. 
This collaboration enabled COOPELESCA to pur-
chase and protect 1,124.7 hectares in the national 
park. COOPELESCA workers maintain and protect 
the forest, and the cooperative is developing 
research collaborations with public universities to 
support student environmental and biodiversity 
programming in the reclaimed areas. The farmers 
who sold their land to COOPELESCA have moved 
on, but there remain more areas within the park in 
need of reclaiming for the ecological and common 
good of the community.
In summary, the BPDC exempliﬁes a large, nation-
al, universal, public-like cooperative bank that also 
has a long history and signiﬁcant lending capacity 
in Costa Rica. Its governance model of ownership 
and control is substantially democratic insofar as it 
represents broad sections of Costa Rican society 
and government. Uniquely, the bank is unmistak-
ably oriented towards serving the needs of workers 
and the poor in Costa Rica. Over the last ﬁve to 10 
years, the BPDC has taken signiﬁcant steps towards 
internalizing environmental (and gender equity) 
goals into its operations. Initial interviews suggest 
that BPDC personnel deeply share this vision.
Still, there is room for improvement. In terms of 
ownership and eﬀective control, at times it seems 
the government can exercise deciding inﬂuence. 
Should workers assume complete governing 
control? What if workers decided to privatize the 
BPDC, would this be in the public interest? The 
issue remains open to debate in Costa Rica. In 
terms of the bank’s green proﬁle, it is certainly 
orienting operations in this direction. Yet the 
BPDC does not systematically measure the impact 
or levels of green lending programmes. Conse-
quently, what the balance of environmental versus 
regular lending is remains unknown. As with most 
public banks today, it is important to work 
towards substantively greening the bank from 
start to ﬁnish, so that lending in one area does not 
oﬀset the green lending in another. This is espe-
cially important when trying to ﬁnd the balance 
between concessional and non-concessional 
lending, or between generating returns and 
maximizing social and environmental impacts. 
There is much to commend the BPDC for, not least 
of which as a strong example of ﬁnancial democra-
tisation and mobilisation of public capital, but it is 
not perfect and there is work yet to be done.
Germany’s KfW: A global 
developmental juggernaut
Germany’s KfW is quite a diﬀerent bank from the 
BPDC. It is a fully public or state-owned and 
controlled development bank (‘promotional’ bank 
in European terms), whose existence is also 
inscribed in public law. Ownership rests with the 
Federal Republic of Germany, which holds 80 per 
cent of KfW shares, and the German federal states, 
which hold 20 per cent. While today the KfW aims 
for the “sustainable improvement of the economic, 
social, and ecological conditions of people’s lives”, 
the bank was born out of post-WWII reconstruc-
tion eﬀorts (founded in 1948).9 The German 
government decided to create a bank to manage 
the incoming Marshall Plan reconstruction funds, 
rather than directly spending the money.
The decision had foresight. Since then, the KfW 
has grown to be one of the largest national 
development banks in the world. Many scholars 
cite KfW as a good example of a public develop-
ment bank that is also ‘green’ (Griﬃth-Jones 2016). 
Yet no public bank should be idealized, and the 
KfW has its problems. Dramatically, the KfW and 
its subsidiary, the IKB (Industriekreditbank), got 
deeply embroiled in the 2008-09 global ﬁnancial 
crisis. The IKB wanted a new source of returns, 
and the subprime mortgage mania seemed to be 
the answer. Yet when the crash hit the conse-
quences cost it dearly (and the KfW by extension). 
When market logics begin to drive public sector 
decisions, this is often the consequence. Social 
forces must actively ensure that public banks are 
run transparently and democratically in the public, 
not private, interest.
The KfW nevertheless has a solid, if imperfect, 
governance structure. At base, it enables the 
representation of German government and 
society within the bank (KfW 2015, 174-6). This is 
not the case for every public bank. The KfW’s 
shareholders (i.e. the government) are represent-
ed by the Board of Supervisory Directors, which 
functions as a general shareholders’ forum (KfW 
2015, 179). The Federal Minister of Finance and 
Federal Minister for Economic Aﬀairs and Energy 
hold the Chair and Deputy Chair positions in 
alternation. The Board is composed of 37 addition-
al members from across German society. These 
members include federal ministers speciﬁed in 
the Law Concerning KfW; members appointed by 
the legislative branch of government, the Bunde-
stag and Bundesrat; representatives of banks and 
savings banks; and representatives of industry, 
the municipalities, agriculture, commerce, handi-
crafts, housing and the trade unions. Transparen-
cy is maintained by the KfW Executive and Supervi-
sory Boards being subject to the Public Corporate 
Governance Code, and the KfW is required to have 
its annual ﬁnancial statements audited by an 
independent auditor.
Over the decades, KfW has built up substantial 
lending capacity that has become increasingly 
green in orientation. In 2016, new lending amount-
ed to €81 billion while 44 per cent of this lending 
(over €35 billion) was dedicated to environmental 
and climate protection projects (KfW 2017, 2). 
Importantly, the KfW does not strive to maximize 
returns but instead to oﬀer low-interest loans. Its 
returns, therefore, are well below that of the 
private sector’s average. This is not a problem, 
though, because KfW excels at fulﬁlling its man-
date of supplying low-interest loans and grants. 
That is its underlying rationale.
The operational strategies of KfW are diverse and 
complex given its large size and scope of business. 
The KfW has four banking divisions separated 
along domestically and internationally oriented 
operations (KfW 2016, 2). For domestic-oriented 
lending, which constitutes about two thirds of 
lending, the SME Bank (Mittelstandsbank) supports 
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), 
business start-ups and other commercial clients. 
The Municipal and Private Client Bank (Kommunal- 
und Privatkundenbank/Kreditinstitute) provides 
private ﬁnancing for housing, education, and 
climate or environmental protection and public 
funding for municipal infrastructure and regional 
development banks (see Box 2 below). For interna-
tionally oriented lending, which is about a third of 
lending, the KfW IPEX-Bank supports international 
export and project ﬁnance. The KfW Development 
Bank (DEG) supports developing and transition 
countries. In October 2012, KfW opened a ﬁfth 
charitable division, the KfW Stiftung, as an indepen-
dent non-proﬁt foundation operating under the 
banners of responsible entrepreneurship; social 
commitment; environment and climate; art and 
culture (KfW 2015a, 13-14).
Unlike commercial banks like the HSBC or 
Citibank, development banks like the KfW do not 
accept personal deposits or lend directly to 
individuals. The KfW lends directly to other banks, 
municipalities and developing country govern-
ments. And, instead of accepting individual 
deposits, the KfW draws in capital from ﬁnancial 
markets and then lends on to various banking 
intermediaries, institutions and organisations that 
have more direct access and contact with individu-
al customers. One beneﬁt of oﬃcial state owner-
ship for the KfW is that it comes with an explicit 
sovereign guarantee, which supports the KfW’s 
very strong credit rating (S&P AAA). This enables 
the KfW to access market-based funds at cheaper 
rates of interest, and pass these savings along.
The KfW can fund projects alone or in collabora-
tion with other funders and donors. The types of 
ﬁnancial instruments used vary across the divi-
sions, but include:
Grants: ﬁnancing provided exclusively from 
German Federal Government budget funds, 
which does not have to be repaid.
Standard loans: subsidized loans from federal 
budget funds that have to be repaid by the 
borrower.
Development loans: a combination of federal 
budget funds and funds that KfW raises on the 
capital market. Combining funds enables the 
loan terms and conditions to be adjusted to the 
economic strength of the borrower country and 
features of the project.
Promotional loans: loans to partners in devel-
oping countries as mandated by the Federal 
Government. The loans are used for projects 
that have a development impact, but for which 
ﬁnancing via the commercial banking sector 
alone is not oﬀered (e.g. due to the longer 
ﬁnancing period necessary).
Oﬃcial donations: KfW may also accept funds 
from other donors.
Green bonds: for investors who place high value 
on sustainable investment.
The funding of projects may be not-for-proﬁt 
(concessional) or at market rates (non-concession-
al). Research suggests that the KfW tends to prefer 
‘promotional loans with subsidized credits’, that is, 
programme-tied loans that explicitly target govern-
ment-determined priority projects geared towards 
overcoming society’s grand challenges, such as 
climate change (Mazzucato and Penna 2015). In 
this way, KfW funds can help to promote the 
public interest.
Green lending ﬁgures prominently in the KfW, 
which has adopted a strong focus on renewable 
energy development (KfW 2015, 18). Notably, 
KfW’s green activities have been guided by a series 
of legal and governmental initiatives undertaken 
in Germany society since 2000, notably the Renew-
able Energy Act (2000); the Integrated Energy and 
Climate Programme (2007); the Climate Initiative 
(2008); and the Energy Initiative (2010). These 
public policy initiatives provide important context 
for why the KfW has committed 44 per cent of all 
lending to green, environmental and low-carbon 
projects.
Costa Rica’s BPDC
The BPDC is a public-like bank that is legally 
owned by the workers of Costa Rica.4 Control of 
the bank, however, is exercised both by worker 
and government representatives. The Govern-
ment of Costa Rica created the BPDC in 1969 to 
promote development and to oﬀer economic 
protection for the country’s workers. Established 
under special law, the BPDC is deﬁned as a 
non-state but public institution that is 100 per 
cent owned by the workers of Costa Rica (BPDC 
2012, 7). A worker’s right to share ownership is 
dependent on having a mandatory savings 
account for at least one year.
The BPDC’s overarching mission is to serve the 
social and sustainable welfare of Costa Ricans 
(BPDC 2015, 15). In 2010, a nationwide 
consultative process gave rise to ﬁve new 
‘Guidelines’ for the Workers’ Assembly:
1. The promotion of the social economy;
2. A quality oﬀering of services by the   
 Conglomerate;
3. The competitive management of the   
 institution;
4. Regional and local development; and
5. The conglomerate as an entity for   
 development.5
Three strategic axes further guide banking 
decisions: gender equity, accessibility and 
environmental responsibility.
The BPDC’s governance model (i.e. control of 
strategic decision-making) is impressive, repre-
senting perhaps the most democratic bank in the 
world. The highest governing body of the BPDC is 
the Assembly of Workers (Asamblea de los Traba-
jadores y Trabajadoras). While not initially mandat-
ed in law, legal changes in 1986 established the 
Workers’ Assembly as the peak of the bank’s 
governance. As of late 2016, the Workers’ Assem-
bly represents nearly 1.2 million savers (BPDC 
2017, 13). That is about 20 per cent of the popula-
tion! Operationally, the Workers’ Assembly itself is 
constituted by 290 individual representatives from 
10 social and economic sectors in Costa Rica 
(artisanal; communal; cooperative; self-managed; 
independent; teachers; professional; confederated 
syndicates; non-confederated and solidarity 
syndicates).
Unlike examples of successful European cooper-
ative banks that are often locally or regionally 
focused, the BPDC is national (see Kalmi 2012). 
This geographical spread can create challenges of 
representation, solidarity and political will to 
sustain the cooperative model. That said, BPDC 
has explicit and formal links to the 10 social 
sectors, which are themselves founded on a 
strong historical tradition of solidarity and cooper-
ative development in Costa Rica. Through its 
lending, the bank strengthens these sectors.
Democratizing finance: 
The BPDC way
To inform a new direction for the BPDC in 
promoting the social economy, the bank’s Nation-
al Board of Directors organized a series of nation-
wide forums. The BPDC social sector leaders in 
the Workers’ Assembly and senior management 
participated in the forums, which connected with 
nearly 1,500 participants across Costa Rica’s 11 
diﬀerent regions. The results have shaped the 
future of the bank (BPDC 2015, 25).
While worker-owners provide strategic direction 
to the BPDC through the Assembly, eﬀective 
control over daily operations is exercised by the 
National Board of Directors, which is the bank’s 
highest administrative unit. The bank’s Board of 
Directors is composed of seven members: four 
represent the Assembly and three, the Govern-
ment. Presently, there are four women and three 
men on the Board, fulﬁlling the requirement that 
it be at least half women. This has earned the 
BPDC an important marker of democratisation, 
namely that it became the ﬁrst public organisation 
in Central America to establish at least 50 per cent 
of women in their decision-making bodies (BPDC 
2017, 13).
The operational strategy of the BPDC reﬂects its 
status as a universal bank (which combines retail 
commercial and developmental functions) and its 
mission to serve the working class of Costa Rica. 
Target clients include workers, peasants, and 
micro-, small- and medium-sized enterprises 
(MSMEs) as well as communal, cooperative and 
municipal development associations. This is 
signiﬁcant: the BPDC prioritizes working with 
cooperatives and public institutions, as well as 
with those people typically excluded from ﬁnan-
cial services. This is qualitatively diﬀerent from the 
bulk of corporative private banks.
The BPDC approach to ﬁnancial sustainability is 
much broader than maximizing returns. Rather, as 
directed by the Workers’ Assembly, the BPDC now 
operates according to what it refers to as a triple 
bottom-line: the economic; the environmental; 
and the social (BPDC 2012, 21). That is, the envi-
ronmental and social good is placed alongside a 
need to generate positive ﬁnancial returns within 
the bank – another qualitative diﬀerence from 
typical private banks.
Unlike strictly public banks, however, the Costa 
Rican government does not explicitly guarantee 
the BPDC. Nevertheless, BPDC experts suggest 
that the bank beneﬁts from implicit state backing. 
That is, most people believe that the BPDC has 
state backing and that, should push come to 
shove and the BPDC face economic troubles, it 
would receive state support. This, together with 
the fact that the bank is founded according to a 
speciﬁc public law (unlike private banks) and thus 
operates according to that law, supports the bank’ 
s credit rating and societal trust in the bank. In 
short, the BPDC has the conﬁdence of markets 
and of the people.
A middle road between profits 
and social lending?
As a universal bank, the BPDC oﬀers a wide 
variety of lending and ﬁnancial services. Since 
2000, it too has grown into a larger ﬁnancial 
conglomerate (and the third largest bank in Costa 
Rica) that incorporates not only its commercial 
and development banking services, but also 
pension, stock market, investment and insurance 
services.
Its banking division is separated into three areas: 
personal banking (Banca de Persona); business and 
corporate banking (Banca Empresarial y Corporati-
va); and social development banking (Banca de 
Desarrollo Social). Notably, 25 per cent of the 
entire BPDC Conglomerate’s returns are chan-
nelled into a series of ‘special funds’, which are 
explicitly intended to meet the social needs of 
those typically excluded from the banking system 
in Costa Rica (BPDC 2017, 58).
The BPDC returns are nonetheless in line with 
other universal banks in developing countries, 
averaging around 1.5 per cent return on assets in 
the last few years. In simple terms, that is at least 
50 per cent more earnings than your average 
private bank (e.g. HSBC or Citibank) in the US or 
Europe.
Conﬁdential interviews with BPDC personnel 
reveal insights into its daily operations. In the past, 
generating returns via commercial activities was 
less important, but since the late 1990s it became 
more signiﬁcant, even overarching. Proﬁts began 
to override its worker-oriented mandate. However, 
more recently, the Workers’ Assembly has 
demanded a return to the bank’s core mandate 
and to servicing the social economy.
These changes experienced in the BPDC opera-
tions have created an interesting situation. The 
ﬁnancial returns now generated by the more 
commercial-oriented operations are seen by some 
personnel as enabling the bank’s other concession-
ary lending (meaning not-for-proﬁt, discounted, or 
made cheaper in one way or another) pro-
grammes (such as the ‘Social Development Bank’). 
Others, however, argue that the whole banking 
operation should be geared towards more social 
and concessionary lending. Presently, the BPDC 
has taken a middle road between proﬁts and 
social lending, with an aim to enhancing the social 
economic and environmental role of the BPDC.
How BPDC is linked to the 
working class and the public 
sector
It should be noted that a deﬁning characteristic 
of the bank derives from a unique source of 
capital, which is linked to the workers of Costa 
Rica. Article 5 of the BPDC Law states that all 
public and private employers must contribute 0.5 
per cent of paid monthly wages to the bank’s 
capital base. Additionally, workers must contrib-
ute 1 per cent of their monthly wages. These 
contributions (or ‘obligatory savings’) are deduct-
ed by the employer and deposited in the BPDC. 
After a year, 1.25 per cent of these savings are 
transferred to each worker’s own pension fund. 
The BPDC, for its part, gets to hold onto the other 
0.25 per cent as a means of permanent capitalisa-
tion. This feature provides economic stability to 
the bank, and infuses a sense of publicness into 
the capital resources held by the bank.
The BPDC is also shaped by its unique links to 
Costa Rica’s public sphere. The BPDC accepts over 
40 per cent of the public sector payroll deposits 
(BPDC 2012, 42). In addition, and unlike private 
banks, the BPDC – because it is governed under 
public law – is not required to hold capital reserves 
in the central bank. This frees up capital for 
lending. Additionally, the BPDC relies on long-term 
deposits and loans from other publicly owned 
development banks to support its own lending 
operations. In this way, the BPDC has a diversity of 
sources of capital that, moreover, inextricably link 
the BPDC to the working class and to the public 
sector. In interviews with BPDC senior managers, 
the bank’s historic ties to workers and the public 
sphere were clearly recognized and celebrated as 
important and unique characteristics of the bank’s 
history and operating ethos.
In response to its deepening environmental 
direction, the BPDC has developed specialty green 
lending facilities, such as the Eco-savings and 
Eco-credits, geared speciﬁcally towards MSME 
projects in which the environment is a key 
element of the project. In 2017 for example, the 
BPDC, in collaboration with a local provider, 
launched a programme to purchase and install 
solar energy panels in residential settings.
As another part of its developmental mandate, 
the BPDC supports local communal associations 
in the provisioning of sustainable, safe local water 
supply systems (ASADAS). According to one local 
BPDC manager: “The BPDC is doing training and 
supporting ASADAS to help them run better, more 
sustainably”.6 This type of assistance too must be 
considered green and sustainable lending.
The BPDC has begun to produce annual Sustain-
ability Reports, which follow the Global Reporting 
Initiative7 guidelines. The bank now tracks its own 
consumption of energy and can more concretely 
strategize around reducing its own carbon impact. 
The Pensions division, for example, has been 
certiﬁed as ‘carbon neutral’ for the last four years 
and been awarded a Five-Star climate change 
award three years running (BPDC 2017, 72). In the 
words of the BPDC: “In environmental matters we 
are promoting green products, accountability and 
the incorporation of this theme throughout the 
chain of value” (2017, 68).
Spotlight on financing energy 
democracy: The BPDC and 
COOPELESCA
“In this case, the community is socializing the 
responsibility of taking care of the environ-
ment” (author interview with BPDC Employee 
in Business Management, San Carlos, Costa 
Rica, 7 April 2017)
In the central valley of Costa Rica, an important 
strategic ‘green’ alliance exists between the BPDC 
and a regional energy cooperative, COOPELESCA.8 
COOPELESCA was formed in 1965 and began 
distributing energy in 1969. Today, the coopera-
tive supplies about 10 per cent of Costa Rica’s 
energy and it is doing so sustainably. In 2013, the 
Costa Rican government certiﬁed the cooperative 
as “Carbon Neutral”, giving COOPELESCA the 
distinction of being the ﬁrst energy distributor in 
Latin America to achieve this certiﬁcation. By 2015, 
COOPELESCA was able to fully oﬀset its carbon 
footprint by using its own resources and through 
its own environmental initiatives.
COOPELESCA environmental policy
COOPELESCA expresses its commitment to 
systematically avoid, mitigate and compen-
sate for negative environmental impacts and 
to optimize the positive environmental 
impacts derived from its economic and social 
projects.
Two examples show how the BPDC has facilitated 
the ‘greening’ of COOPELESCA, and by extension, 
its community. First, the BPDC ﬁnanced the 
conversion of all lighting within COOPELESCA to 
low-energy LED. Together with the energy coopera-
tive, local BPDC staﬀ analyzed the potential cost 
savings from the switch, and then granted a 
low-cost loan based on these savings. The switch 
to LED contributed to gaining carbon neutral 
certiﬁcation, and even continues to provide 
COOPELESCA additional cost reductions beyond 
the cost of ﬁnancing.
Second, the BPDC ﬁnanced a COOPELESCA 
initiative to purchase land for conservation purpos-
es. Beginning in 2009, the community of San 
Carlos recognized that the border areas of the 
Juan Castro Blanco National Park were at risk of 
over-exploitation by local farmers. This, in turn, 
jeopardized the valley’s clean water supply. In 
response to a broad-based community preserva-
tion initiative, the Associates’ Assembly of 
COOPELESCA decided to purchase land in order to 
help preserve the park's natural water resources, 
biodiversity, air, soil and scenic beauty. Coopera-
tive members raised US$1 million in funds, and 
with this approached the BPDC for an additional 
$2 million-loan at not-for-proﬁt concessional rates. 
This collaboration enabled COOPELESCA to pur-
chase and protect 1,124.7 hectares in the national 
park. COOPELESCA workers maintain and protect 
the forest, and the cooperative is developing 
research collaborations with public universities to 
support student environmental and biodiversity 
programming in the reclaimed areas. The farmers 
who sold their land to COOPELESCA have moved 
on, but there remain more areas within the park in 
need of reclaiming for the ecological and common 
good of the community.
In summary, the BPDC exempliﬁes a large, nation-
al, universal, public-like cooperative bank that also 
has a long history and signiﬁcant lending capacity 
in Costa Rica. Its governance model of ownership 
and control is substantially democratic insofar as it 
represents broad sections of Costa Rican society 
and government. Uniquely, the bank is unmistak-
ably oriented towards serving the needs of workers 
and the poor in Costa Rica. Over the last ﬁve to 10 
years, the BPDC has taken signiﬁcant steps towards 
internalizing environmental (and gender equity) 
goals into its operations. Initial interviews suggest 
that BPDC personnel deeply share this vision.
Still, there is room for improvement. In terms of 
ownership and eﬀective control, at times it seems 
the government can exercise deciding inﬂuence. 
Should workers assume complete governing 
control? What if workers decided to privatize the 
BPDC, would this be in the public interest? The 
issue remains open to debate in Costa Rica. In 
terms of the bank’s green proﬁle, it is certainly 
orienting operations in this direction. Yet the 
BPDC does not systematically measure the impact 
or levels of green lending programmes. Conse-
quently, what the balance of environmental versus 
regular lending is remains unknown. As with most 
public banks today, it is important to work 
towards substantively greening the bank from 
start to ﬁnish, so that lending in one area does not 
oﬀset the green lending in another. This is espe-
cially important when trying to ﬁnd the balance 
between concessional and non-concessional 
lending, or between generating returns and 
maximizing social and environmental impacts. 
There is much to commend the BPDC for, not least 
of which as a strong example of ﬁnancial democra-
tisation and mobilisation of public capital, but it is 
not perfect and there is work yet to be done.
Germany’s KfW: A global 
developmental juggernaut
Germany’s KfW is quite a diﬀerent bank from the 
BPDC. It is a fully public or state-owned and 
controlled development bank (‘promotional’ bank 
in European terms), whose existence is also 
inscribed in public law. Ownership rests with the 
Federal Republic of Germany, which holds 80 per 
cent of KfW shares, and the German federal states, 
which hold 20 per cent. While today the KfW aims 
for the “sustainable improvement of the economic, 
social, and ecological conditions of people’s lives”, 
the bank was born out of post-WWII reconstruc-
tion eﬀorts (founded in 1948).9 The German 
government decided to create a bank to manage 
the incoming Marshall Plan reconstruction funds, 
rather than directly spending the money.
The decision had foresight. Since then, the KfW 
has grown to be one of the largest national 
development banks in the world. Many scholars 
cite KfW as a good example of a public develop-
ment bank that is also ‘green’ (Griﬃth-Jones 2016). 
Yet no public bank should be idealized, and the 
KfW has its problems. Dramatically, the KfW and 
its subsidiary, the IKB (Industriekreditbank), got 
deeply embroiled in the 2008-09 global ﬁnancial 
crisis. The IKB wanted a new source of returns, 
and the subprime mortgage mania seemed to be 
the answer. Yet when the crash hit the conse-
quences cost it dearly (and the KfW by extension). 
When market logics begin to drive public sector 
decisions, this is often the consequence. Social 
forces must actively ensure that public banks are 
run transparently and democratically in the public, 
not private, interest.
The KfW nevertheless has a solid, if imperfect, 
governance structure. At base, it enables the 
representation of German government and 
society within the bank (KfW 2015, 174-6). This is 
not the case for every public bank. The KfW’s 
shareholders (i.e. the government) are represent-
ed by the Board of Supervisory Directors, which 
functions as a general shareholders’ forum (KfW 
2015, 179). The Federal Minister of Finance and 
Federal Minister for Economic Aﬀairs and Energy 
hold the Chair and Deputy Chair positions in 
alternation. The Board is composed of 37 addition-
al members from across German society. These 
members include federal ministers speciﬁed in 
the Law Concerning KfW; members appointed by 
the legislative branch of government, the Bunde-
stag and Bundesrat; representatives of banks and 
savings banks; and representatives of industry, 
the municipalities, agriculture, commerce, handi-
crafts, housing and the trade unions. Transparen-
cy is maintained by the KfW Executive and Supervi-
sory Boards being subject to the Public Corporate 
Governance Code, and the KfW is required to have 
its annual ﬁnancial statements audited by an 
independent auditor.
Over the decades, KfW has built up substantial 
lending capacity that has become increasingly 
green in orientation. In 2016, new lending amount-
ed to €81 billion while 44 per cent of this lending 
(over €35 billion) was dedicated to environmental 
and climate protection projects (KfW 2017, 2). 
Importantly, the KfW does not strive to maximize 
returns but instead to oﬀer low-interest loans. Its 
returns, therefore, are well below that of the 
private sector’s average. This is not a problem, 
though, because KfW excels at fulﬁlling its man-
date of supplying low-interest loans and grants. 
That is its underlying rationale.
The operational strategies of KfW are diverse and 
complex given its large size and scope of business. 
The KfW has four banking divisions separated 
along domestically and internationally oriented 
operations (KfW 2016, 2). For domestic-oriented 
lending, which constitutes about two thirds of 
lending, the SME Bank (Mittelstandsbank) supports 
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), 
business start-ups and other commercial clients. 
The Municipal and Private Client Bank (Kommunal- 
und Privatkundenbank/Kreditinstitute) provides 
private ﬁnancing for housing, education, and 
climate or environmental protection and public 
funding for municipal infrastructure and regional 
development banks (see Box 2 below). For interna-
tionally oriented lending, which is about a third of 
lending, the KfW IPEX-Bank supports international 
export and project ﬁnance. The KfW Development 
Bank (DEG) supports developing and transition 
countries. In October 2012, KfW opened a ﬁfth 
charitable division, the KfW Stiftung, as an indepen-
dent non-proﬁt foundation operating under the 
banners of responsible entrepreneurship; social 
commitment; environment and climate; art and 
culture (KfW 2015a, 13-14).
Unlike commercial banks like the HSBC or 
Citibank, development banks like the KfW do not 
accept personal deposits or lend directly to 
individuals. The KfW lends directly to other banks, 
municipalities and developing country govern-
ments. And, instead of accepting individual 
deposits, the KfW draws in capital from ﬁnancial 
markets and then lends on to various banking 
intermediaries, institutions and organisations that 
have more direct access and contact with individu-
al customers. One beneﬁt of oﬃcial state owner-
ship for the KfW is that it comes with an explicit 
sovereign guarantee, which supports the KfW’s 
very strong credit rating (S&P AAA). This enables 
the KfW to access market-based funds at cheaper 
rates of interest, and pass these savings along.
The KfW can fund projects alone or in collabora-
tion with other funders and donors. The types of 
ﬁnancial instruments used vary across the divi-
sions, but include:
Grants: ﬁnancing provided exclusively from 
German Federal Government budget funds, 
which does not have to be repaid.
Standard loans: subsidized loans from federal 
budget funds that have to be repaid by the 
borrower.
Development loans: a combination of federal 
budget funds and funds that KfW raises on the 
capital market. Combining funds enables the 
loan terms and conditions to be adjusted to the 
economic strength of the borrower country and 
features of the project.
Promotional loans: loans to partners in devel-
oping countries as mandated by the Federal 
Government. The loans are used for projects 
that have a development impact, but for which 
ﬁnancing via the commercial banking sector 
alone is not oﬀered (e.g. due to the longer 
ﬁnancing period necessary).
Oﬃcial donations: KfW may also accept funds 
from other donors.
Green bonds: for investors who place high value 
on sustainable investment.
The funding of projects may be not-for-proﬁt 
(concessional) or at market rates (non-concession-
al). Research suggests that the KfW tends to prefer 
‘promotional loans with subsidized credits’, that is, 
programme-tied loans that explicitly target govern-
ment-determined priority projects geared towards 
overcoming society’s grand challenges, such as 
climate change (Mazzucato and Penna 2015). In 
this way, KfW funds can help to promote the 
public interest.
Green lending ﬁgures prominently in the KfW, 
which has adopted a strong focus on renewable 
energy development (KfW 2015, 18). Notably, 
KfW’s green activities have been guided by a series 
of legal and governmental initiatives undertaken 
in Germany society since 2000, notably the Renew-
able Energy Act (2000); the Integrated Energy and 
Climate Programme (2007); the Climate Initiative 
(2008); and the Energy Initiative (2010). These 
public policy initiatives provide important context 
for why the KfW has committed 44 per cent of all 
lending to green, environmental and low-carbon 
projects.
The KfW thus exempliﬁes a large, developed 
country development bank that has a long, stable 
history and signiﬁcant contemporary lending 
capacity. Its governance model is broadly demo-
cratic, drawing in representatives of German 
society. Over the last 15 years or so, moreover, 
the KfW has made impressive strides towards 
reorienting its lending towards environmental 
ends and promoting a low-carbon future. 
Yet, there is room for improvement. While 44 per 
cent of lending is deemed ‘green’, presumably 66 
per cent cannot be or is not assessed along 
environmental lines. In other words, the KfW 
engages in programme lending that does not 
appear ﬁt for ‘green’ purpose or that undermines 
its otherwise good environmental work. Further-
more, in conﬁdential interviews with German 
stakeholders, some suggested that there may 
exist forms of ‘corporate capture’ of KfW green 
resources. That is, some of Germany’s largest 
corporations may disproportionally beneﬁt from 
certain KfW green lending, such as solar panels, in 
ways that may undermine social equality. These 
same stakeholder interviews revealed that the 
decision-making processes within KfW could be 
improved and democratized. If the KfW’s experi-
ence with the 2008-09 ﬁnancial crisis can be taken 
as a failure to work in the public interest, then 
perhaps deeper democratisation can counteract 
any such future problems. Just like Costa Rica’s 
BPDC, Germany’s KfW is a work in constant 
progress. Social forces must ensure these banks 
work and evolve organisationally in the public 
interest and for energy democracy.
Putting green public banks’ 
potential in context
To achieve the SDGs and the ambitions of the 
Paris Agreement, an estimated US$90 trillion 
worth of infrastructure need to be ﬁnanced. To 
date, the IFIs have done relatively little. From 2012 
to 2014, IFI investments promoting energy eﬃcien-
cy equated to a mere 14 per cent of IFIs’ energy 
portfolio, which equates to only 3 per cent of IFI 
total investments (CPI 2017). Commentators also 
lament that public and private investors (read: 
private) see a lack of investment-ready, ‘bankable’ 
projects as a major constraint to future green 
investment as the culprit for such dismal results. 
This has given rise to (existential?) questions of 
whether the private sector is willing or able to 
deliver.
It remains the case that public spending by 
governments on infrastructure constitutes the 
largest proportion of investments, by far, estimat-
ed at about US$1.5 trillion annually (Levy 2017). 
Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) generated an 
additional $112 billion in 2015, with a ﬁnancing 
leverage ratio of about 1:1 (for every dollar invest-
ed publicly, another private dollar would follow). 
In 2015 the Multilateral Development Banks 
contributed about $80 billion. Given the estimated 
US$90 trillion in investments required in the near 
future, the burning questions are how to increase 
investment, and how to green it.
The fact is that public sources of funding are 
doing much, and that there is also potential for 
public banks to do more in the current context. 
This is a point of agreement by the ‘Right’ and 
advocates of market-oriented approaches and by 
the ‘Left’ and advocates of solutions driven by the 
public interest. The position taken in this issue 
brief is that there is a whole world of potential 
public bank catalyzers for a green and just energy 
transformation. That said, public banks must not 
be taken as a panacea in and of themselves, for 
the mere fact that they are public. Their potential 
depends on the actual policies and practices of 
the public banks and the extent to which these 
practices are deﬁned democratically and in the 
public interest. 
The burning issue of ﬁnancial sustainability must 
also be raised. Disagreements continue to rage 
over the ﬁnancial viability and desirability of public 
banks. Conventional economists and neoliberal 
market advocates remain ﬁrmly against public 
ownership, arguing that it leads to corruption and 
economic ineﬃciencies. Heterodox economists 
contest such claims, arguing that the economic 
evidence against public bank ownership is not as 
strong as suggested and that public banks can be 
as eﬃcient as private banks (Levy et al. 2007). 
Others, too, would argue that proﬁtability is 
secondary to the public banks’ capacity to drive 
innovation, address society’s grand challenges, 
and to their capacity to rebuilding and reclaiming 
a progressive public ethos (Marois 2015; Mazzuca-
to and Penna 2015; Povel 2015).
In the end, there is no compelling evidence that 
public banks cannot be ﬁnancially sustainable for 
the simple reason that they are publicly owned (as 
the KfW and BPDC suggest). Most studies claiming 
private banking superiority, moreover, are meth-
odologically ﬂawed. Their approach is typically to 
assess whether public banks are as eﬃcient as 
private banks at making money. One might as well 
ask if oranges are better at making apple juice 
than apples. Many public banks either do not have 
a proﬁt mandate or proﬁtability stands alongside 
other social and development goals, as with the 
BPDC and the KfW. Private corporate banks seek 
proﬁts alone, and are essentially oriented in this 
sole direction. This, in turn, is what has prevented 
more substantial private investments in a global 
green transformation. It is also why private 
investors are unlikely to support social goals like 
energy democracy.
That being said, public banks can perform their 
mandated duties in ﬁnancially sustainable ways in 
at least two diﬀerent ways:
on a not-for-proﬁt basis, which implies that 
returns are re-invested by the bank in society; 
and
via explicit loss-making operations, which 
implies that the government or another part of 
the bank subsidizes such losses to ensure the 
bank’s overall long-term sustainability.
It needs emphasizing that, as for any public or 
public-like entity, ﬁnancial sustainability needs to 
be accounted for across the full spectrum of the 
public bank’s activities and impacts. Accordingly, 
appropriate incentives and training need to be put 
in place to incentivize bank management and staﬀ 
to approve projects according to this long-term 
practice of ﬁnancial sustainability in the public 
good. In any case, the issue of ﬁnancial sustainabil-
ity needs to be democratically decided in line with 
a public bank’s mandate and mission – as 
opposed to the ideologically driven proﬁtability 
imperatives of conventional economics – and this 
should be made fully understood by the public.
Finally, ﬁnancial sustainability should be consid-
ered beyond ‘lending’ to also include forms of 
‘ownership and equity’. Public banks can fund 
public infrastructure and other venture projects, 
and in return take a stake in the new institution. 
Over time the equity stake can pay dividends back 
to the bank, which in turn beneﬁts the public 
purse (see Mazzucato 2015). This is nowhere 
without risks, but the payoﬀs can be ﬁnancially 
and developmentally astounding. Cooperative 
banks such as the BPDC can also consider taking a 
stake in new coop investments as a way of promot-
ing cooperativism in society. Building strong 
coop–coop collaborations helps to solidify a future 
of social solidarity development, which in turn 
helps to provide for the political and economic will 
required to maintain truly cooperative and public 
operations working in the public interest.
Conclusion: What can public 
banks do for a just energy 
transformation?
There are real concrete beneﬁts in having public 
banks involved in the green transformation of 
society. A look at Germany’s development bank 
KfW and Costa Rica’s universal BPDC helps to 
illustrate their potential, but also shortcomings. 
Banks can be public and serve the public good, 
and do so democratically. Public banks can raise 
the needed capital for personal and infrastructur-
al investments, and channel this towards low 
carbon and climate resilient programmes. Proﬁt-
ability need not be the primary measure of a 
bank’s success, and the bank’s stability need not 
be threatened by such an approach. As public 
banks take on greater roles in green transforma-
tion they can help build the needed public ethos 
and necessary technical expertise. These are 
important possibilities.
That said, there are a number of barriers to 
realizing the potential of public banks to ﬁnance a 
green and just energy transformation. Internally, 
public banks need to ﬁnd eﬀective ways of trans-
lating popular democratic aspirations into eﬀec-
tive and sustainable operational strategies.
Sometimes this can lead to conﬂicts between 
those who own the bank (shareholders and 
associated stakeholders) and those who control it 
(senior management and technical experts). This 
politicisation of the banks should not be shied 
away from, but embraced through open, represen-
tative and transparent democratic structures. 
Likewise, public banks need to confront possible 
abuses by either governing parties or bank func-
tionaries. No one beneﬁts from the abuse of 
public banks or the wasting of collective resources 
via ineﬀective banks. Accountability and transpar-
ency must reign supreme.
Externally, public banks face the seemingly 
insurmountable structural context of neoliberal 
ﬁnancial capitalism. For one, neoliberal ideology 
and development practices threaten the very 
legitimacy and existence of public banks. Main-
stream neoclassical economics and liberal political 
economy, by deﬁnition, see public banks as subopti-
mal market actors, which by virtue of public owner-
ship are inherently ineﬃcient and corrupt entities. 
The solution is invariably privatisation. While some 
international institutions have had to begrudgingly 
accept a role for public banks in addressing the 
global climate challenge (and recurrent global 
ﬁnancial crises), their hard-core belief in private 
sector superiority remains rock solid. 
For another, the context of global ﬁnancial 
capitalism has created an intensely competitive 
context for public banks. Gone are the days of a 
purely national developmental strategic orienta-
tion and the possibility of banks ignoring global 
ﬁnancial markets. Today’s public banks are inter-
twined globally, borrowing funds from abroad, 
dealing in global ﬁnancial markets and currencies, 
and mitigating global ﬁnancial risks and crises 
nationally. The experience of KfW in the global 
crisis is instructive. Moreover, public banks are 
under constant threat of takeover, nationally and 
from foreign banking giants. Public and coopera-
tive banks must vigilantly promote a social and 
public ethos in society through their operations. 
Private actors will manifestly oppose this as 
ineﬃcient, biased and corrupt.
Yet lamenting the inﬂuence of neoliberal agents 
and the power of global ﬁnance capital forms no 
eﬀective strategy of resistance. Progressives must 
think strategically and transformatively. Support 
for and capacity in public ﬁnance is a necessary, if 
not suﬃcient, condition for any break with neolib-
eral ﬁnancial capitalism (Marois 2015). Likewise, a 
green and just energy transformation requires, 
among other things, ﬁnancing based on solidarity 
and oriented in the public interest. 
To this end, society must hold their public banks 
to account and, in fact, demand their substantive 
democratisation and ‘greening’. The strides 
towards these positive goals in the KfW and BPDC, 
while distinct, society-speciﬁc and incomplete, are 
substantial. Such positive examples must not be 
taken for granted, but used as a basis to deepen 
and extend the political and economic democratic 
foundations of society and, in particular, to build 
progressive campaigns around democratizing 
ﬁnance for sustainable and just energy transforma-
tion.
In terms of speciﬁc strategies around defending 
and improving public banks, we have elsewhere 
considered a range of actions for progressive 
campaigns.10 These are worth revisiting, by way of 
closing, vis-à-vis public banks and energy 
democracy. These include:
1. Framing public ﬁnance as a common  
 good: The ﬁnancial sector is the nervous  
 system of society, and it needs to be   
 conceived of in the public interest.
2. Democratized banking: The struggle to  
 defend public banks must also involve  
 their democratisation as a long-term   
 strategy of social sustainability.
3. Collective ownership and control: State  
 or public ownership is only one form of  
 ownership. Many other progressive,   
 collective forms of cooperative and   
 worker-controlled banks should be   
 pursued and not be undermined by   
 neoliberal ideology.
4. Radical scholarship: Critical scholars   
 must engage more systematically in the  
 real problem of understanding and   
 advocating for eﬀective public ﬁnancial  
 alternatives.
5. Linking the green transformation to  
 public provisioning: Environmental   
 sustainability demands eﬀective,   
 long-term and accountable sources of   
 ﬁnance. Public banks are uniquely capable  
 of playing a lead, proactive role in a global  
 green and just transition.
6. Collective organisation in the banking  
 sector: Bank workers need eﬀective union  
 representation, and unions can be  
 powerful actors of resistance to   
 neoliberalism and ﬁnancialisation as well  
 as powerful advocates of progressive   
 social change.
7. Solidarity across sectors: Too often   
 dialogue and solidarity between   
 traditional trade unionists,ﬁnance workers  
 and (other) public sector workers is   
 non-existent, and this needs to change for  
 a green and just energy transformation.
・Energy-efficient construction and refurbishment ・Renewable energy (solar; wind)
・Renewable energy storage capacity ・Biodiversity conservation projects
・Green bonds ・Biodiversity days ・Botanical gardens
・Municipal and social infrastructure projects ・Municipal energy supply 
・Urban energy-efficient rehabilitation ・Social business projects for women
KfW diversity in green lending programmes
Through its Urban Energy-Eﬃcient Rehabilitation programmes, the KfW ﬁnancially supports the greening 
of German municipalities, local authorities, municipally owned companies and non-proﬁt organisations 
via energy-eﬃcient building refurbishment loans. The Bank provides long-term, low interest-rate loans 
whose terms are sweetened by repayment bonuses linked to the energy eﬃciencies realized. Details 
include:
・Loan maturities up to 30 years, with a ﬁxed interest rate for 10 years;
・Repayment bonuses of up to 12.5 per cent of a loan’s amount, subject to expert veriﬁcation; 
・A repayment-free, start-up period of up to ﬁve years.
It is not just a top-down venture, but one that aims at initiating “broad and locally adjusted investments 
in energy eﬃciency and renewable energies” . In 2016, the programme accounted for nearly €750 million 
in public bank–public sector ﬁnancing for municipal retroﬁtting to support greater energy eﬃciencies.
Sources: Bach 2017; Hubert and Cochran 2013.
KfW and the greening of municipalities
Costa Rica’s BPDC
The BPDC is a public-like bank that is legally 
owned by the workers of Costa Rica.4 Control of 
the bank, however, is exercised both by worker 
and government representatives. The Govern-
ment of Costa Rica created the BPDC in 1969 to 
promote development and to oﬀer economic 
protection for the country’s workers. Established 
under special law, the BPDC is deﬁned as a 
non-state but public institution that is 100 per 
cent owned by the workers of Costa Rica (BPDC 
2012, 7). A worker’s right to share ownership is 
dependent on having a mandatory savings 
account for at least one year.
The BPDC’s overarching mission is to serve the 
social and sustainable welfare of Costa Ricans 
(BPDC 2015, 15). In 2010, a nationwide 
consultative process gave rise to ﬁve new 
‘Guidelines’ for the Workers’ Assembly:
1. The promotion of the social economy;
2. A quality oﬀering of services by the   
 Conglomerate;
3. The competitive management of the   
 institution;
4. Regional and local development; and
5. The conglomerate as an entity for   
 development.5
Three strategic axes further guide banking 
decisions: gender equity, accessibility and 
environmental responsibility.
The BPDC’s governance model (i.e. control of 
strategic decision-making) is impressive, repre-
senting perhaps the most democratic bank in the 
world. The highest governing body of the BPDC is 
the Assembly of Workers (Asamblea de los Traba-
jadores y Trabajadoras). While not initially mandat-
ed in law, legal changes in 1986 established the 
Workers’ Assembly as the peak of the bank’s 
governance. As of late 2016, the Workers’ Assem-
bly represents nearly 1.2 million savers (BPDC 
2017, 13). That is about 20 per cent of the popula-
tion! Operationally, the Workers’ Assembly itself is 
constituted by 290 individual representatives from 
10 social and economic sectors in Costa Rica 
(artisanal; communal; cooperative; self-managed; 
independent; teachers; professional; confederated 
syndicates; non-confederated and solidarity 
syndicates).
Unlike examples of successful European cooper-
ative banks that are often locally or regionally 
focused, the BPDC is national (see Kalmi 2012). 
This geographical spread can create challenges of 
representation, solidarity and political will to 
sustain the cooperative model. That said, BPDC 
has explicit and formal links to the 10 social 
sectors, which are themselves founded on a 
strong historical tradition of solidarity and cooper-
ative development in Costa Rica. Through its 
lending, the bank strengthens these sectors.
Democratizing finance: 
The BPDC way
To inform a new direction for the BPDC in 
promoting the social economy, the bank’s Nation-
al Board of Directors organized a series of nation-
wide forums. The BPDC social sector leaders in 
the Workers’ Assembly and senior management 
participated in the forums, which connected with 
nearly 1,500 participants across Costa Rica’s 11 
diﬀerent regions. The results have shaped the 
future of the bank (BPDC 2015, 25).
While worker-owners provide strategic direction 
to the BPDC through the Assembly, eﬀective 
control over daily operations is exercised by the 
National Board of Directors, which is the bank’s 
highest administrative unit. The bank’s Board of 
Directors is composed of seven members: four 
represent the Assembly and three, the Govern-
ment. Presently, there are four women and three 
men on the Board, fulﬁlling the requirement that 
it be at least half women. This has earned the 
BPDC an important marker of democratisation, 
namely that it became the ﬁrst public organisation 
in Central America to establish at least 50 per cent 
of women in their decision-making bodies (BPDC 
2017, 13).
The operational strategy of the BPDC reﬂects its 
status as a universal bank (which combines retail 
commercial and developmental functions) and its 
mission to serve the working class of Costa Rica. 
Target clients include workers, peasants, and 
micro-, small- and medium-sized enterprises 
(MSMEs) as well as communal, cooperative and 
municipal development associations. This is 
signiﬁcant: the BPDC prioritizes working with 
cooperatives and public institutions, as well as 
with those people typically excluded from ﬁnan-
cial services. This is qualitatively diﬀerent from the 
bulk of corporative private banks.
The BPDC approach to ﬁnancial sustainability is 
much broader than maximizing returns. Rather, as 
directed by the Workers’ Assembly, the BPDC now 
operates according to what it refers to as a triple 
bottom-line: the economic; the environmental; 
and the social (BPDC 2012, 21). That is, the envi-
ronmental and social good is placed alongside a 
need to generate positive ﬁnancial returns within 
the bank – another qualitative diﬀerence from 
typical private banks.
Unlike strictly public banks, however, the Costa 
Rican government does not explicitly guarantee 
the BPDC. Nevertheless, BPDC experts suggest 
that the bank beneﬁts from implicit state backing. 
That is, most people believe that the BPDC has 
state backing and that, should push come to 
shove and the BPDC face economic troubles, it 
would receive state support. This, together with 
the fact that the bank is founded according to a 
speciﬁc public law (unlike private banks) and thus 
operates according to that law, supports the bank’ 
s credit rating and societal trust in the bank. In 
short, the BPDC has the conﬁdence of markets 
and of the people.
A middle road between profits 
and social lending?
As a universal bank, the BPDC oﬀers a wide 
variety of lending and ﬁnancial services. Since 
2000, it too has grown into a larger ﬁnancial 
conglomerate (and the third largest bank in Costa 
Rica) that incorporates not only its commercial 
and development banking services, but also 
pension, stock market, investment and insurance 
services.
Its banking division is separated into three areas: 
personal banking (Banca de Persona); business and 
corporate banking (Banca Empresarial y Corporati-
va); and social development banking (Banca de 
Desarrollo Social). Notably, 25 per cent of the 
entire BPDC Conglomerate’s returns are chan-
nelled into a series of ‘special funds’, which are 
explicitly intended to meet the social needs of 
those typically excluded from the banking system 
in Costa Rica (BPDC 2017, 58).
The BPDC returns are nonetheless in line with 
other universal banks in developing countries, 
averaging around 1.5 per cent return on assets in 
the last few years. In simple terms, that is at least 
50 per cent more earnings than your average 
private bank (e.g. HSBC or Citibank) in the US or 
Europe.
Conﬁdential interviews with BPDC personnel 
reveal insights into its daily operations. In the past, 
generating returns via commercial activities was 
less important, but since the late 1990s it became 
more signiﬁcant, even overarching. Proﬁts began 
to override its worker-oriented mandate. However, 
more recently, the Workers’ Assembly has 
demanded a return to the bank’s core mandate 
and to servicing the social economy.
These changes experienced in the BPDC opera-
tions have created an interesting situation. The 
ﬁnancial returns now generated by the more 
commercial-oriented operations are seen by some 
personnel as enabling the bank’s other concession-
ary lending (meaning not-for-proﬁt, discounted, or 
made cheaper in one way or another) pro-
grammes (such as the ‘Social Development Bank’). 
Others, however, argue that the whole banking 
operation should be geared towards more social 
and concessionary lending. Presently, the BPDC 
has taken a middle road between proﬁts and 
social lending, with an aim to enhancing the social 
economic and environmental role of the BPDC.
How BPDC is linked to the 
working class and the public 
sector
It should be noted that a deﬁning characteristic 
of the bank derives from a unique source of 
capital, which is linked to the workers of Costa 
Rica. Article 5 of the BPDC Law states that all 
public and private employers must contribute 0.5 
per cent of paid monthly wages to the bank’s 
capital base. Additionally, workers must contrib-
ute 1 per cent of their monthly wages. These 
contributions (or ‘obligatory savings’) are deduct-
ed by the employer and deposited in the BPDC. 
After a year, 1.25 per cent of these savings are 
transferred to each worker’s own pension fund. 
The BPDC, for its part, gets to hold onto the other 
0.25 per cent as a means of permanent capitalisa-
tion. This feature provides economic stability to 
the bank, and infuses a sense of publicness into 
the capital resources held by the bank.
The BPDC is also shaped by its unique links to 
Costa Rica’s public sphere. The BPDC accepts over 
40 per cent of the public sector payroll deposits 
(BPDC 2012, 42). In addition, and unlike private 
banks, the BPDC – because it is governed under 
public law – is not required to hold capital reserves 
in the central bank. This frees up capital for 
lending. Additionally, the BPDC relies on long-term 
deposits and loans from other publicly owned 
development banks to support its own lending 
operations. In this way, the BPDC has a diversity of 
sources of capital that, moreover, inextricably link 
the BPDC to the working class and to the public 
sector. In interviews with BPDC senior managers, 
the bank’s historic ties to workers and the public 
sphere were clearly recognized and celebrated as 
important and unique characteristics of the bank’s 
history and operating ethos.
In response to its deepening environmental 
direction, the BPDC has developed specialty green 
lending facilities, such as the Eco-savings and 
Eco-credits, geared speciﬁcally towards MSME 
projects in which the environment is a key 
element of the project. In 2017 for example, the 
BPDC, in collaboration with a local provider, 
launched a programme to purchase and install 
solar energy panels in residential settings.
As another part of its developmental mandate, 
the BPDC supports local communal associations 
in the provisioning of sustainable, safe local water 
supply systems (ASADAS). According to one local 
BPDC manager: “The BPDC is doing training and 
supporting ASADAS to help them run better, more 
sustainably”.6 This type of assistance too must be 
considered green and sustainable lending.
The BPDC has begun to produce annual Sustain-
ability Reports, which follow the Global Reporting 
Initiative7 guidelines. The bank now tracks its own 
consumption of energy and can more concretely 
strategize around reducing its own carbon impact. 
The Pensions division, for example, has been 
certiﬁed as ‘carbon neutral’ for the last four years 
and been awarded a Five-Star climate change 
award three years running (BPDC 2017, 72). In the 
words of the BPDC: “In environmental matters we 
are promoting green products, accountability and 
the incorporation of this theme throughout the 
chain of value” (2017, 68).
Spotlight on financing energy 
democracy: The BPDC and 
COOPELESCA
“In this case, the community is socializing the 
responsibility of taking care of the environ-
ment” (author interview with BPDC Employee 
in Business Management, San Carlos, Costa 
Rica, 7 April 2017)
In the central valley of Costa Rica, an important 
strategic ‘green’ alliance exists between the BPDC 
and a regional energy cooperative, COOPELESCA.8 
COOPELESCA was formed in 1965 and began 
distributing energy in 1969. Today, the coopera-
tive supplies about 10 per cent of Costa Rica’s 
energy and it is doing so sustainably. In 2013, the 
Costa Rican government certiﬁed the cooperative 
as “Carbon Neutral”, giving COOPELESCA the 
distinction of being the ﬁrst energy distributor in 
Latin America to achieve this certiﬁcation. By 2015, 
COOPELESCA was able to fully oﬀset its carbon 
footprint by using its own resources and through 
its own environmental initiatives.
COOPELESCA environmental policy
COOPELESCA expresses its commitment to 
systematically avoid, mitigate and compen-
sate for negative environmental impacts and 
to optimize the positive environmental 
impacts derived from its economic and social 
projects.
Two examples show how the BPDC has facilitated 
the ‘greening’ of COOPELESCA, and by extension, 
its community. First, the BPDC ﬁnanced the 
conversion of all lighting within COOPELESCA to 
low-energy LED. Together with the energy coopera-
tive, local BPDC staﬀ analyzed the potential cost 
savings from the switch, and then granted a 
low-cost loan based on these savings. The switch 
to LED contributed to gaining carbon neutral 
certiﬁcation, and even continues to provide 
COOPELESCA additional cost reductions beyond 
the cost of ﬁnancing.
Second, the BPDC ﬁnanced a COOPELESCA 
initiative to purchase land for conservation purpos-
es. Beginning in 2009, the community of San 
Carlos recognized that the border areas of the 
Juan Castro Blanco National Park were at risk of 
over-exploitation by local farmers. This, in turn, 
jeopardized the valley’s clean water supply. In 
response to a broad-based community preserva-
tion initiative, the Associates’ Assembly of 
COOPELESCA decided to purchase land in order to 
help preserve the park's natural water resources, 
biodiversity, air, soil and scenic beauty. Coopera-
tive members raised US$1 million in funds, and 
with this approached the BPDC for an additional 
$2 million-loan at not-for-proﬁt concessional rates. 
This collaboration enabled COOPELESCA to pur-
chase and protect 1,124.7 hectares in the national 
park. COOPELESCA workers maintain and protect 
the forest, and the cooperative is developing 
research collaborations with public universities to 
support student environmental and biodiversity 
programming in the reclaimed areas. The farmers 
who sold their land to COOPELESCA have moved 
on, but there remain more areas within the park in 
need of reclaiming for the ecological and common 
good of the community.
In summary, the BPDC exempliﬁes a large, nation-
al, universal, public-like cooperative bank that also 
has a long history and signiﬁcant lending capacity 
in Costa Rica. Its governance model of ownership 
and control is substantially democratic insofar as it 
represents broad sections of Costa Rican society 
and government. Uniquely, the bank is unmistak-
ably oriented towards serving the needs of workers 
and the poor in Costa Rica. Over the last ﬁve to 10 
years, the BPDC has taken signiﬁcant steps towards 
internalizing environmental (and gender equity) 
goals into its operations. Initial interviews suggest 
that BPDC personnel deeply share this vision.
Still, there is room for improvement. In terms of 
ownership and eﬀective control, at times it seems 
the government can exercise deciding inﬂuence. 
Should workers assume complete governing 
control? What if workers decided to privatize the 
BPDC, would this be in the public interest? The 
issue remains open to debate in Costa Rica. In 
terms of the bank’s green proﬁle, it is certainly 
orienting operations in this direction. Yet the 
BPDC does not systematically measure the impact 
or levels of green lending programmes. Conse-
quently, what the balance of environmental versus 
regular lending is remains unknown. As with most 
public banks today, it is important to work 
towards substantively greening the bank from 
start to ﬁnish, so that lending in one area does not 
oﬀset the green lending in another. This is espe-
cially important when trying to ﬁnd the balance 
between concessional and non-concessional 
lending, or between generating returns and 
maximizing social and environmental impacts. 
There is much to commend the BPDC for, not least 
of which as a strong example of ﬁnancial democra-
tisation and mobilisation of public capital, but it is 
not perfect and there is work yet to be done.
Germany’s KfW: A global 
developmental juggernaut
Germany’s KfW is quite a diﬀerent bank from the 
BPDC. It is a fully public or state-owned and 
controlled development bank (‘promotional’ bank 
in European terms), whose existence is also 
inscribed in public law. Ownership rests with the 
Federal Republic of Germany, which holds 80 per 
cent of KfW shares, and the German federal states, 
which hold 20 per cent. While today the KfW aims 
for the “sustainable improvement of the economic, 
social, and ecological conditions of people’s lives”, 
the bank was born out of post-WWII reconstruc-
tion eﬀorts (founded in 1948).9 The German 
government decided to create a bank to manage 
the incoming Marshall Plan reconstruction funds, 
rather than directly spending the money.
The decision had foresight. Since then, the KfW 
has grown to be one of the largest national 
development banks in the world. Many scholars 
cite KfW as a good example of a public develop-
ment bank that is also ‘green’ (Griﬃth-Jones 2016). 
Yet no public bank should be idealized, and the 
KfW has its problems. Dramatically, the KfW and 
its subsidiary, the IKB (Industriekreditbank), got 
deeply embroiled in the 2008-09 global ﬁnancial 
crisis. The IKB wanted a new source of returns, 
and the subprime mortgage mania seemed to be 
the answer. Yet when the crash hit the conse-
quences cost it dearly (and the KfW by extension). 
When market logics begin to drive public sector 
decisions, this is often the consequence. Social 
forces must actively ensure that public banks are 
run transparently and democratically in the public, 
not private, interest.
The KfW nevertheless has a solid, if imperfect, 
governance structure. At base, it enables the 
representation of German government and 
society within the bank (KfW 2015, 174-6). This is 
not the case for every public bank. The KfW’s 
shareholders (i.e. the government) are represent-
ed by the Board of Supervisory Directors, which 
functions as a general shareholders’ forum (KfW 
2015, 179). The Federal Minister of Finance and 
Federal Minister for Economic Aﬀairs and Energy 
hold the Chair and Deputy Chair positions in 
alternation. The Board is composed of 37 addition-
al members from across German society. These 
members include federal ministers speciﬁed in 
the Law Concerning KfW; members appointed by 
the legislative branch of government, the Bunde-
stag and Bundesrat; representatives of banks and 
savings banks; and representatives of industry, 
the municipalities, agriculture, commerce, handi-
crafts, housing and the trade unions. Transparen-
cy is maintained by the KfW Executive and Supervi-
sory Boards being subject to the Public Corporate 
Governance Code, and the KfW is required to have 
its annual ﬁnancial statements audited by an 
independent auditor.
Over the decades, KfW has built up substantial 
lending capacity that has become increasingly 
green in orientation. In 2016, new lending amount-
ed to €81 billion while 44 per cent of this lending 
(over €35 billion) was dedicated to environmental 
and climate protection projects (KfW 2017, 2). 
Importantly, the KfW does not strive to maximize 
returns but instead to oﬀer low-interest loans. Its 
returns, therefore, are well below that of the 
private sector’s average. This is not a problem, 
though, because KfW excels at fulﬁlling its man-
date of supplying low-interest loans and grants. 
That is its underlying rationale.
The operational strategies of KfW are diverse and 
complex given its large size and scope of business. 
The KfW has four banking divisions separated 
along domestically and internationally oriented 
operations (KfW 2016, 2). For domestic-oriented 
lending, which constitutes about two thirds of 
lending, the SME Bank (Mittelstandsbank) supports 
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), 
business start-ups and other commercial clients. 
The Municipal and Private Client Bank (Kommunal- 
und Privatkundenbank/Kreditinstitute) provides 
private ﬁnancing for housing, education, and 
climate or environmental protection and public 
funding for municipal infrastructure and regional 
development banks (see Box 2 below). For interna-
tionally oriented lending, which is about a third of 
lending, the KfW IPEX-Bank supports international 
export and project ﬁnance. The KfW Development 
Bank (DEG) supports developing and transition 
countries. In October 2012, KfW opened a ﬁfth 
charitable division, the KfW Stiftung, as an indepen-
dent non-proﬁt foundation operating under the 
banners of responsible entrepreneurship; social 
commitment; environment and climate; art and 
culture (KfW 2015a, 13-14).
Unlike commercial banks like the HSBC or 
Citibank, development banks like the KfW do not 
accept personal deposits or lend directly to 
individuals. The KfW lends directly to other banks, 
municipalities and developing country govern-
ments. And, instead of accepting individual 
deposits, the KfW draws in capital from ﬁnancial 
markets and then lends on to various banking 
intermediaries, institutions and organisations that 
have more direct access and contact with individu-
al customers. One beneﬁt of oﬃcial state owner-
ship for the KfW is that it comes with an explicit 
sovereign guarantee, which supports the KfW’s 
very strong credit rating (S&P AAA). This enables 
the KfW to access market-based funds at cheaper 
rates of interest, and pass these savings along.
The KfW can fund projects alone or in collabora-
tion with other funders and donors. The types of 
ﬁnancial instruments used vary across the divi-
sions, but include:
Grants: ﬁnancing provided exclusively from 
German Federal Government budget funds, 
which does not have to be repaid.
Standard loans: subsidized loans from federal 
budget funds that have to be repaid by the 
borrower.
Development loans: a combination of federal 
budget funds and funds that KfW raises on the 
capital market. Combining funds enables the 
loan terms and conditions to be adjusted to the 
economic strength of the borrower country and 
features of the project.
Promotional loans: loans to partners in devel-
oping countries as mandated by the Federal 
Government. The loans are used for projects 
that have a development impact, but for which 
ﬁnancing via the commercial banking sector 
alone is not oﬀered (e.g. due to the longer 
ﬁnancing period necessary).
Oﬃcial donations: KfW may also accept funds 
from other donors.
Green bonds: for investors who place high value 
on sustainable investment.
The funding of projects may be not-for-proﬁt 
(concessional) or at market rates (non-concession-
al). Research suggests that the KfW tends to prefer 
‘promotional loans with subsidized credits’, that is, 
programme-tied loans that explicitly target govern-
ment-determined priority projects geared towards 
overcoming society’s grand challenges, such as 
climate change (Mazzucato and Penna 2015). In 
this way, KfW funds can help to promote the 
public interest.
Green lending ﬁgures prominently in the KfW, 
which has adopted a strong focus on renewable 
energy development (KfW 2015, 18). Notably, 
KfW’s green activities have been guided by a series 
of legal and governmental initiatives undertaken 
in Germany society since 2000, notably the Renew-
able Energy Act (2000); the Integrated Energy and 
Climate Programme (2007); the Climate Initiative 
(2008); and the Energy Initiative (2010). These 
public policy initiatives provide important context 
for why the KfW has committed 44 per cent of all 
lending to green, environmental and low-carbon 
projects.
The KfW thus exempliﬁes a large, developed 
country development bank that has a long, stable 
history and signiﬁcant contemporary lending 
capacity. Its governance model is broadly demo-
cratic, drawing in representatives of German 
society. Over the last 15 years or so, moreover, 
the KfW has made impressive strides towards 
reorienting its lending towards environmental 
ends and promoting a low-carbon future. 
Yet, there is room for improvement. While 44 per 
cent of lending is deemed ‘green’, presumably 66 
per cent cannot be or is not assessed along 
environmental lines. In other words, the KfW 
engages in programme lending that does not 
appear ﬁt for ‘green’ purpose or that undermines 
its otherwise good environmental work. Further-
more, in conﬁdential interviews with German 
stakeholders, some suggested that there may 
exist forms of ‘corporate capture’ of KfW green 
resources. That is, some of Germany’s largest 
corporations may disproportionally beneﬁt from 
certain KfW green lending, such as solar panels, in 
ways that may undermine social equality. These 
same stakeholder interviews revealed that the 
decision-making processes within KfW could be 
improved and democratized. If the KfW’s experi-
ence with the 2008-09 ﬁnancial crisis can be taken 
as a failure to work in the public interest, then 
perhaps deeper democratisation can counteract 
any such future problems. Just like Costa Rica’s 
BPDC, Germany’s KfW is a work in constant 
progress. Social forces must ensure these banks 
work and evolve organisationally in the public 
interest and for energy democracy.
Putting green public banks’ 
potential in context
To achieve the SDGs and the ambitions of the 
Paris Agreement, an estimated US$90 trillion 
worth of infrastructure need to be ﬁnanced. To 
date, the IFIs have done relatively little. From 2012 
to 2014, IFI investments promoting energy eﬃcien-
cy equated to a mere 14 per cent of IFIs’ energy 
portfolio, which equates to only 3 per cent of IFI 
total investments (CPI 2017). Commentators also 
lament that public and private investors (read: 
private) see a lack of investment-ready, ‘bankable’ 
projects as a major constraint to future green 
investment as the culprit for such dismal results. 
This has given rise to (existential?) questions of 
whether the private sector is willing or able to 
deliver.
It remains the case that public spending by 
governments on infrastructure constitutes the 
largest proportion of investments, by far, estimat-
ed at about US$1.5 trillion annually (Levy 2017). 
Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) generated an 
additional $112 billion in 2015, with a ﬁnancing 
leverage ratio of about 1:1 (for every dollar invest-
ed publicly, another private dollar would follow). 
In 2015 the Multilateral Development Banks 
contributed about $80 billion. Given the estimated 
US$90 trillion in investments required in the near 
future, the burning questions are how to increase 
investment, and how to green it.
The fact is that public sources of funding are 
doing much, and that there is also potential for 
public banks to do more in the current context. 
This is a point of agreement by the ‘Right’ and 
advocates of market-oriented approaches and by 
the ‘Left’ and advocates of solutions driven by the 
public interest. The position taken in this issue 
brief is that there is a whole world of potential 
public bank catalyzers for a green and just energy 
transformation. That said, public banks must not 
be taken as a panacea in and of themselves, for 
the mere fact that they are public. Their potential 
depends on the actual policies and practices of 
the public banks and the extent to which these 
practices are deﬁned democratically and in the 
public interest. 
The burning issue of ﬁnancial sustainability must 
also be raised. Disagreements continue to rage 
over the ﬁnancial viability and desirability of public 
banks. Conventional economists and neoliberal 
market advocates remain ﬁrmly against public 
ownership, arguing that it leads to corruption and 
economic ineﬃciencies. Heterodox economists 
contest such claims, arguing that the economic 
evidence against public bank ownership is not as 
strong as suggested and that public banks can be 
as eﬃcient as private banks (Levy et al. 2007). 
Others, too, would argue that proﬁtability is 
secondary to the public banks’ capacity to drive 
innovation, address society’s grand challenges, 
and to their capacity to rebuilding and reclaiming 
a progressive public ethos (Marois 2015; Mazzuca-
to and Penna 2015; Povel 2015).
In the end, there is no compelling evidence that 
public banks cannot be ﬁnancially sustainable for 
the simple reason that they are publicly owned (as 
the KfW and BPDC suggest). Most studies claiming 
private banking superiority, moreover, are meth-
odologically ﬂawed. Their approach is typically to 
assess whether public banks are as eﬃcient as 
private banks at making money. One might as well 
ask if oranges are better at making apple juice 
than apples. Many public banks either do not have 
a proﬁt mandate or proﬁtability stands alongside 
other social and development goals, as with the 
BPDC and the KfW. Private corporate banks seek 
proﬁts alone, and are essentially oriented in this 
sole direction. This, in turn, is what has prevented 
more substantial private investments in a global 
green transformation. It is also why private 
investors are unlikely to support social goals like 
energy democracy.
That being said, public banks can perform their 
mandated duties in ﬁnancially sustainable ways in 
at least two diﬀerent ways:
on a not-for-proﬁt basis, which implies that 
returns are re-invested by the bank in society; 
and
via explicit loss-making operations, which 
implies that the government or another part of 
the bank subsidizes such losses to ensure the 
bank’s overall long-term sustainability.
It needs emphasizing that, as for any public or 
public-like entity, ﬁnancial sustainability needs to 
be accounted for across the full spectrum of the 
public bank’s activities and impacts. Accordingly, 
appropriate incentives and training need to be put 
in place to incentivize bank management and staﬀ 
to approve projects according to this long-term 
practice of ﬁnancial sustainability in the public 
good. In any case, the issue of ﬁnancial sustainabil-
ity needs to be democratically decided in line with 
a public bank’s mandate and mission – as 
opposed to the ideologically driven proﬁtability 
imperatives of conventional economics – and this 
should be made fully understood by the public.
Finally, ﬁnancial sustainability should be consid-
ered beyond ‘lending’ to also include forms of 
‘ownership and equity’. Public banks can fund 
public infrastructure and other venture projects, 
and in return take a stake in the new institution. 
Over time the equity stake can pay dividends back 
to the bank, which in turn beneﬁts the public 
purse (see Mazzucato 2015). This is nowhere 
without risks, but the payoﬀs can be ﬁnancially 
and developmentally astounding. Cooperative 
banks such as the BPDC can also consider taking a 
stake in new coop investments as a way of promot-
ing cooperativism in society. Building strong 
coop–coop collaborations helps to solidify a future 
of social solidarity development, which in turn 
helps to provide for the political and economic will 
required to maintain truly cooperative and public 
operations working in the public interest.
Conclusion: What can public 
banks do for a just energy 
transformation?
There are real concrete beneﬁts in having public 
banks involved in the green transformation of 
society. A look at Germany’s development bank 
KfW and Costa Rica’s universal BPDC helps to 
illustrate their potential, but also shortcomings. 
Banks can be public and serve the public good, 
and do so democratically. Public banks can raise 
the needed capital for personal and infrastructur-
al investments, and channel this towards low 
carbon and climate resilient programmes. Proﬁt-
ability need not be the primary measure of a 
bank’s success, and the bank’s stability need not 
be threatened by such an approach. As public 
banks take on greater roles in green transforma-
tion they can help build the needed public ethos 
and necessary technical expertise. These are 
important possibilities.
That said, there are a number of barriers to 
realizing the potential of public banks to ﬁnance a 
green and just energy transformation. Internally, 
public banks need to ﬁnd eﬀective ways of trans-
lating popular democratic aspirations into eﬀec-
tive and sustainable operational strategies.
Sometimes this can lead to conﬂicts between 
those who own the bank (shareholders and 
associated stakeholders) and those who control it 
(senior management and technical experts). This 
politicisation of the banks should not be shied 
away from, but embraced through open, represen-
tative and transparent democratic structures. 
Likewise, public banks need to confront possible 
abuses by either governing parties or bank func-
tionaries. No one beneﬁts from the abuse of 
public banks or the wasting of collective resources 
via ineﬀective banks. Accountability and transpar-
ency must reign supreme.
Externally, public banks face the seemingly 
insurmountable structural context of neoliberal 
ﬁnancial capitalism. For one, neoliberal ideology 
and development practices threaten the very 
legitimacy and existence of public banks. Main-
stream neoclassical economics and liberal political 
economy, by deﬁnition, see public banks as subopti-
mal market actors, which by virtue of public owner-
ship are inherently ineﬃcient and corrupt entities. 
The solution is invariably privatisation. While some 
international institutions have had to begrudgingly 
accept a role for public banks in addressing the 
global climate challenge (and recurrent global 
ﬁnancial crises), their hard-core belief in private 
sector superiority remains rock solid. 
For another, the context of global ﬁnancial 
capitalism has created an intensely competitive 
context for public banks. Gone are the days of a 
purely national developmental strategic orienta-
tion and the possibility of banks ignoring global 
ﬁnancial markets. Today’s public banks are inter-
twined globally, borrowing funds from abroad, 
dealing in global ﬁnancial markets and currencies, 
and mitigating global ﬁnancial risks and crises 
nationally. The experience of KfW in the global 
crisis is instructive. Moreover, public banks are 
under constant threat of takeover, nationally and 
from foreign banking giants. Public and coopera-
tive banks must vigilantly promote a social and 
public ethos in society through their operations. 
Private actors will manifestly oppose this as 
ineﬃcient, biased and corrupt.
Yet lamenting the inﬂuence of neoliberal agents 
and the power of global ﬁnance capital forms no 
eﬀective strategy of resistance. Progressives must 
think strategically and transformatively. Support 
for and capacity in public ﬁnance is a necessary, if 
not suﬃcient, condition for any break with neolib-
eral ﬁnancial capitalism (Marois 2015). Likewise, a 
green and just energy transformation requires, 
among other things, ﬁnancing based on solidarity 
and oriented in the public interest. 
To this end, society must hold their public banks 
to account and, in fact, demand their substantive 
democratisation and ‘greening’. The strides 
towards these positive goals in the KfW and BPDC, 
while distinct, society-speciﬁc and incomplete, are 
substantial. Such positive examples must not be 
taken for granted, but used as a basis to deepen 
and extend the political and economic democratic 
foundations of society and, in particular, to build 
progressive campaigns around democratizing 
ﬁnance for sustainable and just energy transforma-
tion.
In terms of speciﬁc strategies around defending 
and improving public banks, we have elsewhere 
considered a range of actions for progressive 
campaigns.10 These are worth revisiting, by way of 
closing, vis-à-vis public banks and energy 
democracy. These include:
1. Framing public ﬁnance as a common  
 good: The ﬁnancial sector is the nervous  
 system of society, and it needs to be   
 conceived of in the public interest.
2. Democratized banking: The struggle to  
 defend public banks must also involve  
 their democratisation as a long-term   
 strategy of social sustainability.
3. Collective ownership and control: State  
 or public ownership is only one form of  
 ownership. Many other progressive,   
 collective forms of cooperative and   
 worker-controlled banks should be   
 pursued and not be undermined by   
 neoliberal ideology.
4. Radical scholarship: Critical scholars   
 must engage more systematically in the  
 real problem of understanding and   
 advocating for eﬀective public ﬁnancial  
 alternatives.
5. Linking the green transformation to  
 public provisioning: Environmental   
 sustainability demands eﬀective,   
 long-term and accountable sources of   
 ﬁnance. Public banks are uniquely capable  
 of playing a lead, proactive role in a global  
 green and just transition.
6. Collective organisation in the banking  
 sector: Bank workers need eﬀective union  
 representation, and unions can be  
 powerful actors of resistance to   
 neoliberalism and ﬁnancialisation as well  
 as powerful advocates of progressive   
 social change.
7. Solidarity across sectors: Too often   
 dialogue and solidarity between   
 traditional trade unionists,ﬁnance workers  
 and (other) public sector workers is   
 non-existent, and this needs to change for  
 a green and just energy transformation.
Costa Rica’s BPDC
The BPDC is a public-like bank that is legally 
owned by the workers of Costa Rica.4 Control of 
the bank, however, is exercised both by worker 
and government representatives. The Govern-
ment of Costa Rica created the BPDC in 1969 to 
promote development and to oﬀer economic 
protection for the country’s workers. Established 
under special law, the BPDC is deﬁned as a 
non-state but public institution that is 100 per 
cent owned by the workers of Costa Rica (BPDC 
2012, 7). A worker’s right to share ownership is 
dependent on having a mandatory savings 
account for at least one year.
The BPDC’s overarching mission is to serve the 
social and sustainable welfare of Costa Ricans 
(BPDC 2015, 15). In 2010, a nationwide 
consultative process gave rise to ﬁve new 
‘Guidelines’ for the Workers’ Assembly:
1. The promotion of the social economy;
2. A quality oﬀering of services by the   
 Conglomerate;
3. The competitive management of the   
 institution;
4. Regional and local development; and
5. The conglomerate as an entity for   
 development.5
Three strategic axes further guide banking 
decisions: gender equity, accessibility and 
environmental responsibility.
The BPDC’s governance model (i.e. control of 
strategic decision-making) is impressive, repre-
senting perhaps the most democratic bank in the 
world. The highest governing body of the BPDC is 
the Assembly of Workers (Asamblea de los Traba-
jadores y Trabajadoras). While not initially mandat-
ed in law, legal changes in 1986 established the 
Workers’ Assembly as the peak of the bank’s 
governance. As of late 2016, the Workers’ Assem-
bly represents nearly 1.2 million savers (BPDC 
2017, 13). That is about 20 per cent of the popula-
tion! Operationally, the Workers’ Assembly itself is 
constituted by 290 individual representatives from 
10 social and economic sectors in Costa Rica 
(artisanal; communal; cooperative; self-managed; 
independent; teachers; professional; confederated 
syndicates; non-confederated and solidarity 
syndicates).
Unlike examples of successful European cooper-
ative banks that are often locally or regionally 
focused, the BPDC is national (see Kalmi 2012). 
This geographical spread can create challenges of 
representation, solidarity and political will to 
sustain the cooperative model. That said, BPDC 
has explicit and formal links to the 10 social 
sectors, which are themselves founded on a 
strong historical tradition of solidarity and cooper-
ative development in Costa Rica. Through its 
lending, the bank strengthens these sectors.
Democratizing finance: 
The BPDC way
To inform a new direction for the BPDC in 
promoting the social economy, the bank’s Nation-
al Board of Directors organized a series of nation-
wide forums. The BPDC social sector leaders in 
the Workers’ Assembly and senior management 
participated in the forums, which connected with 
nearly 1,500 participants across Costa Rica’s 11 
diﬀerent regions. The results have shaped the 
future of the bank (BPDC 2015, 25).
While worker-owners provide strategic direction 
to the BPDC through the Assembly, eﬀective 
control over daily operations is exercised by the 
National Board of Directors, which is the bank’s 
highest administrative unit. The bank’s Board of 
Directors is composed of seven members: four 
represent the Assembly and three, the Govern-
ment. Presently, there are four women and three 
men on the Board, fulﬁlling the requirement that 
it be at least half women. This has earned the 
BPDC an important marker of democratisation, 
namely that it became the ﬁrst public organisation 
in Central America to establish at least 50 per cent 
of women in their decision-making bodies (BPDC 
2017, 13).
The operational strategy of the BPDC reﬂects its 
status as a universal bank (which combines retail 
commercial and developmental functions) and its 
mission to serve the working class of Costa Rica. 
Target clients include workers, peasants, and 
micro-, small- and medium-sized enterprises 
(MSMEs) as well as communal, cooperative and 
municipal development associations. This is 
signiﬁcant: the BPDC prioritizes working with 
cooperatives and public institutions, as well as 
with those people typically excluded from ﬁnan-
cial services. This is qualitatively diﬀerent from the 
bulk of corporative private banks.
The BPDC approach to ﬁnancial sustainability is 
much broader than maximizing returns. Rather, as 
directed by the Workers’ Assembly, the BPDC now 
operates according to what it refers to as a triple 
bottom-line: the economic; the environmental; 
and the social (BPDC 2012, 21). That is, the envi-
ronmental and social good is placed alongside a 
need to generate positive ﬁnancial returns within 
the bank – another qualitative diﬀerence from 
typical private banks.
Unlike strictly public banks, however, the Costa 
Rican government does not explicitly guarantee 
the BPDC. Nevertheless, BPDC experts suggest 
that the bank beneﬁts from implicit state backing. 
That is, most people believe that the BPDC has 
state backing and that, should push come to 
shove and the BPDC face economic troubles, it 
would receive state support. This, together with 
the fact that the bank is founded according to a 
speciﬁc public law (unlike private banks) and thus 
operates according to that law, supports the bank’ 
s credit rating and societal trust in the bank. In 
short, the BPDC has the conﬁdence of markets 
and of the people.
A middle road between profits 
and social lending?
As a universal bank, the BPDC oﬀers a wide 
variety of lending and ﬁnancial services. Since 
2000, it too has grown into a larger ﬁnancial 
conglomerate (and the third largest bank in Costa 
Rica) that incorporates not only its commercial 
and development banking services, but also 
pension, stock market, investment and insurance 
services.
Its banking division is separated into three areas: 
personal banking (Banca de Persona); business and 
corporate banking (Banca Empresarial y Corporati-
va); and social development banking (Banca de 
Desarrollo Social). Notably, 25 per cent of the 
entire BPDC Conglomerate’s returns are chan-
nelled into a series of ‘special funds’, which are 
explicitly intended to meet the social needs of 
those typically excluded from the banking system 
in Costa Rica (BPDC 2017, 58).
The BPDC returns are nonetheless in line with 
other universal banks in developing countries, 
averaging around 1.5 per cent return on assets in 
the last few years. In simple terms, that is at least 
50 per cent more earnings than your average 
private bank (e.g. HSBC or Citibank) in the US or 
Europe.
Conﬁdential interviews with BPDC personnel 
reveal insights into its daily operations. In the past, 
generating returns via commercial activities was 
less important, but since the late 1990s it became 
more signiﬁcant, even overarching. Proﬁts began 
to override its worker-oriented mandate. However, 
more recently, the Workers’ Assembly has 
demanded a return to the bank’s core mandate 
and to servicing the social economy.
These changes experienced in the BPDC opera-
tions have created an interesting situation. The 
ﬁnancial returns now generated by the more 
commercial-oriented operations are seen by some 
personnel as enabling the bank’s other concession-
ary lending (meaning not-for-proﬁt, discounted, or 
made cheaper in one way or another) pro-
grammes (such as the ‘Social Development Bank’). 
Others, however, argue that the whole banking 
operation should be geared towards more social 
and concessionary lending. Presently, the BPDC 
has taken a middle road between proﬁts and 
social lending, with an aim to enhancing the social 
economic and environmental role of the BPDC.
How BPDC is linked to the 
working class and the public 
sector
It should be noted that a deﬁning characteristic 
of the bank derives from a unique source of 
capital, which is linked to the workers of Costa 
Rica. Article 5 of the BPDC Law states that all 
public and private employers must contribute 0.5 
per cent of paid monthly wages to the bank’s 
capital base. Additionally, workers must contrib-
ute 1 per cent of their monthly wages. These 
contributions (or ‘obligatory savings’) are deduct-
ed by the employer and deposited in the BPDC. 
After a year, 1.25 per cent of these savings are 
transferred to each worker’s own pension fund. 
The BPDC, for its part, gets to hold onto the other 
0.25 per cent as a means of permanent capitalisa-
tion. This feature provides economic stability to 
the bank, and infuses a sense of publicness into 
the capital resources held by the bank.
The BPDC is also shaped by its unique links to 
Costa Rica’s public sphere. The BPDC accepts over 
40 per cent of the public sector payroll deposits 
(BPDC 2012, 42). In addition, and unlike private 
banks, the BPDC – because it is governed under 
public law – is not required to hold capital reserves 
in the central bank. This frees up capital for 
lending. Additionally, the BPDC relies on long-term 
deposits and loans from other publicly owned 
development banks to support its own lending 
operations. In this way, the BPDC has a diversity of 
sources of capital that, moreover, inextricably link 
the BPDC to the working class and to the public 
sector. In interviews with BPDC senior managers, 
the bank’s historic ties to workers and the public 
sphere were clearly recognized and celebrated as 
important and unique characteristics of the bank’s 
history and operating ethos.
In response to its deepening environmental 
direction, the BPDC has developed specialty green 
lending facilities, such as the Eco-savings and 
Eco-credits, geared speciﬁcally towards MSME 
projects in which the environment is a key 
element of the project. In 2017 for example, the 
BPDC, in collaboration with a local provider, 
launched a programme to purchase and install 
solar energy panels in residential settings.
As another part of its developmental mandate, 
the BPDC supports local communal associations 
in the provisioning of sustainable, safe local water 
supply systems (ASADAS). According to one local 
BPDC manager: “The BPDC is doing training and 
supporting ASADAS to help them run better, more 
sustainably”.6 This type of assistance too must be 
considered green and sustainable lending.
The BPDC has begun to produce annual Sustain-
ability Reports, which follow the Global Reporting 
Initiative7 guidelines. The bank now tracks its own 
consumption of energy and can more concretely 
strategize around reducing its own carbon impact. 
The Pensions division, for example, has been 
certiﬁed as ‘carbon neutral’ for the last four years 
and been awarded a Five-Star climate change 
award three years running (BPDC 2017, 72). In the 
words of the BPDC: “In environmental matters we 
are promoting green products, accountability and 
the incorporation of this theme throughout the 
chain of value” (2017, 68).
Spotlight on financing energy 
democracy: The BPDC and 
COOPELESCA
“In this case, the community is socializing the 
responsibility of taking care of the environ-
ment” (author interview with BPDC Employee 
in Business Management, San Carlos, Costa 
Rica, 7 April 2017)
In the central valley of Costa Rica, an important 
strategic ‘green’ alliance exists between the BPDC 
and a regional energy cooperative, COOPELESCA.8 
COOPELESCA was formed in 1965 and began 
distributing energy in 1969. Today, the coopera-
tive supplies about 10 per cent of Costa Rica’s 
energy and it is doing so sustainably. In 2013, the 
Costa Rican government certiﬁed the cooperative 
as “Carbon Neutral”, giving COOPELESCA the 
distinction of being the ﬁrst energy distributor in 
Latin America to achieve this certiﬁcation. By 2015, 
COOPELESCA was able to fully oﬀset its carbon 
footprint by using its own resources and through 
its own environmental initiatives.
COOPELESCA environmental policy
COOPELESCA expresses its commitment to 
systematically avoid, mitigate and compen-
sate for negative environmental impacts and 
to optimize the positive environmental 
impacts derived from its economic and social 
projects.
Two examples show how the BPDC has facilitated 
the ‘greening’ of COOPELESCA, and by extension, 
its community. First, the BPDC ﬁnanced the 
conversion of all lighting within COOPELESCA to 
low-energy LED. Together with the energy coopera-
tive, local BPDC staﬀ analyzed the potential cost 
savings from the switch, and then granted a 
low-cost loan based on these savings. The switch 
to LED contributed to gaining carbon neutral 
certiﬁcation, and even continues to provide 
COOPELESCA additional cost reductions beyond 
the cost of ﬁnancing.
Second, the BPDC ﬁnanced a COOPELESCA 
initiative to purchase land for conservation purpos-
es. Beginning in 2009, the community of San 
Carlos recognized that the border areas of the 
Juan Castro Blanco National Park were at risk of 
over-exploitation by local farmers. This, in turn, 
jeopardized the valley’s clean water supply. In 
response to a broad-based community preserva-
tion initiative, the Associates’ Assembly of 
COOPELESCA decided to purchase land in order to 
help preserve the park's natural water resources, 
biodiversity, air, soil and scenic beauty. Coopera-
tive members raised US$1 million in funds, and 
with this approached the BPDC for an additional 
$2 million-loan at not-for-proﬁt concessional rates. 
This collaboration enabled COOPELESCA to pur-
chase and protect 1,124.7 hectares in the national 
park. COOPELESCA workers maintain and protect 
the forest, and the cooperative is developing 
research collaborations with public universities to 
support student environmental and biodiversity 
programming in the reclaimed areas. The farmers 
who sold their land to COOPELESCA have moved 
on, but there remain more areas within the park in 
need of reclaiming for the ecological and common 
good of the community.
In summary, the BPDC exempliﬁes a large, nation-
al, universal, public-like cooperative bank that also 
has a long history and signiﬁcant lending capacity 
in Costa Rica. Its governance model of ownership 
and control is substantially democratic insofar as it 
represents broad sections of Costa Rican society 
and government. Uniquely, the bank is unmistak-
ably oriented towards serving the needs of workers 
and the poor in Costa Rica. Over the last ﬁve to 10 
years, the BPDC has taken signiﬁcant steps towards 
internalizing environmental (and gender equity) 
goals into its operations. Initial interviews suggest 
that BPDC personnel deeply share this vision.
Still, there is room for improvement. In terms of 
ownership and eﬀective control, at times it seems 
the government can exercise deciding inﬂuence. 
Should workers assume complete governing 
control? What if workers decided to privatize the 
BPDC, would this be in the public interest? The 
issue remains open to debate in Costa Rica. In 
terms of the bank’s green proﬁle, it is certainly 
orienting operations in this direction. Yet the 
BPDC does not systematically measure the impact 
or levels of green lending programmes. Conse-
quently, what the balance of environmental versus 
regular lending is remains unknown. As with most 
public banks today, it is important to work 
towards substantively greening the bank from 
start to ﬁnish, so that lending in one area does not 
oﬀset the green lending in another. This is espe-
cially important when trying to ﬁnd the balance 
between concessional and non-concessional 
lending, or between generating returns and 
maximizing social and environmental impacts. 
There is much to commend the BPDC for, not least 
of which as a strong example of ﬁnancial democra-
tisation and mobilisation of public capital, but it is 
not perfect and there is work yet to be done.
Germany’s KfW: A global 
developmental juggernaut
Germany’s KfW is quite a diﬀerent bank from the 
BPDC. It is a fully public or state-owned and 
controlled development bank (‘promotional’ bank 
in European terms), whose existence is also 
inscribed in public law. Ownership rests with the 
Federal Republic of Germany, which holds 80 per 
cent of KfW shares, and the German federal states, 
which hold 20 per cent. While today the KfW aims 
for the “sustainable improvement of the economic, 
social, and ecological conditions of people’s lives”, 
the bank was born out of post-WWII reconstruc-
tion eﬀorts (founded in 1948).9 The German 
government decided to create a bank to manage 
the incoming Marshall Plan reconstruction funds, 
rather than directly spending the money.
The decision had foresight. Since then, the KfW 
has grown to be one of the largest national 
development banks in the world. Many scholars 
cite KfW as a good example of a public develop-
ment bank that is also ‘green’ (Griﬃth-Jones 2016). 
Yet no public bank should be idealized, and the 
KfW has its problems. Dramatically, the KfW and 
its subsidiary, the IKB (Industriekreditbank), got 
deeply embroiled in the 2008-09 global ﬁnancial 
crisis. The IKB wanted a new source of returns, 
and the subprime mortgage mania seemed to be 
the answer. Yet when the crash hit the conse-
quences cost it dearly (and the KfW by extension). 
When market logics begin to drive public sector 
decisions, this is often the consequence. Social 
forces must actively ensure that public banks are 
run transparently and democratically in the public, 
not private, interest.
The KfW nevertheless has a solid, if imperfect, 
governance structure. At base, it enables the 
representation of German government and 
society within the bank (KfW 2015, 174-6). This is 
not the case for every public bank. The KfW’s 
shareholders (i.e. the government) are represent-
ed by the Board of Supervisory Directors, which 
functions as a general shareholders’ forum (KfW 
2015, 179). The Federal Minister of Finance and 
Federal Minister for Economic Aﬀairs and Energy 
hold the Chair and Deputy Chair positions in 
alternation. The Board is composed of 37 addition-
al members from across German society. These 
members include federal ministers speciﬁed in 
the Law Concerning KfW; members appointed by 
the legislative branch of government, the Bunde-
stag and Bundesrat; representatives of banks and 
savings banks; and representatives of industry, 
the municipalities, agriculture, commerce, handi-
crafts, housing and the trade unions. Transparen-
cy is maintained by the KfW Executive and Supervi-
sory Boards being subject to the Public Corporate 
Governance Code, and the KfW is required to have 
its annual ﬁnancial statements audited by an 
independent auditor.
Over the decades, KfW has built up substantial 
lending capacity that has become increasingly 
green in orientation. In 2016, new lending amount-
ed to €81 billion while 44 per cent of this lending 
(over €35 billion) was dedicated to environmental 
and climate protection projects (KfW 2017, 2). 
Importantly, the KfW does not strive to maximize 
returns but instead to oﬀer low-interest loans. Its 
returns, therefore, are well below that of the 
private sector’s average. This is not a problem, 
though, because KfW excels at fulﬁlling its man-
date of supplying low-interest loans and grants. 
That is its underlying rationale.
The operational strategies of KfW are diverse and 
complex given its large size and scope of business. 
The KfW has four banking divisions separated 
along domestically and internationally oriented 
operations (KfW 2016, 2). For domestic-oriented 
lending, which constitutes about two thirds of 
lending, the SME Bank (Mittelstandsbank) supports 
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), 
business start-ups and other commercial clients. 
The Municipal and Private Client Bank (Kommunal- 
und Privatkundenbank/Kreditinstitute) provides 
private ﬁnancing for housing, education, and 
climate or environmental protection and public 
funding for municipal infrastructure and regional 
development banks (see Box 2 below). For interna-
tionally oriented lending, which is about a third of 
lending, the KfW IPEX-Bank supports international 
export and project ﬁnance. The KfW Development 
Bank (DEG) supports developing and transition 
countries. In October 2012, KfW opened a ﬁfth 
charitable division, the KfW Stiftung, as an indepen-
dent non-proﬁt foundation operating under the 
banners of responsible entrepreneurship; social 
commitment; environment and climate; art and 
culture (KfW 2015a, 13-14).
Unlike commercial banks like the HSBC or 
Citibank, development banks like the KfW do not 
accept personal deposits or lend directly to 
individuals. The KfW lends directly to other banks, 
municipalities and developing country govern-
ments. And, instead of accepting individual 
deposits, the KfW draws in capital from ﬁnancial 
markets and then lends on to various banking 
intermediaries, institutions and organisations that 
have more direct access and contact with individu-
al customers. One beneﬁt of oﬃcial state owner-
ship for the KfW is that it comes with an explicit 
sovereign guarantee, which supports the KfW’s 
very strong credit rating (S&P AAA). This enables 
the KfW to access market-based funds at cheaper 
rates of interest, and pass these savings along.
The KfW can fund projects alone or in collabora-
tion with other funders and donors. The types of 
ﬁnancial instruments used vary across the divi-
sions, but include:
Grants: ﬁnancing provided exclusively from 
German Federal Government budget funds, 
which does not have to be repaid.
Standard loans: subsidized loans from federal 
budget funds that have to be repaid by the 
borrower.
Development loans: a combination of federal 
budget funds and funds that KfW raises on the 
capital market. Combining funds enables the 
loan terms and conditions to be adjusted to the 
economic strength of the borrower country and 
features of the project.
Promotional loans: loans to partners in devel-
oping countries as mandated by the Federal 
Government. The loans are used for projects 
that have a development impact, but for which 
ﬁnancing via the commercial banking sector 
alone is not oﬀered (e.g. due to the longer 
ﬁnancing period necessary).
Oﬃcial donations: KfW may also accept funds 
from other donors.
Green bonds: for investors who place high value 
on sustainable investment.
The funding of projects may be not-for-proﬁt 
(concessional) or at market rates (non-concession-
al). Research suggests that the KfW tends to prefer 
‘promotional loans with subsidized credits’, that is, 
programme-tied loans that explicitly target govern-
ment-determined priority projects geared towards 
overcoming society’s grand challenges, such as 
climate change (Mazzucato and Penna 2015). In 
this way, KfW funds can help to promote the 
public interest.
Green lending ﬁgures prominently in the KfW, 
which has adopted a strong focus on renewable 
energy development (KfW 2015, 18). Notably, 
KfW’s green activities have been guided by a series 
of legal and governmental initiatives undertaken 
in Germany society since 2000, notably the Renew-
able Energy Act (2000); the Integrated Energy and 
Climate Programme (2007); the Climate Initiative 
(2008); and the Energy Initiative (2010). These 
public policy initiatives provide important context 
for why the KfW has committed 44 per cent of all 
lending to green, environmental and low-carbon 
projects.
The KfW thus exempliﬁes a large, developed 
country development bank that has a long, stable 
history and signiﬁcant contemporary lending 
capacity. Its governance model is broadly demo-
cratic, drawing in representatives of German 
society. Over the last 15 years or so, moreover, 
the KfW has made impressive strides towards 
reorienting its lending towards environmental 
ends and promoting a low-carbon future. 
Yet, there is room for improvement. While 44 per 
cent of lending is deemed ‘green’, presumably 66 
per cent cannot be or is not assessed along 
environmental lines. In other words, the KfW 
engages in programme lending that does not 
appear ﬁt for ‘green’ purpose or that undermines 
its otherwise good environmental work. Further-
more, in conﬁdential interviews with German 
stakeholders, some suggested that there may 
exist forms of ‘corporate capture’ of KfW green 
resources. That is, some of Germany’s largest 
corporations may disproportionally beneﬁt from 
certain KfW green lending, such as solar panels, in 
ways that may undermine social equality. These 
same stakeholder interviews revealed that the 
decision-making processes within KfW could be 
improved and democratized. If the KfW’s experi-
ence with the 2008-09 ﬁnancial crisis can be taken 
as a failure to work in the public interest, then 
perhaps deeper democratisation can counteract 
any such future problems. Just like Costa Rica’s 
BPDC, Germany’s KfW is a work in constant 
progress. Social forces must ensure these banks 
work and evolve organisationally in the public 
interest and for energy democracy.
Putting green public banks’ 
potential in context
To achieve the SDGs and the ambitions of the 
Paris Agreement, an estimated US$90 trillion 
worth of infrastructure need to be ﬁnanced. To 
date, the IFIs have done relatively little. From 2012 
to 2014, IFI investments promoting energy eﬃcien-
cy equated to a mere 14 per cent of IFIs’ energy 
portfolio, which equates to only 3 per cent of IFI 
total investments (CPI 2017). Commentators also 
lament that public and private investors (read: 
private) see a lack of investment-ready, ‘bankable’ 
projects as a major constraint to future green 
investment as the culprit for such dismal results. 
This has given rise to (existential?) questions of 
whether the private sector is willing or able to 
deliver.
It remains the case that public spending by 
governments on infrastructure constitutes the 
largest proportion of investments, by far, estimat-
ed at about US$1.5 trillion annually (Levy 2017). 
Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) generated an 
additional $112 billion in 2015, with a ﬁnancing 
leverage ratio of about 1:1 (for every dollar invest-
ed publicly, another private dollar would follow). 
In 2015 the Multilateral Development Banks 
contributed about $80 billion. Given the estimated 
US$90 trillion in investments required in the near 
future, the burning questions are how to increase 
investment, and how to green it.
The fact is that public sources of funding are 
doing much, and that there is also potential for 
public banks to do more in the current context. 
This is a point of agreement by the ‘Right’ and 
advocates of market-oriented approaches and by 
the ‘Left’ and advocates of solutions driven by the 
public interest. The position taken in this issue 
brief is that there is a whole world of potential 
public bank catalyzers for a green and just energy 
transformation. That said, public banks must not 
be taken as a panacea in and of themselves, for 
the mere fact that they are public. Their potential 
depends on the actual policies and practices of 
the public banks and the extent to which these 
practices are deﬁned democratically and in the 
public interest. 
The burning issue of ﬁnancial sustainability must 
also be raised. Disagreements continue to rage 
over the ﬁnancial viability and desirability of public 
banks. Conventional economists and neoliberal 
market advocates remain ﬁrmly against public 
ownership, arguing that it leads to corruption and 
economic ineﬃciencies. Heterodox economists 
contest such claims, arguing that the economic 
evidence against public bank ownership is not as 
strong as suggested and that public banks can be 
as eﬃcient as private banks (Levy et al. 2007). 
Others, too, would argue that proﬁtability is 
secondary to the public banks’ capacity to drive 
innovation, address society’s grand challenges, 
and to their capacity to rebuilding and reclaiming 
a progressive public ethos (Marois 2015; Mazzuca-
to and Penna 2015; Povel 2015).
In the end, there is no compelling evidence that 
public banks cannot be ﬁnancially sustainable for 
the simple reason that they are publicly owned (as 
the KfW and BPDC suggest). Most studies claiming 
private banking superiority, moreover, are meth-
odologically ﬂawed. Their approach is typically to 
assess whether public banks are as eﬃcient as 
private banks at making money. One might as well 
ask if oranges are better at making apple juice 
than apples. Many public banks either do not have 
a proﬁt mandate or proﬁtability stands alongside 
other social and development goals, as with the 
BPDC and the KfW. Private corporate banks seek 
proﬁts alone, and are essentially oriented in this 
sole direction. This, in turn, is what has prevented 
more substantial private investments in a global 
green transformation. It is also why private 
investors are unlikely to support social goals like 
energy democracy.
That being said, public banks can perform their 
mandated duties in ﬁnancially sustainable ways in 
at least two diﬀerent ways:
on a not-for-proﬁt basis, which implies that 
returns are re-invested by the bank in society; 
and
via explicit loss-making operations, which 
implies that the government or another part of 
the bank subsidizes such losses to ensure the 
bank’s overall long-term sustainability.
It needs emphasizing that, as for any public or 
public-like entity, ﬁnancial sustainability needs to 
be accounted for across the full spectrum of the 
public bank’s activities and impacts. Accordingly, 
appropriate incentives and training need to be put 
in place to incentivize bank management and staﬀ 
to approve projects according to this long-term 
practice of ﬁnancial sustainability in the public 
good. In any case, the issue of ﬁnancial sustainabil-
ity needs to be democratically decided in line with 
a public bank’s mandate and mission – as 
opposed to the ideologically driven proﬁtability 
imperatives of conventional economics – and this 
should be made fully understood by the public.
Finally, ﬁnancial sustainability should be consid-
ered beyond ‘lending’ to also include forms of 
‘ownership and equity’. Public banks can fund 
public infrastructure and other venture projects, 
and in return take a stake in the new institution. 
Over time the equity stake can pay dividends back 
to the bank, which in turn beneﬁts the public 
purse (see Mazzucato 2015). This is nowhere 
without risks, but the payoﬀs can be ﬁnancially 
and developmentally astounding. Cooperative 
banks such as the BPDC can also consider taking a 
stake in new coop investments as a way of promot-
ing cooperativism in society. Building strong 
coop–coop collaborations helps to solidify a future 
of social solidarity development, which in turn 
helps to provide for the political and economic will 
required to maintain truly cooperative and public 
operations working in the public interest.
Conclusion: What can public 
banks do for a just energy 
transformation?
There are real concrete beneﬁts in having public 
banks involved in the green transformation of 
society. A look at Germany’s development bank 
KfW and Costa Rica’s universal BPDC helps to 
illustrate their potential, but also shortcomings. 
Banks can be public and serve the public good, 
and do so democratically. Public banks can raise 
the needed capital for personal and infrastructur-
al investments, and channel this towards low 
carbon and climate resilient programmes. Proﬁt-
ability need not be the primary measure of a 
bank’s success, and the bank’s stability need not 
be threatened by such an approach. As public 
banks take on greater roles in green transforma-
tion they can help build the needed public ethos 
and necessary technical expertise. These are 
important possibilities.
That said, there are a number of barriers to 
realizing the potential of public banks to ﬁnance a 
green and just energy transformation. Internally, 
public banks need to ﬁnd eﬀective ways of trans-
lating popular democratic aspirations into eﬀec-
tive and sustainable operational strategies.
Sometimes this can lead to conﬂicts between 
those who own the bank (shareholders and 
associated stakeholders) and those who control it 
(senior management and technical experts). This 
politicisation of the banks should not be shied 
away from, but embraced through open, represen-
tative and transparent democratic structures. 
Likewise, public banks need to confront possible 
abuses by either governing parties or bank func-
tionaries. No one beneﬁts from the abuse of 
public banks or the wasting of collective resources 
via ineﬀective banks. Accountability and transpar-
ency must reign supreme.
Externally, public banks face the seemingly 
insurmountable structural context of neoliberal 
ﬁnancial capitalism. For one, neoliberal ideology 
and development practices threaten the very 
legitimacy and existence of public banks. Main-
stream neoclassical economics and liberal political 
economy, by deﬁnition, see public banks as subopti-
mal market actors, which by virtue of public owner-
ship are inherently ineﬃcient and corrupt entities. 
The solution is invariably privatisation. While some 
international institutions have had to begrudgingly 
accept a role for public banks in addressing the 
global climate challenge (and recurrent global 
ﬁnancial crises), their hard-core belief in private 
sector superiority remains rock solid. 
For another, the context of global ﬁnancial 
capitalism has created an intensely competitive 
context for public banks. Gone are the days of a 
purely national developmental strategic orienta-
tion and the possibility of banks ignoring global 
ﬁnancial markets. Today’s public banks are inter-
twined globally, borrowing funds from abroad, 
dealing in global ﬁnancial markets and currencies, 
and mitigating global ﬁnancial risks and crises 
nationally. The experience of KfW in the global 
crisis is instructive. Moreover, public banks are 
under constant threat of takeover, nationally and 
from foreign banking giants. Public and coopera-
tive banks must vigilantly promote a social and 
public ethos in society through their operations. 
Private actors will manifestly oppose this as 
ineﬃcient, biased and corrupt.
Yet lamenting the inﬂuence of neoliberal agents 
and the power of global ﬁnance capital forms no 
eﬀective strategy of resistance. Progressives must 
think strategically and transformatively. Support 
for and capacity in public ﬁnance is a necessary, if 
not suﬃcient, condition for any break with neolib-
eral ﬁnancial capitalism (Marois 2015). Likewise, a 
green and just energy transformation requires, 
among other things, ﬁnancing based on solidarity 
and oriented in the public interest. 
To this end, society must hold their public banks 
to account and, in fact, demand their substantive 
democratisation and ‘greening’. The strides 
towards these positive goals in the KfW and BPDC, 
while distinct, society-speciﬁc and incomplete, are 
substantial. Such positive examples must not be 
taken for granted, but used as a basis to deepen 
and extend the political and economic democratic 
foundations of society and, in particular, to build 
progressive campaigns around democratizing 
ﬁnance for sustainable and just energy transforma-
tion.
In terms of speciﬁc strategies around defending 
and improving public banks, we have elsewhere 
considered a range of actions for progressive 
campaigns.10 These are worth revisiting, by way of 
closing, vis-à-vis public banks and energy 
democracy. These include:
1. Framing public ﬁnance as a common  
 good: The ﬁnancial sector is the nervous  
 system of society, and it needs to be   
 conceived of in the public interest.
2. Democratized banking: The struggle to  
 defend public banks must also involve  
 their democratisation as a long-term   
 strategy of social sustainability.
3. Collective ownership and control: State  
 or public ownership is only one form of  
 ownership. Many other progressive,   
 collective forms of cooperative and   
 worker-controlled banks should be   
 pursued and not be undermined by   
 neoliberal ideology.
4. Radical scholarship: Critical scholars   
 must engage more systematically in the  
 real problem of understanding and   
 advocating for eﬀective public ﬁnancial  
 alternatives.
5. Linking the green transformation to  
 public provisioning: Environmental   
 sustainability demands eﬀective,   
 long-term and accountable sources of   
 ﬁnance. Public banks are uniquely capable  
 of playing a lead, proactive role in a global  
 green and just transition.
6. Collective organisation in the banking  
 sector: Bank workers need eﬀective union  
 representation, and unions can be  
 powerful actors of resistance to   
 neoliberalism and ﬁnancialisation as well  
 as powerful advocates of progressive   
 social change.
7. Solidarity across sectors: Too often   
 dialogue and solidarity between   
 traditional trade unionists,ﬁnance workers  
 and (other) public sector workers is   
 non-existent, and this needs to change for  
 a green and just energy transformation.
Costa Rica’s BPDC
The BPDC is a public-like bank that is legally 
owned by the workers of Costa Rica.4 Control of 
the bank, however, is exercised both by worker 
and government representatives. The Govern-
ment of Costa Rica created the BPDC in 1969 to 
promote development and to oﬀer economic 
protection for the country’s workers. Established 
under special law, the BPDC is deﬁned as a 
non-state but public institution that is 100 per 
cent owned by the workers of Costa Rica (BPDC 
2012, 7). A worker’s right to share ownership is 
dependent on having a mandatory savings 
account for at least one year.
The BPDC’s overarching mission is to serve the 
social and sustainable welfare of Costa Ricans 
(BPDC 2015, 15). In 2010, a nationwide 
consultative process gave rise to ﬁve new 
‘Guidelines’ for the Workers’ Assembly:
1. The promotion of the social economy;
2. A quality oﬀering of services by the   
 Conglomerate;
3. The competitive management of the   
 institution;
4. Regional and local development; and
5. The conglomerate as an entity for   
 development.5
Three strategic axes further guide banking 
decisions: gender equity, accessibility and 
environmental responsibility.
The BPDC’s governance model (i.e. control of 
strategic decision-making) is impressive, repre-
senting perhaps the most democratic bank in the 
world. The highest governing body of the BPDC is 
the Assembly of Workers (Asamblea de los Traba-
jadores y Trabajadoras). While not initially mandat-
ed in law, legal changes in 1986 established the 
Workers’ Assembly as the peak of the bank’s 
governance. As of late 2016, the Workers’ Assem-
bly represents nearly 1.2 million savers (BPDC 
2017, 13). That is about 20 per cent of the popula-
tion! Operationally, the Workers’ Assembly itself is 
constituted by 290 individual representatives from 
10 social and economic sectors in Costa Rica 
(artisanal; communal; cooperative; self-managed; 
independent; teachers; professional; confederated 
syndicates; non-confederated and solidarity 
syndicates).
Unlike examples of successful European cooper-
ative banks that are often locally or regionally 
focused, the BPDC is national (see Kalmi 2012). 
This geographical spread can create challenges of 
representation, solidarity and political will to 
sustain the cooperative model. That said, BPDC 
has explicit and formal links to the 10 social 
sectors, which are themselves founded on a 
strong historical tradition of solidarity and cooper-
ative development in Costa Rica. Through its 
lending, the bank strengthens these sectors.
Democratizing finance: 
The BPDC way
To inform a new direction for the BPDC in 
promoting the social economy, the bank’s Nation-
al Board of Directors organized a series of nation-
wide forums. The BPDC social sector leaders in 
the Workers’ Assembly and senior management 
participated in the forums, which connected with 
nearly 1,500 participants across Costa Rica’s 11 
diﬀerent regions. The results have shaped the 
future of the bank (BPDC 2015, 25).
While worker-owners provide strategic direction 
to the BPDC through the Assembly, eﬀective 
control over daily operations is exercised by the 
National Board of Directors, which is the bank’s 
highest administrative unit. The bank’s Board of 
Directors is composed of seven members: four 
represent the Assembly and three, the Govern-
ment. Presently, there are four women and three 
men on the Board, fulﬁlling the requirement that 
it be at least half women. This has earned the 
BPDC an important marker of democratisation, 
namely that it became the ﬁrst public organisation 
in Central America to establish at least 50 per cent 
of women in their decision-making bodies (BPDC 
2017, 13).
The operational strategy of the BPDC reﬂects its 
status as a universal bank (which combines retail 
commercial and developmental functions) and its 
mission to serve the working class of Costa Rica. 
Target clients include workers, peasants, and 
micro-, small- and medium-sized enterprises 
(MSMEs) as well as communal, cooperative and 
municipal development associations. This is 
signiﬁcant: the BPDC prioritizes working with 
cooperatives and public institutions, as well as 
with those people typically excluded from ﬁnan-
cial services. This is qualitatively diﬀerent from the 
bulk of corporative private banks.
The BPDC approach to ﬁnancial sustainability is 
much broader than maximizing returns. Rather, as 
directed by the Workers’ Assembly, the BPDC now 
operates according to what it refers to as a triple 
bottom-line: the economic; the environmental; 
and the social (BPDC 2012, 21). That is, the envi-
ronmental and social good is placed alongside a 
need to generate positive ﬁnancial returns within 
the bank – another qualitative diﬀerence from 
typical private banks.
Unlike strictly public banks, however, the Costa 
Rican government does not explicitly guarantee 
the BPDC. Nevertheless, BPDC experts suggest 
that the bank beneﬁts from implicit state backing. 
That is, most people believe that the BPDC has 
state backing and that, should push come to 
shove and the BPDC face economic troubles, it 
would receive state support. This, together with 
the fact that the bank is founded according to a 
speciﬁc public law (unlike private banks) and thus 
operates according to that law, supports the bank’ 
s credit rating and societal trust in the bank. In 
short, the BPDC has the conﬁdence of markets 
and of the people.
A middle road between profits 
and social lending?
As a universal bank, the BPDC oﬀers a wide 
variety of lending and ﬁnancial services. Since 
2000, it too has grown into a larger ﬁnancial 
conglomerate (and the third largest bank in Costa 
Rica) that incorporates not only its commercial 
and development banking services, but also 
pension, stock market, investment and insurance 
services.
Its banking division is separated into three areas: 
personal banking (Banca de Persona); business and 
corporate banking (Banca Empresarial y Corporati-
va); and social development banking (Banca de 
Desarrollo Social). Notably, 25 per cent of the 
entire BPDC Conglomerate’s returns are chan-
nelled into a series of ‘special funds’, which are 
explicitly intended to meet the social needs of 
those typically excluded from the banking system 
in Costa Rica (BPDC 2017, 58).
The BPDC returns are nonetheless in line with 
other universal banks in developing countries, 
averaging around 1.5 per cent return on assets in 
the last few years. In simple terms, that is at least 
50 per cent more earnings than your average 
private bank (e.g. HSBC or Citibank) in the US or 
Europe.
Conﬁdential interviews with BPDC personnel 
reveal insights into its daily operations. In the past, 
generating returns via commercial activities was 
less important, but since the late 1990s it became 
more signiﬁcant, even overarching. Proﬁts began 
to override its worker-oriented mandate. However, 
more recently, the Workers’ Assembly has 
demanded a return to the bank’s core mandate 
and to servicing the social economy.
These changes experienced in the BPDC opera-
tions have created an interesting situation. The 
ﬁnancial returns now generated by the more 
commercial-oriented operations are seen by some 
personnel as enabling the bank’s other concession-
ary lending (meaning not-for-proﬁt, discounted, or 
made cheaper in one way or another) pro-
grammes (such as the ‘Social Development Bank’). 
Others, however, argue that the whole banking 
operation should be geared towards more social 
and concessionary lending. Presently, the BPDC 
has taken a middle road between proﬁts and 
social lending, with an aim to enhancing the social 
economic and environmental role of the BPDC.
How BPDC is linked to the 
working class and the public 
sector
It should be noted that a deﬁning characteristic 
of the bank derives from a unique source of 
capital, which is linked to the workers of Costa 
Rica. Article 5 of the BPDC Law states that all 
public and private employers must contribute 0.5 
per cent of paid monthly wages to the bank’s 
capital base. Additionally, workers must contrib-
ute 1 per cent of their monthly wages. These 
contributions (or ‘obligatory savings’) are deduct-
ed by the employer and deposited in the BPDC. 
After a year, 1.25 per cent of these savings are 
transferred to each worker’s own pension fund. 
The BPDC, for its part, gets to hold onto the other 
0.25 per cent as a means of permanent capitalisa-
tion. This feature provides economic stability to 
the bank, and infuses a sense of publicness into 
the capital resources held by the bank.
The BPDC is also shaped by its unique links to 
Costa Rica’s public sphere. The BPDC accepts over 
40 per cent of the public sector payroll deposits 
(BPDC 2012, 42). In addition, and unlike private 
banks, the BPDC – because it is governed under 
public law – is not required to hold capital reserves 
in the central bank. This frees up capital for 
lending. Additionally, the BPDC relies on long-term 
deposits and loans from other publicly owned 
development banks to support its own lending 
operations. In this way, the BPDC has a diversity of 
sources of capital that, moreover, inextricably link 
the BPDC to the working class and to the public 
sector. In interviews with BPDC senior managers, 
the bank’s historic ties to workers and the public 
sphere were clearly recognized and celebrated as 
important and unique characteristics of the bank’s 
history and operating ethos.
In response to its deepening environmental 
direction, the BPDC has developed specialty green 
lending facilities, such as the Eco-savings and 
Eco-credits, geared speciﬁcally towards MSME 
projects in which the environment is a key 
element of the project. In 2017 for example, the 
BPDC, in collaboration with a local provider, 
launched a programme to purchase and install 
solar energy panels in residential settings.
As another part of its developmental mandate, 
the BPDC supports local communal associations 
in the provisioning of sustainable, safe local water 
supply systems (ASADAS). According to one local 
BPDC manager: “The BPDC is doing training and 
supporting ASADAS to help them run better, more 
sustainably”.6 This type of assistance too must be 
considered green and sustainable lending.
The BPDC has begun to produce annual Sustain-
ability Reports, which follow the Global Reporting 
Initiative7 guidelines. The bank now tracks its own 
consumption of energy and can more concretely 
strategize around reducing its own carbon impact. 
The Pensions division, for example, has been 
certiﬁed as ‘carbon neutral’ for the last four years 
and been awarded a Five-Star climate change 
award three years running (BPDC 2017, 72). In the 
words of the BPDC: “In environmental matters we 
are promoting green products, accountability and 
the incorporation of this theme throughout the 
chain of value” (2017, 68).
Spotlight on financing energy 
democracy: The BPDC and 
COOPELESCA
“In this case, the community is socializing the 
responsibility of taking care of the environ-
ment” (author interview with BPDC Employee 
in Business Management, San Carlos, Costa 
Rica, 7 April 2017)
In the central valley of Costa Rica, an important 
strategic ‘green’ alliance exists between the BPDC 
and a regional energy cooperative, COOPELESCA.8 
COOPELESCA was formed in 1965 and began 
distributing energy in 1969. Today, the coopera-
tive supplies about 10 per cent of Costa Rica’s 
energy and it is doing so sustainably. In 2013, the 
Costa Rican government certiﬁed the cooperative 
as “Carbon Neutral”, giving COOPELESCA the 
distinction of being the ﬁrst energy distributor in 
Latin America to achieve this certiﬁcation. By 2015, 
COOPELESCA was able to fully oﬀset its carbon 
footprint by using its own resources and through 
its own environmental initiatives.
COOPELESCA environmental policy
COOPELESCA expresses its commitment to 
systematically avoid, mitigate and compen-
sate for negative environmental impacts and 
to optimize the positive environmental 
impacts derived from its economic and social 
projects.
Two examples show how the BPDC has facilitated 
the ‘greening’ of COOPELESCA, and by extension, 
its community. First, the BPDC ﬁnanced the 
conversion of all lighting within COOPELESCA to 
low-energy LED. Together with the energy coopera-
tive, local BPDC staﬀ analyzed the potential cost 
savings from the switch, and then granted a 
low-cost loan based on these savings. The switch 
to LED contributed to gaining carbon neutral 
certiﬁcation, and even continues to provide 
COOPELESCA additional cost reductions beyond 
the cost of ﬁnancing.
Second, the BPDC ﬁnanced a COOPELESCA 
initiative to purchase land for conservation purpos-
es. Beginning in 2009, the community of San 
Carlos recognized that the border areas of the 
Juan Castro Blanco National Park were at risk of 
over-exploitation by local farmers. This, in turn, 
jeopardized the valley’s clean water supply. In 
response to a broad-based community preserva-
tion initiative, the Associates’ Assembly of 
COOPELESCA decided to purchase land in order to 
help preserve the park's natural water resources, 
biodiversity, air, soil and scenic beauty. Coopera-
tive members raised US$1 million in funds, and 
with this approached the BPDC for an additional 
$2 million-loan at not-for-proﬁt concessional rates. 
This collaboration enabled COOPELESCA to pur-
chase and protect 1,124.7 hectares in the national 
park. COOPELESCA workers maintain and protect 
the forest, and the cooperative is developing 
research collaborations with public universities to 
support student environmental and biodiversity 
programming in the reclaimed areas. The farmers 
who sold their land to COOPELESCA have moved 
on, but there remain more areas within the park in 
need of reclaiming for the ecological and common 
good of the community.
In summary, the BPDC exempliﬁes a large, nation-
al, universal, public-like cooperative bank that also 
has a long history and signiﬁcant lending capacity 
in Costa Rica. Its governance model of ownership 
and control is substantially democratic insofar as it 
represents broad sections of Costa Rican society 
and government. Uniquely, the bank is unmistak-
ably oriented towards serving the needs of workers 
and the poor in Costa Rica. Over the last ﬁve to 10 
years, the BPDC has taken signiﬁcant steps towards 
internalizing environmental (and gender equity) 
goals into its operations. Initial interviews suggest 
that BPDC personnel deeply share this vision.
Still, there is room for improvement. In terms of 
ownership and eﬀective control, at times it seems 
the government can exercise deciding inﬂuence. 
Should workers assume complete governing 
control? What if workers decided to privatize the 
BPDC, would this be in the public interest? The 
issue remains open to debate in Costa Rica. In 
terms of the bank’s green proﬁle, it is certainly 
orienting operations in this direction. Yet the 
BPDC does not systematically measure the impact 
or levels of green lending programmes. Conse-
quently, what the balance of environmental versus 
regular lending is remains unknown. As with most 
public banks today, it is important to work 
towards substantively greening the bank from 
start to ﬁnish, so that lending in one area does not 
oﬀset the green lending in another. This is espe-
cially important when trying to ﬁnd the balance 
between concessional and non-concessional 
lending, or between generating returns and 
maximizing social and environmental impacts. 
There is much to commend the BPDC for, not least 
of which as a strong example of ﬁnancial democra-
tisation and mobilisation of public capital, but it is 
not perfect and there is work yet to be done.
Germany’s KfW: A global 
developmental juggernaut
Germany’s KfW is quite a diﬀerent bank from the 
BPDC. It is a fully public or state-owned and 
controlled development bank (‘promotional’ bank 
in European terms), whose existence is also 
inscribed in public law. Ownership rests with the 
Federal Republic of Germany, which holds 80 per 
cent of KfW shares, and the German federal states, 
which hold 20 per cent. While today the KfW aims 
for the “sustainable improvement of the economic, 
social, and ecological conditions of people’s lives”, 
the bank was born out of post-WWII reconstruc-
tion eﬀorts (founded in 1948).9 The German 
government decided to create a bank to manage 
the incoming Marshall Plan reconstruction funds, 
rather than directly spending the money.
The decision had foresight. Since then, the KfW 
has grown to be one of the largest national 
development banks in the world. Many scholars 
cite KfW as a good example of a public develop-
ment bank that is also ‘green’ (Griﬃth-Jones 2016). 
Yet no public bank should be idealized, and the 
KfW has its problems. Dramatically, the KfW and 
its subsidiary, the IKB (Industriekreditbank), got 
deeply embroiled in the 2008-09 global ﬁnancial 
crisis. The IKB wanted a new source of returns, 
and the subprime mortgage mania seemed to be 
the answer. Yet when the crash hit the conse-
quences cost it dearly (and the KfW by extension). 
When market logics begin to drive public sector 
decisions, this is often the consequence. Social 
forces must actively ensure that public banks are 
run transparently and democratically in the public, 
not private, interest.
The KfW nevertheless has a solid, if imperfect, 
governance structure. At base, it enables the 
representation of German government and 
society within the bank (KfW 2015, 174-6). This is 
not the case for every public bank. The KfW’s 
shareholders (i.e. the government) are represent-
ed by the Board of Supervisory Directors, which 
functions as a general shareholders’ forum (KfW 
2015, 179). The Federal Minister of Finance and 
Federal Minister for Economic Aﬀairs and Energy 
hold the Chair and Deputy Chair positions in 
alternation. The Board is composed of 37 addition-
al members from across German society. These 
members include federal ministers speciﬁed in 
the Law Concerning KfW; members appointed by 
the legislative branch of government, the Bunde-
stag and Bundesrat; representatives of banks and 
savings banks; and representatives of industry, 
the municipalities, agriculture, commerce, handi-
crafts, housing and the trade unions. Transparen-
cy is maintained by the KfW Executive and Supervi-
sory Boards being subject to the Public Corporate 
Governance Code, and the KfW is required to have 
its annual ﬁnancial statements audited by an 
independent auditor.
Over the decades, KfW has built up substantial 
lending capacity that has become increasingly 
green in orientation. In 2016, new lending amount-
ed to €81 billion while 44 per cent of this lending 
(over €35 billion) was dedicated to environmental 
and climate protection projects (KfW 2017, 2). 
Importantly, the KfW does not strive to maximize 
returns but instead to oﬀer low-interest loans. Its 
returns, therefore, are well below that of the 
private sector’s average. This is not a problem, 
though, because KfW excels at fulﬁlling its man-
date of supplying low-interest loans and grants. 
That is its underlying rationale.
The operational strategies of KfW are diverse and 
complex given its large size and scope of business. 
The KfW has four banking divisions separated 
along domestically and internationally oriented 
operations (KfW 2016, 2). For domestic-oriented 
lending, which constitutes about two thirds of 
lending, the SME Bank (Mittelstandsbank) supports 
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), 
business start-ups and other commercial clients. 
The Municipal and Private Client Bank (Kommunal- 
und Privatkundenbank/Kreditinstitute) provides 
private ﬁnancing for housing, education, and 
climate or environmental protection and public 
funding for municipal infrastructure and regional 
development banks (see Box 2 below). For interna-
tionally oriented lending, which is about a third of 
lending, the KfW IPEX-Bank supports international 
export and project ﬁnance. The KfW Development 
Bank (DEG) supports developing and transition 
countries. In October 2012, KfW opened a ﬁfth 
charitable division, the KfW Stiftung, as an indepen-
dent non-proﬁt foundation operating under the 
banners of responsible entrepreneurship; social 
commitment; environment and climate; art and 
culture (KfW 2015a, 13-14).
Unlike commercial banks like the HSBC or 
Citibank, development banks like the KfW do not 
accept personal deposits or lend directly to 
individuals. The KfW lends directly to other banks, 
municipalities and developing country govern-
ments. And, instead of accepting individual 
deposits, the KfW draws in capital from ﬁnancial 
markets and then lends on to various banking 
intermediaries, institutions and organisations that 
have more direct access and contact with individu-
al customers. One beneﬁt of oﬃcial state owner-
ship for the KfW is that it comes with an explicit 
sovereign guarantee, which supports the KfW’s 
very strong credit rating (S&P AAA). This enables 
the KfW to access market-based funds at cheaper 
rates of interest, and pass these savings along.
The KfW can fund projects alone or in collabora-
tion with other funders and donors. The types of 
ﬁnancial instruments used vary across the divi-
sions, but include:
Grants: ﬁnancing provided exclusively from 
German Federal Government budget funds, 
which does not have to be repaid.
Standard loans: subsidized loans from federal 
budget funds that have to be repaid by the 
borrower.
Development loans: a combination of federal 
budget funds and funds that KfW raises on the 
capital market. Combining funds enables the 
loan terms and conditions to be adjusted to the 
economic strength of the borrower country and 
features of the project.
Promotional loans: loans to partners in devel-
oping countries as mandated by the Federal 
Government. The loans are used for projects 
that have a development impact, but for which 
ﬁnancing via the commercial banking sector 
alone is not oﬀered (e.g. due to the longer 
ﬁnancing period necessary).
Oﬃcial donations: KfW may also accept funds 
from other donors.
Green bonds: for investors who place high value 
on sustainable investment.
The funding of projects may be not-for-proﬁt 
(concessional) or at market rates (non-concession-
al). Research suggests that the KfW tends to prefer 
‘promotional loans with subsidized credits’, that is, 
programme-tied loans that explicitly target govern-
ment-determined priority projects geared towards 
overcoming society’s grand challenges, such as 
climate change (Mazzucato and Penna 2015). In 
this way, KfW funds can help to promote the 
public interest.
Green lending ﬁgures prominently in the KfW, 
which has adopted a strong focus on renewable 
energy development (KfW 2015, 18). Notably, 
KfW’s green activities have been guided by a series 
of legal and governmental initiatives undertaken 
in Germany society since 2000, notably the Renew-
able Energy Act (2000); the Integrated Energy and 
Climate Programme (2007); the Climate Initiative 
(2008); and the Energy Initiative (2010). These 
public policy initiatives provide important context 
for why the KfW has committed 44 per cent of all 
lending to green, environmental and low-carbon 
projects.
The KfW thus exempliﬁes a large, developed 
country development bank that has a long, stable 
history and signiﬁcant contemporary lending 
capacity. Its governance model is broadly demo-
cratic, drawing in representatives of German 
society. Over the last 15 years or so, moreover, 
the KfW has made impressive strides towards 
reorienting its lending towards environmental 
ends and promoting a low-carbon future. 
Yet, there is room for improvement. While 44 per 
cent of lending is deemed ‘green’, presumably 66 
per cent cannot be or is not assessed along 
environmental lines. In other words, the KfW 
engages in programme lending that does not 
appear ﬁt for ‘green’ purpose or that undermines 
its otherwise good environmental work. Further-
more, in conﬁdential interviews with German 
stakeholders, some suggested that there may 
exist forms of ‘corporate capture’ of KfW green 
resources. That is, some of Germany’s largest 
corporations may disproportionally beneﬁt from 
certain KfW green lending, such as solar panels, in 
ways that may undermine social equality. These 
same stakeholder interviews revealed that the 
decision-making processes within KfW could be 
improved and democratized. If the KfW’s experi-
ence with the 2008-09 ﬁnancial crisis can be taken 
as a failure to work in the public interest, then 
perhaps deeper democratisation can counteract 
any such future problems. Just like Costa Rica’s 
BPDC, Germany’s KfW is a work in constant 
progress. Social forces must ensure these banks 
work and evolve organisationally in the public 
interest and for energy democracy.
Putting green public banks’ 
potential in context
To achieve the SDGs and the ambitions of the 
Paris Agreement, an estimated US$90 trillion 
worth of infrastructure need to be ﬁnanced. To 
date, the IFIs have done relatively little. From 2012 
to 2014, IFI investments promoting energy eﬃcien-
cy equated to a mere 14 per cent of IFIs’ energy 
portfolio, which equates to only 3 per cent of IFI 
total investments (CPI 2017). Commentators also 
lament that public and private investors (read: 
private) see a lack of investment-ready, ‘bankable’ 
projects as a major constraint to future green 
investment as the culprit for such dismal results. 
This has given rise to (existential?) questions of 
whether the private sector is willing or able to 
deliver.
It remains the case that public spending by 
governments on infrastructure constitutes the 
largest proportion of investments, by far, estimat-
ed at about US$1.5 trillion annually (Levy 2017). 
Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) generated an 
additional $112 billion in 2015, with a ﬁnancing 
leverage ratio of about 1:1 (for every dollar invest-
ed publicly, another private dollar would follow). 
In 2015 the Multilateral Development Banks 
contributed about $80 billion. Given the estimated 
US$90 trillion in investments required in the near 
future, the burning questions are how to increase 
investment, and how to green it.
The fact is that public sources of funding are 
doing much, and that there is also potential for 
public banks to do more in the current context. 
This is a point of agreement by the ‘Right’ and 
advocates of market-oriented approaches and by 
the ‘Left’ and advocates of solutions driven by the 
public interest. The position taken in this issue 
brief is that there is a whole world of potential 
public bank catalyzers for a green and just energy 
transformation. That said, public banks must not 
be taken as a panacea in and of themselves, for 
the mere fact that they are public. Their potential 
depends on the actual policies and practices of 
the public banks and the extent to which these 
practices are deﬁned democratically and in the 
public interest. 
The burning issue of ﬁnancial sustainability must 
also be raised. Disagreements continue to rage 
over the ﬁnancial viability and desirability of public 
banks. Conventional economists and neoliberal 
market advocates remain ﬁrmly against public 
ownership, arguing that it leads to corruption and 
economic ineﬃciencies. Heterodox economists 
contest such claims, arguing that the economic 
evidence against public bank ownership is not as 
strong as suggested and that public banks can be 
as eﬃcient as private banks (Levy et al. 2007). 
Others, too, would argue that proﬁtability is 
secondary to the public banks’ capacity to drive 
innovation, address society’s grand challenges, 
and to their capacity to rebuilding and reclaiming 
a progressive public ethos (Marois 2015; Mazzuca-
to and Penna 2015; Povel 2015).
In the end, there is no compelling evidence that 
public banks cannot be ﬁnancially sustainable for 
the simple reason that they are publicly owned (as 
the KfW and BPDC suggest). Most studies claiming 
private banking superiority, moreover, are meth-
odologically ﬂawed. Their approach is typically to 
assess whether public banks are as eﬃcient as 
private banks at making money. One might as well 
ask if oranges are better at making apple juice 
than apples. Many public banks either do not have 
a proﬁt mandate or proﬁtability stands alongside 
other social and development goals, as with the 
BPDC and the KfW. Private corporate banks seek 
proﬁts alone, and are essentially oriented in this 
sole direction. This, in turn, is what has prevented 
more substantial private investments in a global 
green transformation. It is also why private 
investors are unlikely to support social goals like 
energy democracy.
That being said, public banks can perform their 
mandated duties in ﬁnancially sustainable ways in 
at least two diﬀerent ways:
on a not-for-proﬁt basis, which implies that 
returns are re-invested by the bank in society; 
and
via explicit loss-making operations, which 
implies that the government or another part of 
the bank subsidizes such losses to ensure the 
bank’s overall long-term sustainability.
It needs emphasizing that, as for any public or 
public-like entity, ﬁnancial sustainability needs to 
be accounted for across the full spectrum of the 
public bank’s activities and impacts. Accordingly, 
appropriate incentives and training need to be put 
in place to incentivize bank management and staﬀ 
to approve projects according to this long-term 
practice of ﬁnancial sustainability in the public 
good. In any case, the issue of ﬁnancial sustainabil-
ity needs to be democratically decided in line with 
a public bank’s mandate and mission – as 
opposed to the ideologically driven proﬁtability 
imperatives of conventional economics – and this 
should be made fully understood by the public.
Finally, ﬁnancial sustainability should be consid-
ered beyond ‘lending’ to also include forms of 
‘ownership and equity’. Public banks can fund 
public infrastructure and other venture projects, 
and in return take a stake in the new institution. 
Over time the equity stake can pay dividends back 
to the bank, which in turn beneﬁts the public 
purse (see Mazzucato 2015). This is nowhere 
without risks, but the payoﬀs can be ﬁnancially 
and developmentally astounding. Cooperative 
banks such as the BPDC can also consider taking a 
stake in new coop investments as a way of promot-
ing cooperativism in society. Building strong 
coop–coop collaborations helps to solidify a future 
of social solidarity development, which in turn 
helps to provide for the political and economic will 
required to maintain truly cooperative and public 
operations working in the public interest.
Conclusion: What can public 
banks do for a just energy 
transformation?
There are real concrete beneﬁts in having public 
banks involved in the green transformation of 
society. A look at Germany’s development bank 
KfW and Costa Rica’s universal BPDC helps to 
illustrate their potential, but also shortcomings. 
Banks can be public and serve the public good, 
and do so democratically. Public banks can raise 
the needed capital for personal and infrastructur-
al investments, and channel this towards low 
carbon and climate resilient programmes. Proﬁt-
ability need not be the primary measure of a 
bank’s success, and the bank’s stability need not 
be threatened by such an approach. As public 
banks take on greater roles in green transforma-
tion they can help build the needed public ethos 
and necessary technical expertise. These are 
important possibilities.
That said, there are a number of barriers to 
realizing the potential of public banks to ﬁnance a 
green and just energy transformation. Internally, 
public banks need to ﬁnd eﬀective ways of trans-
lating popular democratic aspirations into eﬀec-
tive and sustainable operational strategies.
Sometimes this can lead to conﬂicts between 
those who own the bank (shareholders and 
associated stakeholders) and those who control it 
(senior management and technical experts). This 
politicisation of the banks should not be shied 
away from, but embraced through open, represen-
tative and transparent democratic structures. 
Likewise, public banks need to confront possible 
abuses by either governing parties or bank func-
tionaries. No one beneﬁts from the abuse of 
public banks or the wasting of collective resources 
via ineﬀective banks. Accountability and transpar-
ency must reign supreme.
Externally, public banks face the seemingly 
insurmountable structural context of neoliberal 
ﬁnancial capitalism. For one, neoliberal ideology 
and development practices threaten the very 
legitimacy and existence of public banks. Main-
stream neoclassical economics and liberal political 
economy, by deﬁnition, see public banks as subopti-
mal market actors, which by virtue of public owner-
ship are inherently ineﬃcient and corrupt entities. 
The solution is invariably privatisation. While some 
international institutions have had to begrudgingly 
accept a role for public banks in addressing the 
global climate challenge (and recurrent global 
ﬁnancial crises), their hard-core belief in private 
sector superiority remains rock solid. 
For another, the context of global ﬁnancial 
capitalism has created an intensely competitive 
context for public banks. Gone are the days of a 
purely national developmental strategic orienta-
tion and the possibility of banks ignoring global 
ﬁnancial markets. Today’s public banks are inter-
twined globally, borrowing funds from abroad, 
dealing in global ﬁnancial markets and currencies, 
and mitigating global ﬁnancial risks and crises 
nationally. The experience of KfW in the global 
crisis is instructive. Moreover, public banks are 
under constant threat of takeover, nationally and 
from foreign banking giants. Public and coopera-
tive banks must vigilantly promote a social and 
public ethos in society through their operations. 
Private actors will manifestly oppose this as 
ineﬃcient, biased and corrupt.
Yet lamenting the inﬂuence of neoliberal agents 
and the power of global ﬁnance capital forms no 
eﬀective strategy of resistance. Progressives must 
think strategically and transformatively. Support 
for and capacity in public ﬁnance is a necessary, if 
not suﬃcient, condition for any break with neolib-
eral ﬁnancial capitalism (Marois 2015). Likewise, a 
green and just energy transformation requires, 
among other things, ﬁnancing based on solidarity 
and oriented in the public interest. 
To this end, society must hold their public banks 
to account and, in fact, demand their substantive 
democratisation and ‘greening’. The strides 
towards these positive goals in the KfW and BPDC, 
while distinct, society-speciﬁc and incomplete, are 
substantial. Such positive examples must not be 
taken for granted, but used as a basis to deepen 
and extend the political and economic democratic 
foundations of society and, in particular, to build 
progressive campaigns around democratizing 
ﬁnance for sustainable and just energy transforma-
tion.
In terms of speciﬁc strategies around defending 
and improving public banks, we have elsewhere 
considered a range of actions for progressive 
campaigns.10 These are worth revisiting, by way of 
closing, vis-à-vis public banks and energy 
democracy. These include:
1. Framing public ﬁnance as a common  
 good: The ﬁnancial sector is the nervous  
 system of society, and it needs to be   
 conceived of in the public interest.
2. Democratized banking: The struggle to  
 defend public banks must also involve  
 their democratisation as a long-term   
 strategy of social sustainability.
3. Collective ownership and control: State  
 or public ownership is only one form of  
 ownership. Many other progressive,   
 collective forms of cooperative and   
 worker-controlled banks should be   
 pursued and not be undermined by   
 neoliberal ideology.
4. Radical scholarship: Critical scholars   
 must engage more systematically in the  
 real problem of understanding and   
 advocating for eﬀective public ﬁnancial  
 alternatives.
5. Linking the green transformation to  
 public provisioning: Environmental   
 sustainability demands eﬀective,   
 long-term and accountable sources of   
 ﬁnance. Public banks are uniquely capable  
 of playing a lead, proactive role in a global  
 green and just transition.
6. Collective organisation in the banking  
 sector: Bank workers need eﬀective union  
 representation, and unions can be  
 powerful actors of resistance to   
 neoliberalism and ﬁnancialisation as well  
 as powerful advocates of progressive   
 social change.
7. Solidarity across sectors: Too often   
 dialogue and solidarity between   
 traditional trade unionists,ﬁnance workers  
 and (other) public sector workers is   
 non-existent, and this needs to change for  
 a green and just energy transformation.
Can be 100% public and operate eﬀectively under public lawOwnership
Can democratically internalize governmental and popular direction into their core 
mandates and daily operations
Governance
Can be sustainable without prioritizing ﬁnancial returns over social, gender equity, 
and environmental mandates
Can beneﬁt from explicit and implicit state guarantees, and use this to fulﬁl their 
mandates
Can magnify existing public resources for the public good
Operational strategies
Can take the lead in developing innovative, green, supportive lending
Can promote a public ethos around a just, green future
Can build internal expertise to support transformation
Green transformation
Criteria Characteristics of KfW and BPDC
Table 2. The potential of public banks for a green transformation
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The KfW thus exempliﬁes a large, developed 
country development bank that has a long, stable 
history and signiﬁcant contemporary lending 
capacity. Its governance model is broadly demo-
cratic, drawing in representatives of German 
society. Over the last 15 years or so, moreover, 
the KfW has made impressive strides towards 
reorienting its lending towards environmental 
ends and promoting a low-carbon future. 
Yet, there is room for improvement. While 44 per 
cent of lending is deemed ‘green’, presumably 66 
per cent cannot be or is not assessed along 
environmental lines. In other words, the KfW 
engages in programme lending that does not 
appear ﬁt for ‘green’ purpose or that undermines 
its otherwise good environmental work. Further-
more, in conﬁdential interviews with German 
stakeholders, some suggested that there may 
exist forms of ‘corporate capture’ of KfW green 
resources. That is, some of Germany’s largest 
corporations may disproportionally beneﬁt from 
certain KfW green lending, such as solar panels, in 
ways that may undermine social equality. These 
same stakeholder interviews revealed that the 
decision-making processes within KfW could be 
improved and democratized. If the KfW’s experi-
ence with the 2008-09 ﬁnancial crisis can be taken 
as a failure to work in the public interest, then 
perhaps deeper democratisation can counteract 
any such future problems. Just like Costa Rica’s 
BPDC, Germany’s KfW is a work in constant 
progress. Social forces must ensure these banks 
work and evolve organisationally in the public 
interest and for energy democracy.
Putting green public banks’ 
potential in context
To achieve the SDGs and the ambitions of the 
Paris Agreement, an estimated US$90 trillion 
worth of infrastructure need to be ﬁnanced. To 
date, the IFIs have done relatively little. From 2012 
to 2014, IFI investments promoting energy eﬃcien-
cy equated to a mere 14 per cent of IFIs’ energy 
portfolio, which equates to only 3 per cent of IFI 
total investments (CPI 2017). Commentators also 
lament that public and private investors (read: 
private) see a lack of investment-ready, ‘bankable’ 
projects as a major constraint to future green 
investment as the culprit for such dismal results. 
This has given rise to (existential?) questions of 
whether the private sector is willing or able to 
deliver.
It remains the case that public spending by 
governments on infrastructure constitutes the 
largest proportion of investments, by far, estimat-
ed at about US$1.5 trillion annually (Levy 2017). 
Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) generated an 
additional $112 billion in 2015, with a ﬁnancing 
leverage ratio of about 1:1 (for every dollar invest-
ed publicly, another private dollar would follow). 
In 2015 the Multilateral Development Banks 
contributed about $80 billion. Given the estimated 
US$90 trillion in investments required in the near 
future, the burning questions are how to increase 
investment, and how to green it.
The fact is that public sources of funding are 
doing much, and that there is also potential for 
public banks to do more in the current context. 
This is a point of agreement by the ‘Right’ and 
advocates of market-oriented approaches and by 
the ‘Left’ and advocates of solutions driven by the 
public interest. The position taken in this issue 
brief is that there is a whole world of potential 
public bank catalyzers for a green and just energy 
transformation. That said, public banks must not 
be taken as a panacea in and of themselves, for 
the mere fact that they are public. Their potential 
depends on the actual policies and practices of 
the public banks and the extent to which these 
practices are deﬁned democratically and in the 
public interest. 
The burning issue of ﬁnancial sustainability must 
also be raised. Disagreements continue to rage 
over the ﬁnancial viability and desirability of public 
banks. Conventional economists and neoliberal 
market advocates remain ﬁrmly against public 
ownership, arguing that it leads to corruption and 
economic ineﬃciencies. Heterodox economists 
contest such claims, arguing that the economic 
evidence against public bank ownership is not as 
strong as suggested and that public banks can be 
as eﬃcient as private banks (Levy et al. 2007). 
Others, too, would argue that proﬁtability is 
secondary to the public banks’ capacity to drive 
innovation, address society’s grand challenges, 
and to their capacity to rebuilding and reclaiming 
a progressive public ethos (Marois 2015; Mazzuca-
to and Penna 2015; Povel 2015).
In the end, there is no compelling evidence that 
public banks cannot be ﬁnancially sustainable for 
the simple reason that they are publicly owned (as 
the KfW and BPDC suggest). Most studies claiming 
private banking superiority, moreover, are meth-
odologically ﬂawed. Their approach is typically to 
assess whether public banks are as eﬃcient as 
private banks at making money. One might as well 
ask if oranges are better at making apple juice 
than apples. Many public banks either do not have 
a proﬁt mandate or proﬁtability stands alongside 
other social and development goals, as with the 
BPDC and the KfW. Private corporate banks seek 
proﬁts alone, and are essentially oriented in this 
sole direction. This, in turn, is what has prevented 
more substantial private investments in a global 
green transformation. It is also why private 
investors are unlikely to support social goals like 
energy democracy.
That being said, public banks can perform their 
mandated duties in ﬁnancially sustainable ways in 
at least two diﬀerent ways:
on a not-for-proﬁt basis, which implies that 
returns are re-invested by the bank in society; 
and
via explicit loss-making operations, which 
implies that the government or another part of 
the bank subsidizes such losses to ensure the 
bank’s overall long-term sustainability.
It needs emphasizing that, as for any public or 
public-like entity, ﬁnancial sustainability needs to 
be accounted for across the full spectrum of the 
public bank’s activities and impacts. Accordingly, 
appropriate incentives and training need to be put 
in place to incentivize bank management and staﬀ 
to approve projects according to this long-term 
practice of ﬁnancial sustainability in the public 
good. In any case, the issue of ﬁnancial sustainabil-
ity needs to be democratically decided in line with 
a public bank’s mandate and mission – as 
opposed to the ideologically driven proﬁtability 
imperatives of conventional economics – and this 
should be made fully understood by the public.
Finally, ﬁnancial sustainability should be consid-
ered beyond ‘lending’ to also include forms of 
‘ownership and equity’. Public banks can fund 
public infrastructure and other venture projects, 
and in return take a stake in the new institution. 
Over time the equity stake can pay dividends back 
to the bank, which in turn beneﬁts the public 
purse (see Mazzucato 2015). This is nowhere 
without risks, but the payoﬀs can be ﬁnancially 
and developmentally astounding. Cooperative 
banks such as the BPDC can also consider taking a 
stake in new coop investments as a way of promot-
ing cooperativism in society. Building strong 
coop–coop collaborations helps to solidify a future 
of social solidarity development, which in turn 
helps to provide for the political and economic will 
required to maintain truly cooperative and public 
operations working in the public interest.
Conclusion: What can public 
banks do for a just energy 
transformation?
There are real concrete beneﬁts in having public 
banks involved in the green transformation of 
society. A look at Germany’s development bank 
KfW and Costa Rica’s universal BPDC helps to 
illustrate their potential, but also shortcomings. 
Banks can be public and serve the public good, 
and do so democratically. Public banks can raise 
the needed capital for personal and infrastructur-
al investments, and channel this towards low 
carbon and climate resilient programmes. Proﬁt-
ability need not be the primary measure of a 
bank’s success, and the bank’s stability need not 
be threatened by such an approach. As public 
banks take on greater roles in green transforma-
tion they can help build the needed public ethos 
and necessary technical expertise. These are 
important possibilities.
That said, there are a number of barriers to 
realizing the potential of public banks to ﬁnance a 
green and just energy transformation. Internally, 
public banks need to ﬁnd eﬀective ways of trans-
lating popular democratic aspirations into eﬀec-
tive and sustainable operational strategies.
Sometimes this can lead to conﬂicts between 
those who own the bank (shareholders and 
associated stakeholders) and those who control it 
(senior management and technical experts). This 
politicisation of the banks should not be shied 
away from, but embraced through open, represen-
tative and transparent democratic structures. 
Likewise, public banks need to confront possible 
abuses by either governing parties or bank func-
tionaries. No one beneﬁts from the abuse of 
public banks or the wasting of collective resources 
via ineﬀective banks. Accountability and transpar-
ency must reign supreme.
Externally, public banks face the seemingly 
insurmountable structural context of neoliberal 
ﬁnancial capitalism. For one, neoliberal ideology 
and development practices threaten the very 
legitimacy and existence of public banks. Main-
stream neoclassical economics and liberal political 
economy, by deﬁnition, see public banks as subopti-
mal market actors, which by virtue of public owner-
ship are inherently ineﬃcient and corrupt entities. 
The solution is invariably privatisation. While some 
international institutions have had to begrudgingly 
accept a role for public banks in addressing the 
global climate challenge (and recurrent global 
ﬁnancial crises), their hard-core belief in private 
sector superiority remains rock solid. 
For another, the context of global ﬁnancial 
capitalism has created an intensely competitive 
context for public banks. Gone are the days of a 
purely national developmental strategic orienta-
tion and the possibility of banks ignoring global 
ﬁnancial markets. Today’s public banks are inter-
twined globally, borrowing funds from abroad, 
dealing in global ﬁnancial markets and currencies, 
and mitigating global ﬁnancial risks and crises 
nationally. The experience of KfW in the global 
crisis is instructive. Moreover, public banks are 
under constant threat of takeover, nationally and 
from foreign banking giants. Public and coopera-
tive banks must vigilantly promote a social and 
public ethos in society through their operations. 
Private actors will manifestly oppose this as 
ineﬃcient, biased and corrupt.
Yet lamenting the inﬂuence of neoliberal agents 
and the power of global ﬁnance capital forms no 
eﬀective strategy of resistance. Progressives must 
think strategically and transformatively. Support 
for and capacity in public ﬁnance is a necessary, if 
not suﬃcient, condition for any break with neolib-
eral ﬁnancial capitalism (Marois 2015). Likewise, a 
green and just energy transformation requires, 
among other things, ﬁnancing based on solidarity 
and oriented in the public interest. 
To this end, society must hold their public banks 
to account and, in fact, demand their substantive 
democratisation and ‘greening’. The strides 
towards these positive goals in the KfW and BPDC, 
while distinct, society-speciﬁc and incomplete, are 
substantial. Such positive examples must not be 
taken for granted, but used as a basis to deepen 
and extend the political and economic democratic 
foundations of society and, in particular, to build 
progressive campaigns around democratizing 
ﬁnance for sustainable and just energy transforma-
tion.
In terms of speciﬁc strategies around defending 
and improving public banks, we have elsewhere 
considered a range of actions for progressive 
campaigns.10 These are worth revisiting, by way of 
closing, vis-à-vis public banks and energy 
democracy. These include:
1. Framing public ﬁnance as a common  
 good: The ﬁnancial sector is the nervous  
 system of society, and it needs to be   
 conceived of in the public interest.
2. Democratized banking: The struggle to  
 defend public banks must also involve  
 their democratisation as a long-term   
 strategy of social sustainability.
3. Collective ownership and control: State  
 or public ownership is only one form of  
 ownership. Many other progressive,   
 collective forms of cooperative and   
 worker-controlled banks should be   
 pursued and not be undermined by   
 neoliberal ideology.
4. Radical scholarship: Critical scholars   
 must engage more systematically in the  
 real problem of understanding and   
 advocating for eﬀective public ﬁnancial  
 alternatives.
5. Linking the green transformation to  
 public provisioning: Environmental   
 sustainability demands eﬀective,   
 long-term and accountable sources of   
 ﬁnance. Public banks are uniquely capable  
 of playing a lead, proactive role in a global  
 green and just transition.
6. Collective organisation in the banking  
 sector: Bank workers need eﬀective union  
 representation, and unions can be  
 powerful actors of resistance to   
 neoliberalism and ﬁnancialisation as well  
 as powerful advocates of progressive   
 social change.
7. Solidarity across sectors: Too often   
 dialogue and solidarity between   
 traditional trade unionists,ﬁnance workers  
 and (other) public sector workers is   
 non-existent, and this needs to change for  
 a green and just energy transformation.
The KfW thus exempliﬁes a large, developed 
country development bank that has a long, stable 
history and signiﬁcant contemporary lending 
capacity. Its governance model is broadly demo-
cratic, drawing in representatives of German 
society. Over the last 15 years or so, moreover, 
the KfW has made impressive strides towards 
reorienting its lending towards environmental 
ends and promoting a low-carbon future. 
Yet, there is room for improvement. While 44 per 
cent of lending is deemed ‘green’, presumably 66 
per cent cannot be or is not assessed along 
environmental lines. In other words, the KfW 
engages in programme lending that does not 
appear ﬁt for ‘green’ purpose or that undermines 
its otherwise good environmental work. Further-
more, in conﬁdential interviews with German 
stakeholders, some suggested that there may 
exist forms of ‘corporate capture’ of KfW green 
resources. That is, some of Germany’s largest 
corporations may disproportionally beneﬁt from 
certain KfW green lending, such as solar panels, in 
ways that may undermine social equality. These 
same stakeholder interviews revealed that the 
decision-making processes within KfW could be 
improved and democratized. If the KfW’s experi-
ence with the 2008-09 ﬁnancial crisis can be taken 
as a failure to work in the public interest, then 
perhaps deeper democratisation can counteract 
any such future problems. Just like Costa Rica’s 
BPDC, Germany’s KfW is a work in constant 
progress. Social forces must ensure these banks 
work and evolve organisationally in the public 
interest and for energy democracy.
Putting green public banks’ 
potential in context
To achieve the SDGs and the ambitions of the 
Paris Agreement, an estimated US$90 trillion 
worth of infrastructure need to be ﬁnanced. To 
date, the IFIs have done relatively little. From 2012 
to 2014, IFI investments promoting energy eﬃcien-
cy equated to a mere 14 per cent of IFIs’ energy 
portfolio, which equates to only 3 per cent of IFI 
total investments (CPI 2017). Commentators also 
lament that public and private investors (read: 
private) see a lack of investment-ready, ‘bankable’ 
projects as a major constraint to future green 
investment as the culprit for such dismal results. 
This has given rise to (existential?) questions of 
whether the private sector is willing or able to 
deliver.
It remains the case that public spending by 
governments on infrastructure constitutes the 
largest proportion of investments, by far, estimat-
ed at about US$1.5 trillion annually (Levy 2017). 
Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) generated an 
additional $112 billion in 2015, with a ﬁnancing 
leverage ratio of about 1:1 (for every dollar invest-
ed publicly, another private dollar would follow). 
In 2015 the Multilateral Development Banks 
contributed about $80 billion. Given the estimated 
US$90 trillion in investments required in the near 
future, the burning questions are how to increase 
investment, and how to green it.
The fact is that public sources of funding are 
doing much, and that there is also potential for 
public banks to do more in the current context. 
This is a point of agreement by the ‘Right’ and 
advocates of market-oriented approaches and by 
the ‘Left’ and advocates of solutions driven by the 
public interest. The position taken in this issue 
brief is that there is a whole world of potential 
public bank catalyzers for a green and just energy 
transformation. That said, public banks must not 
be taken as a panacea in and of themselves, for 
the mere fact that they are public. Their potential 
depends on the actual policies and practices of 
the public banks and the extent to which these 
practices are deﬁned democratically and in the 
public interest. 
The burning issue of ﬁnancial sustainability must 
also be raised. Disagreements continue to rage 
over the ﬁnancial viability and desirability of public 
banks. Conventional economists and neoliberal 
market advocates remain ﬁrmly against public 
ownership, arguing that it leads to corruption and 
economic ineﬃciencies. Heterodox economists 
contest such claims, arguing that the economic 
evidence against public bank ownership is not as 
strong as suggested and that public banks can be 
as eﬃcient as private banks (Levy et al. 2007). 
Others, too, would argue that proﬁtability is 
secondary to the public banks’ capacity to drive 
innovation, address society’s grand challenges, 
and to their capacity to rebuilding and reclaiming 
a progressive public ethos (Marois 2015; Mazzuca-
to and Penna 2015; Povel 2015).
In the end, there is no compelling evidence that 
public banks cannot be ﬁnancially sustainable for 
the simple reason that they are publicly owned (as 
the KfW and BPDC suggest). Most studies claiming 
private banking superiority, moreover, are meth-
odologically ﬂawed. Their approach is typically to 
assess whether public banks are as eﬃcient as 
private banks at making money. One might as well 
ask if oranges are better at making apple juice 
than apples. Many public banks either do not have 
a proﬁt mandate or proﬁtability stands alongside 
other social and development goals, as with the 
BPDC and the KfW. Private corporate banks seek 
proﬁts alone, and are essentially oriented in this 
sole direction. This, in turn, is what has prevented 
more substantial private investments in a global 
green transformation. It is also why private 
investors are unlikely to support social goals like 
energy democracy.
That being said, public banks can perform their 
mandated duties in ﬁnancially sustainable ways in 
at least two diﬀerent ways:
on a not-for-proﬁt basis, which implies that 
returns are re-invested by the bank in society; 
and
via explicit loss-making operations, which 
implies that the government or another part of 
the bank subsidizes such losses to ensure the 
bank’s overall long-term sustainability.
It needs emphasizing that, as for any public or 
public-like entity, ﬁnancial sustainability needs to 
be accounted for across the full spectrum of the 
public bank’s activities and impacts. Accordingly, 
appropriate incentives and training need to be put 
in place to incentivize bank management and staﬀ 
to approve projects according to this long-term 
practice of ﬁnancial sustainability in the public 
good. In any case, the issue of ﬁnancial sustainabil-
ity needs to be democratically decided in line with 
a public bank’s mandate and mission – as 
opposed to the ideologically driven proﬁtability 
imperatives of conventional economics – and this 
should be made fully understood by the public.
Finally, ﬁnancial sustainability should be consid-
ered beyond ‘lending’ to also include forms of 
‘ownership and equity’. Public banks can fund 
public infrastructure and other venture projects, 
and in return take a stake in the new institution. 
Over time the equity stake can pay dividends back 
to the bank, which in turn beneﬁts the public 
purse (see Mazzucato 2015). This is nowhere 
without risks, but the payoﬀs can be ﬁnancially 
and developmentally astounding. Cooperative 
banks such as the BPDC can also consider taking a 
stake in new coop investments as a way of promot-
ing cooperativism in society. Building strong 
coop–coop collaborations helps to solidify a future 
of social solidarity development, which in turn 
helps to provide for the political and economic will 
required to maintain truly cooperative and public 
operations working in the public interest.
Conclusion: What can public 
banks do for a just energy 
transformation?
There are real concrete beneﬁts in having public 
banks involved in the green transformation of 
society. A look at Germany’s development bank 
KfW and Costa Rica’s universal BPDC helps to 
illustrate their potential, but also shortcomings. 
Banks can be public and serve the public good, 
and do so democratically. Public banks can raise 
the needed capital for personal and infrastructur-
al investments, and channel this towards low 
carbon and climate resilient programmes. Proﬁt-
ability need not be the primary measure of a 
bank’s success, and the bank’s stability need not 
be threatened by such an approach. As public 
banks take on greater roles in green transforma-
tion they can help build the needed public ethos 
and necessary technical expertise. These are 
important possibilities.
That said, there are a number of barriers to 
realizing the potential of public banks to ﬁnance a 
green and just energy transformation. Internally, 
public banks need to ﬁnd eﬀective ways of trans-
lating popular democratic aspirations into eﬀec-
tive and sustainable operational strategies.
Sometimes this can lead to conﬂicts between 
those who own the bank (shareholders and 
associated stakeholders) and those who control it 
(senior management and technical experts). This 
politicisation of the banks should not be shied 
away from, but embraced through open, represen-
tative and transparent democratic structures. 
Likewise, public banks need to confront possible 
abuses by either governing parties or bank func-
tionaries. No one beneﬁts from the abuse of 
public banks or the wasting of collective resources 
via ineﬀective banks. Accountability and transpar-
ency must reign supreme.
Externally, public banks face the seemingly 
insurmountable structural context of neoliberal 
ﬁnancial capitalism. For one, neoliberal ideology 
and development practices threaten the very 
legitimacy and existence of public banks. Main-
stream neoclassical economics and liberal political 
economy, by deﬁnition, see public banks as subopti-
mal market actors, which by virtue of public owner-
ship are inherently ineﬃcient and corrupt entities. 
The solution is invariably privatisation. While some 
international institutions have had to begrudgingly 
accept a role for public banks in addressing the 
global climate challenge (and recurrent global 
ﬁnancial crises), their hard-core belief in private 
sector superiority remains rock solid. 
For another, the context of global ﬁnancial 
capitalism has created an intensely competitive 
context for public banks. Gone are the days of a 
purely national developmental strategic orienta-
tion and the possibility of banks ignoring global 
ﬁnancial markets. Today’s public banks are inter-
twined globally, borrowing funds from abroad, 
dealing in global ﬁnancial markets and currencies, 
and mitigating global ﬁnancial risks and crises 
nationally. The experience of KfW in the global 
crisis is instructive. Moreover, public banks are 
under constant threat of takeover, nationally and 
from foreign banking giants. Public and coopera-
tive banks must vigilantly promote a social and 
public ethos in society through their operations. 
Private actors will manifestly oppose this as 
ineﬃcient, biased and corrupt.
Yet lamenting the inﬂuence of neoliberal agents 
and the power of global ﬁnance capital forms no 
eﬀective strategy of resistance. Progressives must 
think strategically and transformatively. Support 
for and capacity in public ﬁnance is a necessary, if 
not suﬃcient, condition for any break with neolib-
eral ﬁnancial capitalism (Marois 2015). Likewise, a 
green and just energy transformation requires, 
among other things, ﬁnancing based on solidarity 
and oriented in the public interest. 
To this end, society must hold their public banks 
to account and, in fact, demand their substantive 
democratisation and ‘greening’. The strides 
towards these positive goals in the KfW and BPDC, 
while distinct, society-speciﬁc and incomplete, are 
substantial. Such positive examples must not be 
taken for granted, but used as a basis to deepen 
and extend the political and economic democratic 
foundations of society and, in particular, to build 
progressive campaigns around democratizing 
ﬁnance for sustainable and just energy transforma-
tion.
In terms of speciﬁc strategies around defending 
and improving public banks, we have elsewhere 
considered a range of actions for progressive 
campaigns.10 These are worth revisiting, by way of 
closing, vis-à-vis public banks and energy 
democracy. These include:
1. Framing public ﬁnance as a common  
 good: The ﬁnancial sector is the nervous  
 system of society, and it needs to be   
 conceived of in the public interest.
2. Democratized banking: The struggle to  
 defend public banks must also involve  
 their democratisation as a long-term   
 strategy of social sustainability.
3. Collective ownership and control: State  
 or public ownership is only one form of  
 ownership. Many other progressive,   
 collective forms of cooperative and   
 worker-controlled banks should be   
 pursued and not be undermined by   
 neoliberal ideology.
4. Radical scholarship: Critical scholars   
 must engage more systematically in the  
 real problem of understanding and   
 advocating for eﬀective public ﬁnancial  
 alternatives.
5. Linking the green transformation to  
 public provisioning: Environmental   
 sustainability demands eﬀective,   
 long-term and accountable sources of   
 ﬁnance. Public banks are uniquely capable  
 of playing a lead, proactive role in a global  
 green and just transition.
6. Collective organisation in the banking  
 sector: Bank workers need eﬀective union  
 representation, and unions can be  
 powerful actors of resistance to   
 neoliberalism and ﬁnancialisation as well  
 as powerful advocates of progressive   
 social change.
7. Solidarity across sectors: Too often   
 dialogue and solidarity between   
 traditional trade unionists,ﬁnance workers  
 and (other) public sector workers is   
 non-existent, and this needs to change for  
 a green and just energy transformation.
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The KfW thus exempliﬁes a large, developed 
country development bank that has a long, stable 
history and signiﬁcant contemporary lending 
capacity. Its governance model is broadly demo-
cratic, drawing in representatives of German 
society. Over the last 15 years or so, moreover, 
the KfW has made impressive strides towards 
reorienting its lending towards environmental 
ends and promoting a low-carbon future. 
Yet, there is room for improvement. While 44 per 
cent of lending is deemed ‘green’, presumably 66 
per cent cannot be or is not assessed along 
environmental lines. In other words, the KfW 
engages in programme lending that does not 
appear ﬁt for ‘green’ purpose or that undermines 
its otherwise good environmental work. Further-
more, in conﬁdential interviews with German 
stakeholders, some suggested that there may 
exist forms of ‘corporate capture’ of KfW green 
resources. That is, some of Germany’s largest 
corporations may disproportionally beneﬁt from 
certain KfW green lending, such as solar panels, in 
ways that may undermine social equality. These 
same stakeholder interviews revealed that the 
decision-making processes within KfW could be 
improved and democratized. If the KfW’s experi-
ence with the 2008-09 ﬁnancial crisis can be taken 
as a failure to work in the public interest, then 
perhaps deeper democratisation can counteract 
any such future problems. Just like Costa Rica’s 
BPDC, Germany’s KfW is a work in constant 
progress. Social forces must ensure these banks 
work and evolve organisationally in the public 
interest and for energy democracy.
Putting green public banks’ 
potential in context
To achieve the SDGs and the ambitions of the 
Paris Agreement, an estimated US$90 trillion 
worth of infrastructure need to be ﬁnanced. To 
date, the IFIs have done relatively little. From 2012 
to 2014, IFI investments promoting energy eﬃcien-
cy equated to a mere 14 per cent of IFIs’ energy 
portfolio, which equates to only 3 per cent of IFI 
total investments (CPI 2017). Commentators also 
lament that public and private investors (read: 
private) see a lack of investment-ready, ‘bankable’ 
projects as a major constraint to future green 
investment as the culprit for such dismal results. 
This has given rise to (existential?) questions of 
whether the private sector is willing or able to 
deliver.
It remains the case that public spending by 
governments on infrastructure constitutes the 
largest proportion of investments, by far, estimat-
ed at about US$1.5 trillion annually (Levy 2017). 
Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) generated an 
additional $112 billion in 2015, with a ﬁnancing 
leverage ratio of about 1:1 (for every dollar invest-
ed publicly, another private dollar would follow). 
In 2015 the Multilateral Development Banks 
contributed about $80 billion. Given the estimated 
US$90 trillion in investments required in the near 
future, the burning questions are how to increase 
investment, and how to green it.
The fact is that public sources of funding are 
doing much, and that there is also potential for 
public banks to do more in the current context. 
This is a point of agreement by the ‘Right’ and 
advocates of market-oriented approaches and by 
the ‘Left’ and advocates of solutions driven by the 
public interest. The position taken in this issue 
brief is that there is a whole world of potential 
public bank catalyzers for a green and just energy 
transformation. That said, public banks must not 
be taken as a panacea in and of themselves, for 
the mere fact that they are public. Their potential 
depends on the actual policies and practices of 
the public banks and the extent to which these 
practices are deﬁned democratically and in the 
public interest. 
The burning issue of ﬁnancial sustainability must 
also be raised. Disagreements continue to rage 
over the ﬁnancial viability and desirability of public 
banks. Conventional economists and neoliberal 
market advocates remain ﬁrmly against public 
ownership, arguing that it leads to corruption and 
economic ineﬃciencies. Heterodox economists 
contest such claims, arguing that the economic 
evidence against public bank ownership is not as 
strong as suggested and that public banks can be 
as eﬃcient as private banks (Levy et al. 2007). 
Others, too, would argue that proﬁtability is 
secondary to the public banks’ capacity to drive 
innovation, address society’s grand challenges, 
and to their capacity to rebuilding and reclaiming 
a progressive public ethos (Marois 2015; Mazzuca-
to and Penna 2015; Povel 2015).
In the end, there is no compelling evidence that 
public banks cannot be ﬁnancially sustainable for 
the simple reason that they are publicly owned (as 
the KfW and BPDC suggest). Most studies claiming 
private banking superiority, moreover, are meth-
odologically ﬂawed. Their approach is typically to 
assess whether public banks are as eﬃcient as 
private banks at making money. One might as well 
ask if oranges are better at making apple juice 
than apples. Many public banks either do not have 
a proﬁt mandate or proﬁtability stands alongside 
other social and development goals, as with the 
BPDC and the KfW. Private corporate banks seek 
proﬁts alone, and are essentially oriented in this 
sole direction. This, in turn, is what has prevented 
more substantial private investments in a global 
green transformation. It is also why private 
investors are unlikely to support social goals like 
energy democracy.
That being said, public banks can perform their 
mandated duties in ﬁnancially sustainable ways in 
at least two diﬀerent ways:
on a not-for-proﬁt basis, which implies that 
returns are re-invested by the bank in society; 
and
via explicit loss-making operations, which 
implies that the government or another part of 
the bank subsidizes such losses to ensure the 
bank’s overall long-term sustainability.
It needs emphasizing that, as for any public or 
public-like entity, ﬁnancial sustainability needs to 
be accounted for across the full spectrum of the 
public bank’s activities and impacts. Accordingly, 
appropriate incentives and training need to be put 
in place to incentivize bank management and staﬀ 
to approve projects according to this long-term 
practice of ﬁnancial sustainability in the public 
good. In any case, the issue of ﬁnancial sustainabil-
ity needs to be democratically decided in line with 
a public bank’s mandate and mission – as 
opposed to the ideologically driven proﬁtability 
imperatives of conventional economics – and this 
should be made fully understood by the public.
Finally, ﬁnancial sustainability should be consid-
ered beyond ‘lending’ to also include forms of 
‘ownership and equity’. Public banks can fund 
public infrastructure and other venture projects, 
and in return take a stake in the new institution. 
Over time the equity stake can pay dividends back 
to the bank, which in turn beneﬁts the public 
purse (see Mazzucato 2015). This is nowhere 
without risks, but the payoﬀs can be ﬁnancially 
and developmentally astounding. Cooperative 
banks such as the BPDC can also consider taking a 
stake in new coop investments as a way of promot-
ing cooperativism in society. Building strong 
coop–coop collaborations helps to solidify a future 
of social solidarity development, which in turn 
helps to provide for the political and economic will 
required to maintain truly cooperative and public 
operations working in the public interest.
Conclusion: What can public 
banks do for a just energy 
transformation?
There are real concrete beneﬁts in having public 
banks involved in the green transformation of 
society. A look at Germany’s development bank 
KfW and Costa Rica’s universal BPDC helps to 
illustrate their potential, but also shortcomings. 
Banks can be public and serve the public good, 
and do so democratically. Public banks can raise 
the needed capital for personal and infrastructur-
al investments, and channel this towards low 
carbon and climate resilient programmes. Proﬁt-
ability need not be the primary measure of a 
bank’s success, and the bank’s stability need not 
be threatened by such an approach. As public 
banks take on greater roles in green transforma-
tion they can help build the needed public ethos 
and necessary technical expertise. These are 
important possibilities.
That said, there are a number of barriers to 
realizing the potential of public banks to ﬁnance a 
green and just energy transformation. Internally, 
public banks need to ﬁnd eﬀective ways of trans-
lating popular democratic aspirations into eﬀec-
tive and sustainable operational strategies.
Sometimes this can lead to conﬂicts between 
those who own the bank (shareholders and 
associated stakeholders) and those who control it 
(senior management and technical experts). This 
politicisation of the banks should not be shied 
away from, but embraced through open, represen-
tative and transparent democratic structures. 
Likewise, public banks need to confront possible 
abuses by either governing parties or bank func-
tionaries. No one beneﬁts from the abuse of 
public banks or the wasting of collective resources 
via ineﬀective banks. Accountability and transpar-
ency must reign supreme.
Externally, public banks face the seemingly 
insurmountable structural context of neoliberal 
ﬁnancial capitalism. For one, neoliberal ideology 
and development practices threaten the very 
legitimacy and existence of public banks. Main-
stream neoclassical economics and liberal political 
economy, by deﬁnition, see public banks as subopti-
mal market actors, which by virtue of public owner-
ship are inherently ineﬃcient and corrupt entities. 
The solution is invariably privatisation. While some 
international institutions have had to begrudgingly 
accept a role for public banks in addressing the 
global climate challenge (and recurrent global 
ﬁnancial crises), their hard-core belief in private 
sector superiority remains rock solid. 
For another, the context of global ﬁnancial 
capitalism has created an intensely competitive 
context for public banks. Gone are the days of a 
purely national developmental strategic orienta-
tion and the possibility of banks ignoring global 
ﬁnancial markets. Today’s public banks are inter-
twined globally, borrowing funds from abroad, 
dealing in global ﬁnancial markets and currencies, 
and mitigating global ﬁnancial risks and crises 
nationally. The experience of KfW in the global 
crisis is instructive. Moreover, public banks are 
under constant threat of takeover, nationally and 
from foreign banking giants. Public and coopera-
tive banks must vigilantly promote a social and 
public ethos in society through their operations. 
Private actors will manifestly oppose this as 
ineﬃcient, biased and corrupt.
Yet lamenting the inﬂuence of neoliberal agents 
and the power of global ﬁnance capital forms no 
eﬀective strategy of resistance. Progressives must 
think strategically and transformatively. Support 
for and capacity in public ﬁnance is a necessary, if 
not suﬃcient, condition for any break with neolib-
eral ﬁnancial capitalism (Marois 2015). Likewise, a 
green and just energy transformation requires, 
among other things, ﬁnancing based on solidarity 
and oriented in the public interest. 
To this end, society must hold their public banks 
to account and, in fact, demand their substantive 
democratisation and ‘greening’. The strides 
towards these positive goals in the KfW and BPDC, 
while distinct, society-speciﬁc and incomplete, are 
substantial. Such positive examples must not be 
taken for granted, but used as a basis to deepen 
and extend the political and economic democratic 
foundations of society and, in particular, to build 
progressive campaigns around democratizing 
ﬁnance for sustainable and just energy transforma-
tion.
In terms of speciﬁc strategies around defending 
and improving public banks, we have elsewhere 
considered a range of actions for progressive 
campaigns.10 These are worth revisiting, by way of 
closing, vis-à-vis public banks and energy 
democracy. These include:
1. Framing public ﬁnance as a common  
 good: The ﬁnancial sector is the nervous  
 system of society, and it needs to be   
 conceived of in the public interest.
2. Democratized banking: The struggle to  
 defend public banks must also involve  
 their democratisation as a long-term   
 strategy of social sustainability.
3. Collective ownership and control: State  
 or public ownership is only one form of  
 ownership. Many other progressive,   
 collective forms of cooperative and   
 worker-controlled banks should be   
 pursued and not be undermined by   
 neoliberal ideology.
4. Radical scholarship: Critical scholars   
 must engage more systematically in the  
 real problem of understanding and   
 advocating for eﬀective public ﬁnancial  
 alternatives.
5. Linking the green transformation to  
 public provisioning: Environmental   
 sustainability demands eﬀective,   
 long-term and accountable sources of   
 ﬁnance. Public banks are uniquely capable  
 of playing a lead, proactive role in a global  
 green and just transition.
6. Collective organisation in the banking  
 sector: Bank workers need eﬀective union  
 representation, and unions can be  
 powerful actors of resistance to   
 neoliberalism and ﬁnancialisation as well  
 as powerful advocates of progressive   
 social change.
7. Solidarity across sectors: Too often   
 dialogue and solidarity between   
 traditional trade unionists,ﬁnance workers  
 and (other) public sector workers is   
 non-existent, and this needs to change for  
 a green and just energy transformation.
Bach, D. (2017) ‘The ﬁnancing of energy eﬃcient 
refurbishment: KfW‘s oﬀer for municipalities’, 
presentation at the Forum Annuel du CFDD: Accélérer la 
rénovation énergétique des bâtiments, Brussels, 16 March. 
Available at: 
http://www.frdo-cfdd.be/sites/default/ﬁles/content/downl
oad/ﬁles/dominik_bach_kfw.pdf 
Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal (BPDC) (2017) 
Reporte de Sostenibilidad Conglomerado Financiero Banco 
Popular. San Jose, Costa Rica: BPDC.
Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal (BPDC) (2015) 
Reporte de Sostenibilidad Conglomerado Financiero Banco 
Popular. San Jose, Costa Rica: BPDC.
Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal (BPDC) (2012) 
Reporte de Sostenibilidad Conglomerado Financiero Banco 
Popular. San Jose, Costa Rica: BPDC.
Barone, B. and Spratt, S. (2015) ‘Development Banks from 
the BRICS’, Institute of Development Studies Evidence 
Report No. 111.
Brei, M. and Schclarek, A. (2013) ‘Public bank lending in 
times of crisis’, Journal of Financial Stability 9: 820–30.
Butzbach, O. and von Mettenheim, K. (eds.) (2014) (eds). 
Alternative Banking and Financial Crisis. London: Pickering 
& Chatto.
Culpeper, R. (2012). ‘Financial sector policy and 
development in the wake of the global crisis: The role of 
national development banks’, Third World Quarterly 33(3): 
383-403.
de Luna-Martínez, J. and Vicente, C. L. (2012) Global Survey 
of Development Banks. Washington, DC: World Bank.
EPSC (2017) ‘Financing Sustainability: Triggering 
Investments for the Clean Economy’, EPSC Strategic Notes, 
Issue 25, 8 June, European Political Strategy Centre, 
European Commission, Brussels.
Financial Times (2016) ‘Modern Energy’, Special Report, 26 
July.
Gerschenkron, A. (1962) Economic backwardness in 
historical perspective. Boston: Harvard University Press.
Griﬃth-Jones, S. (2016) ‘National Development Banks and 
Sustainable Infrastructure: The case of KfW’, Global 
Economic Governance Initiative, Working Paper 006, July. 
Available at: 
http://www.stephanygj.net/papers/National_Developmen
t_Banks_and_Sustainable%20Infrastructure_the_case_of_
KfW_2016.pdf
Hubert, R. and Cochran, I. (2013) ‘Public Finance 
Institutions & the Low-Carbon Transition Case Study: KfW 
Bankengruppe’, CDC Climat Research (now I4CE). 
Available at: 
https://www.i4ce.org/wp-core/wp-content/uploads/2015/
10/14-09_kfw_case_study.pdf 
IDB (2013) Public Development Banks: Towards a New 
Paradigm?, F. de Olloqui (ed.). Washington, D.C.: 
Inter-American Development Bank.
Kalmi, P. (2012) ‘Cooperative banking’, in J. Toporowski 
and J. Michell (eds.) Handbook of Critical Issues in Finance 
(pp. 56-65). Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing.
Kodrzycki, Y. K. and Elmatad, T. (2011) ‘The Bank of North 
Dakota: A model for Massachusetts and other states?’ 
New England Public Policy Center Research Report, 11-2. 
Boston: Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
Lapavitsas, C. (2010) ‘Systemic Failure of Private Banking: 
A Case for Public Banks’, in P. Arestis and M. Sawyer (eds.) 
21st Century Keynesian Economics. Houndsmills, 
Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F. and Shleifer, A. (2002) 
‘Government Ownership of Banks’, The Journal of Finance 
57(1): 265-301.
Levy, J. (2017) Building Climate Smart Infrastructure 
Systems in Emerging Markets, Managing Director and 
Chief Financial Oﬃcer of the World Bank Group, and 
former ﬁnance minister of Brazil, presentation to OMFIF, 
24 February, London, UK.
Levy Yeyati, E., Micco, A. and Panizza, U. (2007) ‘A 
reappraisal of state-owned banks’, Economia 7(2): 209-247.
Marois, T. (2013) State-owned banks and development: 
Dispelling mainstream myths. Occasional Paper 21. Cape 
Town: Municipal Services Project. Available at: 
http://www.municipalservicesproject.org/sites/municipalse
rvicesproject.org/ﬁles/publications/OccasionalPaper21_Mar
ois_State-owned_Banks_and_Development_Dec2013_0.pdf 
Marois, T. (2015) 'Banking on Alternatives to Neoliberal 
Development', in L. Pradellaand and T. Marois (eds.), 
Polarizing Development: Alternatives to Neoliberalism and 
the Crisis. Pluto Press.
Marois, T. and Güngen, A. R. (2016) 'Credibility and Class 
in the Evolution of Public Banks: The Case of Turkey', 
Journal of Peasant Studies 43 (6): 1285-1309.
Mazzucato, M. (2015) The Entrepreneurial State: Debunking 
Public vs. Private Sector Myths, 2nd ed. London: Anthem 
Press.
Mazzucato, M. and Penna, C.C.R. (2015) ‘The Rise of 
Mission-Oriented State Investment Banks: The Cases of 
Germany’s KfW and Brazil’s BNDES’, SPRU Working Paper 
Series (ISSN 2057-6668), University of Sussex.
OECD (2016) Green Investment Banks: Scaling Up Private 
Investment in Low-Carbon, Climate-Resilient 
Infrastructure. Paris: OECD.
Orbis (2017) Orbis. Bureau van Dijk.
United Nations (2015) ‘The Raison d’Être of Public 
Development Banks and Recommendations for 
Successful Development Banking’, paper presented at 
KfW FfD panel on Development Banks, Addis Ababa, July. 
Available at: 
http://www.un.org/esa/ﬀd/ﬀd3/wp-content/uploads/sites/
2/2015/07/Raison-detre-of-DBs-nonpaper-Addis.pdf 
Schmit, M., L. Gheeraert, Denuit, T. and Warny, C. (2011) 
Public Financial Institutions in Europe. Brussels: European 
Association of Public Banks.
von Mettenheim, K. (2012) ‘Public banks: Competitive 
advantages and policy alternatives’, Public Banking 
Institute Journal 1(1): 2-34.
World Bank (2001) Finance for growth: Policy choices in a 
volatile world. Washington, DC: World Bank.
World Bank. 2012. Global ﬁnancial development report 
2013: Rethinking the role of state in ﬁnance. Washington, 
DC: World Bank.
The KfW thus exempliﬁes a large, developed 
country development bank that has a long, stable 
history and signiﬁcant contemporary lending 
capacity. Its governance model is broadly demo-
cratic, drawing in representatives of German 
society. Over the last 15 years or so, moreover, 
the KfW has made impressive strides towards 
reorienting its lending towards environmental 
ends and promoting a low-carbon future. 
Yet, there is room for improvement. While 44 per 
cent of lending is deemed ‘green’, presumably 66 
per cent cannot be or is not assessed along 
environmental lines. In other words, the KfW 
engages in programme lending that does not 
appear ﬁt for ‘green’ purpose or that undermines 
its otherwise good environmental work. Further-
more, in conﬁdential interviews with German 
stakeholders, some suggested that there may 
exist forms of ‘corporate capture’ of KfW green 
resources. That is, some of Germany’s largest 
corporations may disproportionally beneﬁt from 
certain KfW green lending, such as solar panels, in 
ways that may undermine social equality. These 
same stakeholder interviews revealed that the 
decision-making processes within KfW could be 
improved and democratized. If the KfW’s experi-
ence with the 2008-09 ﬁnancial crisis can be taken 
as a failure to work in the public interest, then 
perhaps deeper democratisation can counteract 
any such future problems. Just like Costa Rica’s 
BPDC, Germany’s KfW is a work in constant 
progress. Social forces must ensure these banks 
work and evolve organisationally in the public 
interest and for energy democracy.
Putting green public banks’ 
potential in context
To achieve the SDGs and the ambitions of the 
Paris Agreement, an estimated US$90 trillion 
worth of infrastructure need to be ﬁnanced. To 
date, the IFIs have done relatively little. From 2012 
to 2014, IFI investments promoting energy eﬃcien-
cy equated to a mere 14 per cent of IFIs’ energy 
portfolio, which equates to only 3 per cent of IFI 
total investments (CPI 2017). Commentators also 
lament that public and private investors (read: 
private) see a lack of investment-ready, ‘bankable’ 
projects as a major constraint to future green 
investment as the culprit for such dismal results. 
This has given rise to (existential?) questions of 
whether the private sector is willing or able to 
deliver.
It remains the case that public spending by 
governments on infrastructure constitutes the 
largest proportion of investments, by far, estimat-
ed at about US$1.5 trillion annually (Levy 2017). 
Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) generated an 
additional $112 billion in 2015, with a ﬁnancing 
leverage ratio of about 1:1 (for every dollar invest-
ed publicly, another private dollar would follow). 
In 2015 the Multilateral Development Banks 
contributed about $80 billion. Given the estimated 
US$90 trillion in investments required in the near 
future, the burning questions are how to increase 
investment, and how to green it.
The fact is that public sources of funding are 
doing much, and that there is also potential for 
public banks to do more in the current context. 
This is a point of agreement by the ‘Right’ and 
advocates of market-oriented approaches and by 
the ‘Left’ and advocates of solutions driven by the 
public interest. The position taken in this issue 
brief is that there is a whole world of potential 
public bank catalyzers for a green and just energy 
transformation. That said, public banks must not 
be taken as a panacea in and of themselves, for 
the mere fact that they are public. Their potential 
depends on the actual policies and practices of 
the public banks and the extent to which these 
practices are deﬁned democratically and in the 
public interest. 
The burning issue of ﬁnancial sustainability must 
also be raised. Disagreements continue to rage 
over the ﬁnancial viability and desirability of public 
banks. Conventional economists and neoliberal 
market advocates remain ﬁrmly against public 
ownership, arguing that it leads to corruption and 
economic ineﬃciencies. Heterodox economists 
contest such claims, arguing that the economic 
evidence against public bank ownership is not as 
strong as suggested and that public banks can be 
as eﬃcient as private banks (Levy et al. 2007). 
Others, too, would argue that proﬁtability is 
secondary to the public banks’ capacity to drive 
innovation, address society’s grand challenges, 
and to their capacity to rebuilding and reclaiming 
a progressive public ethos (Marois 2015; Mazzuca-
to and Penna 2015; Povel 2015).
In the end, there is no compelling evidence that 
public banks cannot be ﬁnancially sustainable for 
the simple reason that they are publicly owned (as 
the KfW and BPDC suggest). Most studies claiming 
private banking superiority, moreover, are meth-
odologically ﬂawed. Their approach is typically to 
assess whether public banks are as eﬃcient as 
private banks at making money. One might as well 
ask if oranges are better at making apple juice 
than apples. Many public banks either do not have 
a proﬁt mandate or proﬁtability stands alongside 
other social and development goals, as with the 
BPDC and the KfW. Private corporate banks seek 
proﬁts alone, and are essentially oriented in this 
sole direction. This, in turn, is what has prevented 
more substantial private investments in a global 
green transformation. It is also why private 
investors are unlikely to support social goals like 
energy democracy.
That being said, public banks can perform their 
mandated duties in ﬁnancially sustainable ways in 
at least two diﬀerent ways:
on a not-for-proﬁt basis, which implies that 
returns are re-invested by the bank in society; 
and
via explicit loss-making operations, which 
implies that the government or another part of 
the bank subsidizes such losses to ensure the 
bank’s overall long-term sustainability.
It needs emphasizing that, as for any public or 
public-like entity, ﬁnancial sustainability needs to 
be accounted for across the full spectrum of the 
public bank’s activities and impacts. Accordingly, 
appropriate incentives and training need to be put 
in place to incentivize bank management and staﬀ 
to approve projects according to this long-term 
practice of ﬁnancial sustainability in the public 
good. In any case, the issue of ﬁnancial sustainabil-
ity needs to be democratically decided in line with 
a public bank’s mandate and mission – as 
opposed to the ideologically driven proﬁtability 
imperatives of conventional economics – and this 
should be made fully understood by the public.
Finally, ﬁnancial sustainability should be consid-
ered beyond ‘lending’ to also include forms of 
‘ownership and equity’. Public banks can fund 
public infrastructure and other venture projects, 
and in return take a stake in the new institution. 
Over time the equity stake can pay dividends back 
to the bank, which in turn beneﬁts the public 
purse (see Mazzucato 2015). This is nowhere 
without risks, but the payoﬀs can be ﬁnancially 
and developmentally astounding. Cooperative 
banks such as the BPDC can also consider taking a 
stake in new coop investments as a way of promot-
ing cooperativism in society. Building strong 
coop–coop collaborations helps to solidify a future 
of social solidarity development, which in turn 
helps to provide for the political and economic will 
required to maintain truly cooperative and public 
operations working in the public interest.
Conclusion: What can public 
banks do for a just energy 
transformation?
There are real concrete beneﬁts in having public 
banks involved in the green transformation of 
society. A look at Germany’s development bank 
KfW and Costa Rica’s universal BPDC helps to 
illustrate their potential, but also shortcomings. 
Banks can be public and serve the public good, 
and do so democratically. Public banks can raise 
the needed capital for personal and infrastructur-
al investments, and channel this towards low 
carbon and climate resilient programmes. Proﬁt-
ability need not be the primary measure of a 
bank’s success, and the bank’s stability need not 
be threatened by such an approach. As public 
banks take on greater roles in green transforma-
tion they can help build the needed public ethos 
and necessary technical expertise. These are 
important possibilities.
That said, there are a number of barriers to 
realizing the potential of public banks to ﬁnance a 
green and just energy transformation. Internally, 
public banks need to ﬁnd eﬀective ways of trans-
lating popular democratic aspirations into eﬀec-
tive and sustainable operational strategies.
Sometimes this can lead to conﬂicts between 
those who own the bank (shareholders and 
associated stakeholders) and those who control it 
(senior management and technical experts). This 
politicisation of the banks should not be shied 
away from, but embraced through open, represen-
tative and transparent democratic structures. 
Likewise, public banks need to confront possible 
abuses by either governing parties or bank func-
tionaries. No one beneﬁts from the abuse of 
public banks or the wasting of collective resources 
via ineﬀective banks. Accountability and transpar-
ency must reign supreme.
Externally, public banks face the seemingly 
insurmountable structural context of neoliberal 
ﬁnancial capitalism. For one, neoliberal ideology 
and development practices threaten the very 
legitimacy and existence of public banks. Main-
stream neoclassical economics and liberal political 
economy, by deﬁnition, see public banks as subopti-
mal market actors, which by virtue of public owner-
ship are inherently ineﬃcient and corrupt entities. 
The solution is invariably privatisation. While some 
international institutions have had to begrudgingly 
accept a role for public banks in addressing the 
global climate challenge (and recurrent global 
ﬁnancial crises), their hard-core belief in private 
sector superiority remains rock solid. 
For another, the context of global ﬁnancial 
capitalism has created an intensely competitive 
context for public banks. Gone are the days of a 
purely national developmental strategic orienta-
tion and the possibility of banks ignoring global 
ﬁnancial markets. Today’s public banks are inter-
twined globally, borrowing funds from abroad, 
dealing in global ﬁnancial markets and currencies, 
and mitigating global ﬁnancial risks and crises 
nationally. The experience of KfW in the global 
crisis is instructive. Moreover, public banks are 
under constant threat of takeover, nationally and 
from foreign banking giants. Public and coopera-
tive banks must vigilantly promote a social and 
public ethos in society through their operations. 
Private actors will manifestly oppose this as 
ineﬃcient, biased and corrupt.
Yet lamenting the inﬂuence of neoliberal agents 
and the power of global ﬁnance capital forms no 
eﬀective strategy of resistance. Progressives must 
think strategically and transformatively. Support 
for and capacity in public ﬁnance is a necessary, if 
not suﬃcient, condition for any break with neolib-
eral ﬁnancial capitalism (Marois 2015). Likewise, a 
green and just energy transformation requires, 
among other things, ﬁnancing based on solidarity 
and oriented in the public interest. 
To this end, society must hold their public banks 
to account and, in fact, demand their substantive 
democratisation and ‘greening’. The strides 
towards these positive goals in the KfW and BPDC, 
while distinct, society-speciﬁc and incomplete, are 
substantial. Such positive examples must not be 
taken for granted, but used as a basis to deepen 
and extend the political and economic democratic 
foundations of society and, in particular, to build 
progressive campaigns around democratizing 
ﬁnance for sustainable and just energy transforma-
tion.
In terms of speciﬁc strategies around defending 
and improving public banks, we have elsewhere 
considered a range of actions for progressive 
campaigns.10 These are worth revisiting, by way of 
closing, vis-à-vis public banks and energy 
democracy. These include:
1. Framing public ﬁnance as a common  
 good: The ﬁnancial sector is the nervous  
 system of society, and it needs to be   
 conceived of in the public interest.
2. Democratized banking: The struggle to  
 defend public banks must also involve  
 their democratisation as a long-term   
 strategy of social sustainability.
3. Collective ownership and control: State  
 or public ownership is only one form of  
 ownership. Many other progressive,   
 collective forms of cooperative and   
 worker-controlled banks should be   
 pursued and not be undermined by   
 neoliberal ideology.
4. Radical scholarship: Critical scholars   
 must engage more systematically in the  
 real problem of understanding and   
 advocating for eﬀective public ﬁnancial  
 alternatives.
5. Linking the green transformation to  
 public provisioning: Environmental   
 sustainability demands eﬀective,   
 long-term and accountable sources of   
 ﬁnance. Public banks are uniquely capable  
 of playing a lead, proactive role in a global  
 green and just transition.
6. Collective organisation in the banking  
 sector: Bank workers need eﬀective union  
 representation, and unions can be  
 powerful actors of resistance to   
 neoliberalism and ﬁnancialisation as well  
 as powerful advocates of progressive   
 social change.
7. Solidarity across sectors: Too often   
 dialogue and solidarity between   
 traditional trade unionists,ﬁnance workers  
 and (other) public sector workers is   
 non-existent, and this needs to change for  
 a green and just energy transformation.
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